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A TRANSACTIONAL GENEALOGY OF 
SCANDAL: FROM MICHAEL MILKEN 
TO ENRON TO GOLDMAN SACHS 
WILLIAM W. BRATTON* 
ADAM J. LEVITIN† 
ABSTRACT 
Three scandals have reshaped business regulation over the past thirty 
years: the securities fraud prosecution of Michael Milken in 1988, the 
Enron implosion of 2001, and the Goldman Sachs “ABACUS” enforcement 
action of 2010. The scandals have always been seen as unrelated. This 
Article highlights a previously unnoticed transactional affinity tying these 
scandals together—a deal structure known as the synthetic collateralized 
debt obligation involving the use of a special purpose entity (“SPE”). The 
SPE is a new and widely used form of corporate alter ego designed to 
undertake transactions for its creator’s accounting and regulatory benefit. 
The SPE remains mysterious and poorly understood despite its use in 
framing transactions involving trillions of dollars and its prominence in 
foundational scandals. The traditional corporate alter ego was a 
subsidiary or affiliate with equity control. The SPE eschews equity control 
in favor of control through preset instructions emanating from 
transactional documents. In theory, these instructions are complete or very 
close thereto, making SPEs a real-world manifestation of the “nexus of 
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contracts” firm of economic and legal theory. In practice, however, formal 
designations of separateness do not always stand up under the strain of 
economic reality. 
When coupled with financial disaster, the use of an SPE alter ego can 
turn even a minor compliance problem into a scandal because of the 
mismatch between the traditional legal model of the firm and the SPE’s 
economic reality. The standard legal model looks to equity ownership to 
determine the boundaries of the firm: equity is inside the firm, while 
contract is outside. Regulatory regimes make inter-firm connections by 
tracking equity ownership. SPEs escape regulation by funneling inter-firm 
connections through contracts, rather than equity ownership. 
The integration of SPEs into regulatory systems requires a ground-up 
rethinking of traditional legal models of the firm. A theory is emerging, not 
from corporate law or financial economics, but from accounting principles. 
Accounting has responded to these scandals by abandoning the equity 
touchstone in favor of an analysis in which contractual allocations of risk, 
reward, and control operate as functional equivalents of equity 
ownership—an approach that redraws the boundaries of the firm. 
Unfortunately, corporate and securities law hold out no prospects for 
similar responsiveness. Accordingly, we await the next alter-ego-based 
innovation from Wall Street’s transaction engineers with an incomplete 
menu of defensive responses. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Three scandals fundamentally reshaped the structure of business 
regulation over the past thirty years. First came the 1988 securities fraud 
prosecution of Michael Milken and his firm, Drexel Burnham Lambert,1 
which generated the junk bonds that financed the takeover wars of the 
1980s.2 The prosecution marked the end of the takeover wars,3 but not 
before Milken’s junk bonds had poisoned the balance sheets of many 
savings and loans, leading to their failures.4 The takeover wars reshaped 
Delaware corporate law,5 while the savings and loan debacle resulted in 
 
 1. JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES 461, 478–510 (1992) (providing the details of the 
prosecutions of Drexel, Milken, and others). 
 2. See infra Part II.A. 
 3. ROBERT B. THOMPSON, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: LAW AND FINANCE 235 (2010) 
(detailing how the prosecution of Milken may have prevented the appeal to the Delaware Supreme 
Court of City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988), in which the 
Delaware Chancery Court had ordered a poison pill withdrawn). 
 4. BENJAMIN J. STEIN, A LICENSE TO STEAL: THE UNTOLD STORY OF MICHAEL MILKEN AND 
THE CONSPIRACY TO BILK THE NATION 1–2 (1992). 
 5. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) 
(requiring directors to maximize short-term value once they have decided to dismantle a company); 
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major banking law reforms, culminating in the Financial Institutions 
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 19896 and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991.7 
The second scandal was Enron’s accounting and securities fraud in 
2001, which quickly led to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(“SOX”).8 More recently, the securities fraud scandal surrounding 
Goldman Sachs (“Goldman”) and its ABACUS 2007-AC1 transaction 
provided needed momentum to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act.9 
Each of these scandals provided an impetus for major changes in 
business regulation, but the scandals have always been seen as unrelated. 
This Article highlights a previously unnoticed transactional tie that binds 
the Milken, Enron, and Goldman affairs—a transaction structure known as 
the synthetic collateralized debt obligation developed at J.P. Morgan & 
Co., Inc., (“Morgan”) in 1997 under the name “Broad Index Secured Trust 
Offering” or “Bistro.”10 
Bistro built on the regular or cash collateralized debt obligation 
(“CDO”), a security produced through a transaction structure invented by 
Milken in 1987.11 The CDO applied the techniques of private-label 
mortgage securitization, in its infancy during the 1980s, to corporate bonds 
and loans. Bistro combined the CDO with a second financial invention, the 
credit default swap (“CDS”), a derivative that Morgan had pioneered 
 
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 448 A.2d 858, 881 (Del. 1985) (requiring directors to make decisions related to 
takeovers based on an informed understanding of the “intrinsic” value of the corporation, rather than the 
market value); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955–56 (Del. 1985) (accepting the 
appropriateness of takeover defenses and changing the standard for evaluating directors’ response to 
unsolicited takeover bids from a business judgment rule to a more demanding, objective “reasonable in 
relation to the threat posed” test); Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985) 
(permitting Delaware boards to adopt a poison pill, which would be evaluated under the Unocal 
standard rather than the business judgment rule). Although the takeover era ended badly, it is credited 
for the emergence of corporate governance as we now know it. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. 
Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 677–81 (2010) 
(describing the prevalence of shareholder-oriented economic assumptions after the takeover era). 
 6. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 
103 Stat. 183. 
 7. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 
Stat. 2236. 
 8. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
 9. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 10. See infra Part III.B. 
 11. The term CDO refers both to securities and to the entity that issues the securities. 
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during the early 1990s.12 The result was a “synthetic” CDO, which 
amounted to a securitization of a CDS. Goldman’s ABACUS deal was also 
a synthetic CDO, a direct descendant of Bistro. The transactions that lay at 
the core of the Enron scandal also descended from Bistro, albeit along a 
crooked, collateral line with transactional affinities to Milken-era 
machinations. 
Our transactional lens highlights commonalities between the scandals 
that have significant implications for understanding firms, markets, and risk 
taking. All three cases involved compliance problems, bad bets, and 
copious red ink. All three scandals involved companies in the vanguard of 
financial innovation, populated with swaggering, sharp-elbowed traders. 
All three involved companies that loomed large in the public eye as 
exemplars of free market capitalism. All three involved transaction 
structures designed to facilitate risk management, but which also opened 
doors to new modes of market speculation. All three involved the creation 
of markets where none had formerly existed—markets that were supposed 
to import pricing accuracy and management discipline, but often failed to 
do so. 
All three also involved misuse of special purpose entities (“SPEs”).13 
SPEs are legally distinct entities that companies use to facilitate 
transactions that yield regulatory and accounting benefits. In particular, 
SPEs enable companies to become “asset light,” meaning that they move 
assets and liabilities off their balance sheets without necessarily making a 
concomitant sacrifice of earnings power. Becoming “asset light” enhances 
return on assets and shareholder value by arbitraging accounting rules and, 
in the case of banks and insurers, regulatory capital requirements. The 
transactions, however, can lack ancillary business motivations and fall well 
short of the arm’s-length transactional ideal. Therefore, when SPE 
structures produce red ink, scandal can quickly arise. 
The SPEs embody these scandals’ lessons for lawyers and 
regulators.14 It is often said that corporations are “artificial entities.”15 With 
 
 12. GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT J.P. MORGAN 
WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE 46–56 (2009) 
(describing the creation of Bistro and CDS and Morgan’s combined use of the two). 
 13. SPEs are also known as “special purpose vehicles” or “SPVs.” 
 14. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Teaching Enron, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1139, 1182–83, 1238–39 
(2005) (describing Enron’s relationship with outside entities including Nahanni and CHEWCO). 
 15. See, e.g., Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819) (“A corporation is 
an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.”); Samuel J. Alito, 
Jr., Documents and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 27, 30 (1986) 
(referring to “artificial entities, such as corporations”); Ralph Nader, Legislating Corporate Ethics, 30 J. 
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conventional corporations, the artifice contains assets, agents, and equity 
owners, all of which coalesce together as an interest that can negotiate an 
arm’s-length contract. Corporations are also said to be nexuses of 
contracts.16 The characterization is apt, but only with a qualification. With 
conventional operating companies, the contracts are incomplete, and the 
omitted terms are filled in over time by agents operating subject to 
governance constraints. Control is critical at this point, and the traditional 
legal model allocates it to the holders of the residual economic, or “equity,” 
interest. 
SPEs, like corporations, begin with artificial legal form. But they 
never fully coalesce as independent organizations that take actions in 
pursuit of business goals. Nor does control lie with the holder of the equity 
interest. Instead, SPEs operate pursuant to instructions emanating from 
complex transactional documents. In theory, the instructions are complete 
or very close thereto—set in advance in immutable contractual stone. The 
SPE is intended to be the firm robotic. 
In practice, however, opportunities arise for the exercise of influence 
by the transactions’ real parties in interest. When financial disaster follows 
such a moment of influence, scandal is invited. Meanwhile, a critical 
regulatory question is posed: Should the real parties in interest be treated as 
if they are traditional equity holders even though their ties to the SPE are 
entirely in contractual form? 
The transactional affinities among these scandals point to a new legal 
model of the firm, one based not on equity ownership, but on functional 
control. In traditional corporate law and financial economics models of the 
firm, everything follows from a line of separation between the equity 
interest and the interests of contract counterparties. In the traditional model, 
equity “owns” the firm, which in turn makes contracts with third parties: 
equity is inside the firm, contract is outside, and regulatory regimes make 
inter-firm connections by tracking equity ownership. 
The SPE scandals all involved the use of third-party contracts, rather 
than equity, to exercise control, thereby escaping traditional equity-based 
regulation. The SPE scandals show that control can be exercised by 
contract as well as by ownership, a transactional development that 
 
LEGIS. 193, 202 (2004) (explaining that “[corporations] are artificial entities”); John C. Coates IV, 
Note, State Takeover Statutes and Corporate Theory: The Revival of an Old Debate, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
806, 810–15 (1989) (discussing the artificial entity theory of the corporation). 
 16. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976). 
  
2013] TRANSACTIONAL GENEALOGY OF SCANDAL 789 
accounting principles have begun to recognize, but neither law nor finance. 
The new accounting approach rejects the formalism that enabled 
transactional arbitrage via SPEs, drawing the line between the firm’s 
insiders and outsiders on a case-by-case basis based on allocations of risk 
and directive power. This functional conception of the firm may also point 
to expanded liability: traditional fiduciary duties may apply to contractual 
relationships in addition to equity relations, as Goldman learned with 
ABACUS. 
This Article tells a five-part story of the development of SPEs and the 
related scandals that point to a more refined, functional model of the firm. 
Figure 1 presents the genealogy of these scandals. 
 
FIGURE 1.  The Genealogy of Scandal 
The story begins in Part II with the origins of the collateralized debt 
obligation (“CDO”), the brainchild of Michael Milken. The CDO was a 
new type of security issued by SPEs that purchased junk bonds from 
Milken clients, thereby cleaning up the clients’ balance sheets. The CDO 
never realized its potential under Milken; he was convicted of securities 
fraud before it could take off. But even from its first days, the CDO 
transaction structure was a vehicle for regulatory arbitrage, entwined in the 
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failure of one of the nation’s largest life insurers—and the world’s largest 
investor in junk bonds—First Executive Corporation. First Executive tried 
to use a CDO transaction to get regulatory capital relief for its plunging 
junk bond portfolio. It failed. 
In Part III we show how Morgan succeeded where First Executive did 
not. In a breathtaking regulatory arbitrage, Morgan combined the CDO 
with the credit default swap to bring forth Bistro. Bistro posed a question: 
Is a swap with an alter ego SPE truly a swap? That is, is there any 
economic substance to a party’s contract with itself? 
Amazingly, Morgan got a “yes” answer from the Federal Reserve 
Board—a “yes” based on the Bistro SPE’s financial contents. The 
structure, unlike the one pioneered by First Executive, involved third-party 
investors, whose capital commitment was deemed to make the SPE 
financially viable. The Bistro structure also magnified the SPE’s capital 
base, permitting Morgan to remove billions of dollars of loans from its 
regulatory balance sheet by hedging them with swaps with the SPE. These 
hedges allowed Morgan to reduce significantly the amount of regulatory 
capital it was required to hold, effecting an “asset light” increase in its 
return on invested capital. 
Bistro was a moment of genius, but there was also something 
diabolical about it. Part IV pursues the diabolical possibilities, following 
Bistro to Enron, where the Smartest Guys in the Room invented an SPE 
and swap variant that protected its earnings statement from $1 billion of 
investment portfolio losses. The Enron variation missed Bistro’s central 
point, however. Where Morgan infused its SPE with financial wherewithal 
in the form of hard money from outside investors, Enron funded its SPEs 
with its own common stock. The stock lost value, causing Enron’s self-
constructed swap counterparties to become insolvent and forcing a massive 
downward restatement of Enron’s earnings reports. Enron filed for 
bankruptcy within two months. Enron had propped up its earnings by 
booking revenue from swaps with itself, subverting capitalism’s most basic 
norm—it takes two to transact. Scandal followed. 
Part V takes a regulatory digression, following Enron rather than 
Bistro to the Structured Investment Vehicles (“SIVs”) sponsored by the big 
banks in the run up to the financial crisis of 2008. The banks used the SIVs 
to follow a different transactional trail blazed by Enron. Enron used SPEs 
not only to engage in faux swaps to bolster earnings, but also as off-balance 
sheet dumping grounds for underperforming assets and associated 
indebtedness. The arrangements were conditional—Enron was back on the 
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hook if its stock price fell below stated levels. It received its final kick into 
bankruptcy when those off-balance-sheet obligations came due. 
The Enron scandal resulted in revised accounting principles. After 
Enron, contractual ties to the sponsoring company could prevent the use of 
leveraged SPEs to move assets off of balance sheets.17 But the banks 
constructed the SIVs to fly in under the radar of the new principles and 
used the SIVs to expand their portfolios of securitized subprime mortgage 
debt, parking the assets off-balance sheet and funding them with 
borrowing. 
The off-balance-sheet treatment allowed the banks to increase return 
on equity without increasing their assets and debt and, hence, their 
regulatory capital. But, as with Enron, there turned out to be a catch. When 
the quality of the SIVs’ investments deteriorated in 2007, the banks 
honored “implicit” guaranties and brought the SIVs’ assets and debt back 
to their own balance sheets. But there was no scandal, for, unlike Enron, 
the banks internalized the losses and appeared to have followed the rules. A 
regulatory Enron repeat did occur, however. Once again, accounting 
standards were revised after the fact in 2010 to prohibit the off-balance-
sheet treatment employed. With this revision, the accountants provide us 
with the basis for a new model of the firm tailored to the SPE, an approach 
that abandons the traditional distinction between contract and equity 
participations and looks for control where the parties vest it, ignoring the 
form their arrangements take. 
The SIVs proved to be the canary in the coal mine. The banks would 
follow the SIVs into collapse in 2008, along with the rest of the economy. 
They would honor their obligations then too, but in many cases only with 
federal bailout money. In the end, the risks the banks ran as the SIVs took 
advantage of off-balance-sheet treatment were externalized on the economy 
as a whole. The fact that the SIVs collapsed without a scandal should now 
give us pause. 
In Part VI, the story returns to Bistro, the synthetic CDO, and its role 
in the Goldman affair. After 2000, Bistro became the template for a 
“naked” synthetic securitization—a securitization of a credit default swap 
that made a naked bet rather than a hedge. Such naked synthetic CDOs 
became a favorite vehicle for betting on the performance of U.S. 
mortgages, and as such, facilitated a magnification of risk taking far 
beyond direct investments in mortgages and mortgage-backed securities. 
 
 17. See infra text accompanying notes 208–14. 
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The new template changed the economic profile of the Bistro structure. 
Bistro was a transaction used to obtain regulatory capital relief from a 
portfolio of loans owned by a bank. Banks like Goldman repurposed the 
structure to enable a party (the “short”) to make a naked wager against the 
SPE (the “long”) about the performance of a portfolio of obligations in 
which neither party had any credit exposure. 
Goldman’s ABACUS 2007-AC1 SPE was one of many such synthetic 
CDOs. Like ABACUS, many of them ended up in default. ABACUS 
attracted attention because Goldman led the buyers of the CDOs' debt 
securities to believe that an actor who helped select the assets for the bet 
was also making a long bet when the actor was in fact going short. 
Goldman, in other words, marketed assets selected by a party betting that 
the assets would decline in value without disclosing the nature and extent 
of that party’s participation.18 Not that Goldman lacked a defense: the 
deal’s structure presupposed a short and a long and their mutual agreement 
on the assets for the wager.19 Even so, Goldman soon cut its losses and 
settled with the SEC for $550 million, then the largest settlement in the 
agency’s history.20 
Part of Goldman’s problem lay in the toxic characterization applied to 
bankers and bailouts after 2008. ABACUS was a small-scale compliance 
problem that underwent magnification in a particular political context.21 It 
all might have gone unnoticed at another time, but in 2010 the economy 
was still recovering from externalities inflicted by large financial 
institutions. Goldman had the least attractive public profile in the group. It 
 
 18. Consent of Defendant Goldman, Sachs & Co. ¶ 3, SEC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 790 F. 
Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 10-CV-3229(BSJ)), 2010 WL 2779309. 
 19. Goldman mooted a two-part defense: (1) any omission was immaterial, and (2) no actor at 
Goldman acted with scienter. Submission on Behalf of Goldman, Sachs & Co. at 4–6, In re ABACUS 
CDO, No. HO-10911 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2009), available at http://av.r.ftdata.co.uk/files/2010/04/ 
Goldman-defence-doc-Part-I.pdf. 
 20. Press Release, SEC, Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges 
Related to Subprime Mortgage CDO (July 15, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/ 
2010-123.htm. 
 21. As such, it bears comparison to the 1970s foreign payments scandal. The payments in 
question there were bribes made to corrupt actors abroad to facilitate the sale of big-ticket products. 
They were termed “questionable” because they were not exactly illegal and had been in pursuit of 
profits for American shareholders. But the payments were not exactly appropriate either. The 
companies covered them up only to see them uncovered in the course of the Watergate investigation. 
The public, reeling from revelations of government corruption, found corporate corruption unacceptable 
as well, even corruption abroad in pursuit of shareholder value at home. DONALD R. CRUVER, 
COMPLYING WITH THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 5 (2d ed. 1999); GEORGE C. GREANIAS & 
DUANE WINDSOR, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 59 (1982).  
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was the arrogant “Vampire Squid”22 that contributed to the financial 
meltdown by promoting risky transactions, even as its CEO proclaimed that 
Goldman was “doing God’s work.”23 It thereafter benefitted from federal 
bailouts of contract counterparties24 and promptly returned to rapacious 
profit making as if nothing had happened.25 ABACUS thus loomed large 
because it fed public demands for rectitude on the part of powerful 
corporate actors in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008.26 In such 
circumstances, even borderline fraud more than sufficed to bring the wrath 
of the enforcers, the politicians, and the press. 
We think Goldman’s problem also stemmed from the nature of the 
securities offered by the ABACUS SPE. A formal entity such as an SPE 
that lacks both assets and actors can neither make investments nor 
representations about itself, for there is “no there there.”27 It follows that 
the eyes of the world turn to the entity’s promoter when things go wrong, 
transforming the promoter into the de facto issuer of the securities as well 
as their marketer. As such, what ordinarily might be viewed as an arm’s-
length relationship takes on a fiduciary coloration and invites the 
imposition of heightened disclosure duties. Unfortunately, our 
characterization better explains the scandal than it maps onto federal 
securities law, which is increasingly respectful of formal entities. The 
Goldman scandal accordingly heralds no change on the law of SPEs. 
Part VII concludes, focusing on the SPE, the central character in each 
phase of our story, and how it presents a challenge to traditional equity-
based models of the firm. The SPE is a new form of corporate alter ego that 
breaks the historical mold by posing as a wholly separate, independent 
entity for accounting and regulatory purposes. Unsurprisingly, new 
questions follow concerning the responsibilities of those who create and 
benefit from it. The cases discussed in this Article show that formal 
 
 22. Matt Taibbi, The Great American Bubble Machine, ROLLING STONE (July 9, 2009), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-great-american-bubble-machine-20100405. 
 23. John Arlidge, I’m Doing “God’s Work.” Meet Mr. Goldman Sachs, SUNDAY TIMES (Nov. 8, 
2009), www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/world_news/article189615.ece. 
 24. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JUNE OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE AIG RESCUE, ITS IMPACT ON 
MARKETS, AND THE GOVERNMENT’S EXIT STRATEGY 3–4 (2010), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111JPRT56698/pdf/CPRT-111JPRT56698.pdf. 
 25. See id. at 85 (after the bailout, “AIG’s normal course of business, such as putting up cash 
collateral for new or existing contracts (including both CDSs that would eventually be placed into ML3 
and CDSs that AIG still covers)” continued). 
 26. TETT, supra note 12, at 243–49 (discussing the rapid shift in public sentiment toward Morgan 
and other major banking institutions). 
 27. GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY’S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 289 (1937). The use of the term “CDO” 
to refer to both an issuer and its securities is perhaps indicative of the lack of entity substance. 
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designations of separation constructed by transaction engineers—lawyers, 
accountants, and investment bankers—do not always stand up under the 
strain of economic reality. The accounting and regulatory authorities have 
responded in fits and starts. But, now, after a succession of scandals and 
financial disasters, a workable approach is emerging, not from Congress, 
corporate lawyers, or bank regulators, but from the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board, the private body that promulgates generally accepted 
accounting principles (“GAAP”). The new GAAP follows from a 
functional model that looks to actual control and economic returns, rather 
than formal indicia of ownership, to determine firm boundaries and legal 
duties. 
It is said that bad law results when lawmakers respond to scandals,28 
and there is something to the point. But we reach a contrasting conclusion. 
SPE usage in recent years vastly outstripped the ability of regulators to 
consider systemic implications. Financial institutions possess the political 
wherewithal to retard regulatory catch-up even in the wake of catastrophic 
losses. So, even when an arguable compliance problem ripens into a full-
blown scandal, it does so as a part of a wider political economic process of 
adjustment. This metastasis of peccadilloes into major scandals is a natural 
consequence of finance capitalism and its cycle of scandal, regulation, and 
transactional end-runs on regulation. Those who push the limit in 
transaction structuring have only themselves to blame when scandal 
ensues. Even so, regulatory catch up in the case of SPEs remains 
incomplete, covering appearances through new accounting standards but 
not sponsor liability under corporate and securities law. 
II.  MYTHIC ORIGINS: MICHAEL MILKEN AND JUNK BONDS 
Our story begins with Michael Milken, Drexel Burnham Lambert 
(“Drexel”), and the drama they acted out with junk bonds during the 1980s. 
Our interest lies in a particular Milken transaction structure, the 
 
 28. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS 268–69 (2012) (“[F]ederal intervention in corporate governance tends to be ill-conceived” in 
part because such laws “tend to be enacted in a climate of political pressure that does not facilitate 
careful analysis of costs and benefits.”); Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark, in REGULATORY 
BREAKDOWN: THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN U.S. REGULATION 88 (Cary Coglianese ed., 2012) 
(explaining that legislation adopted in response to financial crises is bound to be “off the mark”); Larry 
E. Ribstein, Commentary, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 77, 82 (2003) (“[L]awmakers regulating in a 
crash are likely to ignore or minimize regulatory costs.”); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1528 (2005) (“The healthy 
ventilation of issues that occurs in the usual give-and-take negotiations . . . did not occur” when 
Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted). 
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collateralized debt obligation (“CDO”), which only made its appearance in 
his drama’s last act. Even so, the CDO stood at the intersection of the era’s 
highest profile compliance scandal and the Savings and Loans debacle. 
More importantly, we here witness the genesis of central pieces of later 
scandals: the securitization of dodgy financial assets; desperate attempts to 
clean up corporate balance sheets either for market or regulatory capital 
purposes; and companies swapping with themselves. 
A.  JUNK BONDS AND S&LS 
Michael Milken’s contribution to corporate finance was the original 
issue, non-investment-grade (“junk”) bond. Before Milken, the bond 
market accepted only new issues of investment grade paper. The pre-
Milken junk bond market was comprised only of “fallen angels”—bonds 
that had been investment grade at issue but had been subsequently 
downgraded.29 Milken argued that junk bonds were irrationally stigmatized 
and therefore underpriced by the market; they represented a good value, 
particularly as the benefits of portfolio diversification nullified the risk on 
individual bonds.30 
Milken established a trading operation in junk bonds at Drexel in the 
early 1970s and succeeded in marketing new issues of junk bonds in large 
amounts by 1977.31 The new market grew rapidly in the 1980s when junk 
bonds became the preferred tool for financing (or defending against) 
corporate takeovers. Issuers found the junk bond market an attractive 
alternative to bank borrowing for mobilizing large sums of capital quickly. 
Junk bond buyers sought high yields, relying on misleading reports of low 
junk bond default rates in early academic research.32 Here at last was the 
 
 29. Robert A. Taggart, Jr., The Growth of the “Junk” Bond Market and Its Role in Financing 
Takeovers, in MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 5, 8 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988). See also George A. 
Akerlof & Paul M. Romer, Looting: The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit 45 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. R1869, 1994), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=227162 (observing that the market for sub-
investment grade bonds was “trivially small” prior to Milken). 
 30. These were notably self-serving assertions from one seeking to make a market in junk bonds. 
 31. Taggart, supra note 29, at 8. 
 32. The first published research on junk bond default rates was Edward I. Altman & Scott A. 
Nammacher, The Default Rate Experience on High-Yield Corporate Debt, 41 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 25, 27–
35 (1985). Altman and Nammacher found a very low default rate on junk bonds, but their measurement 
had several flaws. Id. at 29. First, it failed to distinguish between bonds that were junk at issuance and 
“fallen angels”—bonds that had been originally investment grade and were subsequently downgraded. 
Id. at 30–31. Instead, Altman and Nammacher looked at all high-yield debt. If the fallen angels 
performed better than the true-born junk, it would mask the real performance of the junk. Second, it 
defined default somewhat formally and narrowly, excluding restructurings where there were payments 
in kind of securities instead of cash. See id. at 26 (“The appropriate base for calculating the default rate 
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portfolio manager’s holy grail: high return for low risk. 
Milken built a network of junk bond issuers and investors, leveraging 
Drexel’s trading operation into a secondary junk bond market.33 This 
secondary market provided liquidity that added appeal to new junk bond 
issues. It was a proprietary operation: sitting at his X-shaped trading desk 
in Beverly Hills, Milken matched buyers and sellers, taking fees on every 
deal.34 He alone was the node that connected the market’s sell-side issuers, 
corporate raiders prominent among them, and buy-side institutional 
investors. 
A handful35 of high-flying, federally-insured savings and loans figured 
 
for corporate debt seems to us to be the low-rated straight debt market.”). Exchanges were not included 
in their definition of default. See Akerlof & Romer, supra note 29, at 51–52 (explaining that such 
exchanges “were not taken into account in the junk bond market’s halcyon years”). This had the effect 
of reducing the numerator in the default rate. 
  The greater flaw, however, was that Altman and Nammacher presented the default rate as a 
percentage of total debt outstanding: their 1.53 percent annual default rate from 1974–1985 was the 
quotient of high-yield debt defaulted in a year over high-yield debt outstanding in a year. EDWARD I. 
ALTMAN & SCOTT A. NAMMACHER, INVESTING IN JUNK BONDS: INSIDE THE HIGH YIELD DEBT 
MARKET 103–04 (1987). The problem with this approach was that it would necessarily understate the 
riskiness of high-yield debt if the market were expanding and conversely overstate it if the market were 
contracting. To wit, imagine that over ten years the volume of high-yield debt began at one hundred and 
doubled annually. Also assume that there is a 100 percent default rate on all high yield debt, but that the 
default does not occur until year five. Thus, in years one through four, the default rate is zero. In year 
five, by Altman and Nammacher’s calculation, the default rate is 3.2 percent 
(=100/(100+200+400+800+1600)). And by year ten, the default rate is 3.1 percent (=3200/102300). As 
it happens, the market was rapidly expanding, so Altman and Nammacher’s methodology understated 
the real risk on junk bonds. 
  Altman’s later work recognized the flaws in this approach, but this recognition came after his 
initial work was used to promote the safety of a diversified junk bond portfolio. See Edward I. Altman, 
Revisiting the High-Yield Bond Market, 21 FIN. MGMT. 78, 85 (1992) (acknowledging criticisms of the 
traditional method for calculating default rates); Edward I. Altman, Measuring Corporate Bond 
Mortality and Performance, 44 J. FIN. 909, 912 (1989) (adopting human mortality calculation methods 
for calculating investment risks); Paul Asquith, David W. Mullins, Jr. & Eric D. Wolff, Original Issue 
High Yield Bonds: Aging Analysis of Defaults, Exchanges and Calls, 44 J. FIN. 923, 924–25 (1989) 
(arguing that prior default calculations underestimated actual high-yield bond default rates). 
 33. Akerlof & Romer, supra note 29, at 46. 
 34. X Marked the Spot . . ., L.A. TIMES (May 28, 1990), http://articles.latimes.com/1990-05-
28/business/fi-148_1_michael-milken. 
 35. While by the late 1980s S&Ls as a whole held only around 7 percent of the junk bonds in the 
market, Taggart, supra note 29, at 11, this 7 percent was highly concentrated among a handful of S&Ls 
closely associated with Milken. Akerlof & Romer, supra note 29, at 53. By 1989, S&Ls held over $13.5 
billion in junk bonds or 6.5 percent of a $205 billion market. Harry DeAngelo, Linda DeAngelo & 
Stuart C. Gilson, The Collapse of First Executive Corporation: Junk Bonds, Adverse Publicity, and the 
“Run on the Bank” Phenomenon, 36 J. FIN. ECON. 287, 290 (1994) (market size); Anise C. Wallace, 
Savings Units Trim “Junk” Holdings, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1990, at D7, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/04/02/business/savings-units-trim-junk-holdings.html (S&L holding 
size). A single S&L, Columbia Savings & Loan Association of Beverly Hills, California, held over 
$4.36 billion in junk bonds by 1989, accounting for more than 2 percent of the entire junk bond market. 
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prominently on both the buy and the sell sides. For example, Charles 
Keating used Drexel junk bonds to finance his takeover of an S&L, Lincoln 
Savings & Loan, and then caused Lincoln to figure prominently as a junk 
bond customer.36 The implicit rule was pay to play: if you wanted Drexel to 
underwrite your junk bonds, it was understood that you would be a buyer 
for Drexel’s future issues.37 And the players were willing. Keating was not 
the only junk bond investor who took over an S&L in a Drexel-financed 
acquisition.38 The S&Ls, with their federally-insured deposit bases,39 in 
turn provided ready buyers for new issues.40 
It has been alleged, credibly in our view, that the S&Ls took part in a 
“daisy chain” scheme masterminded by Milken to inflate junk bond prices 
artificially and make the market appear more liquid than it was, enhancing 
 
Richard W. Stevenson, “Junk Bond” Shift Hurts Columbia Savings, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1989, at D19, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1989/10/26/business/junk-bond-shift-hurts-columbia-
savings.html. See also James Bates & Greg Johnson, For Sale: Used S&Ls, Including Lincoln, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 3, 1990, at D1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1990-11-03/business/fi-
3357_1_drexel-junk-bond (describing the forced sale of several Saving & Loans which invested heavily 
in junk bonds, including Lincoln and Imperial). 
 36. 1 FDIC, MANAGING THE CRISIS: THE FDIC AND RTC EXPERIENCE 282 (1998), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/managing/history1-11.pdf. Keating bought Lincoln Savings & 
Loan with the proceeds of a Drexel underwriting. Id. Keating then turned Lincoln into a leading junk 
bond purchaser. 3 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 
AGE OF DERIVATIVES INTO THE NEW MILLENNIUM (1970-2001) 170 (2002). Similarly, in 1983 
corporate raider Victor Goulet, already a major junk bond investor, purchased a controlling interest in 
the stock of Imperial Corporation of America (ICA), the parent of Imperial Savings and Loan 
Association of California. Goulet’s acquisition was funded by Executive Life, a major life insurance 
company closely affiliated with Milken, which will be discussed below for its own CDO. Amended 
Complaint Class Action at 140, FDIC v. Milken, 781 F. Supp. 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (No. 91-0433) 
[hereinafter FDIC Complaint]. Executive Life later acquired a 9.9 percent share in ICA, and Columbia, 
another Milken-dominated S&L, purchased an 8 percent share. Id at 143. Later, in 1988, MDC, a 
Denver-based homebuilder financed by Milken, purchased 9.5 percent of Imperial’s stock, apparently in 
an attempt to prop up its stock price. Stephen P. Pizzo, Congress to Investigate “Daisy Chain” of 
Thrifts, NAT’L MORTGAGE. NEWS, Dec. 18, 1989, at 1. 
 37. FDIC Complaint, supra note 36, at 158; Richard Stengel, Free Mike Milken, SPY, Feb. 1990, 
at 45, 48. Milken may also have rewarded cooperative conspirators with insider information on deals to 
facilitate insider trading. 
 38. In some cases, these investors used the banks as personal piggy-banks, looting them. See 
WILLIAM K. BLACK, THE BEST WAY TO ROB A BANK IS TO OWN ONE: HOW CORPORATE EXECUTIVES 
AND POLITICIANS LOOTED THE S&L INDUSTRY 38 (2005) (describing the S&L acquisition process); 
KATHLEEN DAY, S&L HELL: THE PEOPLE AND THE POLITICS BEHIND THE $1 TRILLION SAVINGS AND 
LOAN SCANDAL 387–90 (1993) (discussing the involvement of numerous top officials in the S&L 
scandal). 
 39. FDIC Complaint, supra note 36, at 140. 
 40. Dan Morain & James Granelli, Lincoln S&L Backed Boesky Takeover Bids: Irvine-Based 
Thrift Invested $100 Million, Apparently Profited, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1989, § 4, at 1, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/1989-08-30/business/fi-1423_1_risky-investments. When it looked like an 
issue was headed for default, Milken engineered for its refinancing, thereby maintaining the junk bond 
market’s performance record. Stengel, supra note 37, at 49. 
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its appeal to investors and further encouraging its growth.41 A “daisy 
chain” is a Ponzi scheme variant that inflates the value of an asset not 
because of any change in fundamentals, but through constant “flipping”: an 
asset is sold back and forth among the chain’s members who book “profits” 
on each sale even as the fundamental value of the asset does not 
appreciate.42 
Thus did the handful of Milken-associated S&Ls sell each other junk 
bonds at inflated prices set by Milken, using their phony “gains” to mask 
their real financial results (and in some cases to disguise looting by their 
owners), at least for a while. They also provided a market for Milken to 
place more and more junk bonds and take more underwriting fees. 
B.  THE FIRST COLLATERALIZED BOND OBLIGATIONS 
There were implicit limits on the liquidity Milken could gin up at the 
X-shaped trading desk. After all, in a daisy chain, each bond seller is also a 
bond buyer. Within the chain, the pool of new cash for purchases expands 
only to the extent the members expand their businesses or new members 
join up (as in a Ponzi scheme). Meanwhile, there were limits on the class of 
potential new members. Pension funds, for example, were required to 
invest only in investment-grade bonds and so stayed out of the junk market. 
Other institutions’ junk bond portfolios were subject to regulatory caps. For 
example, federally chartered S&Ls were limited to holding 11 percent of 
their assets in junk bonds.43 Thus did Drexel and its S&L clients share a 
 
 41. See FDIC Complaint, supra note 36, at 5–7 (describing the Milken Group’s manipulation of 
the junk bond market). Numerous Milken affiliated partnerships were also part of the daisy chain. 
Akerlof & Romer, supra note 29, at 47–48. But see DANIEL FISCHEL, PAYBACK: THE CONSPIRACY TO 
DESTROY MICHAEL MILKEN AND HIS FINANCIAL REVOLUTION 285 (1995) (“The daisy chain variant of 
the high-yield bond market as a Ponzi scheme claim was ludicrous.”). While we think the charge 
credible, we note that it would have been extremely hard to prove: given an artificially inflated price, 
chain members would have had every incentive to cheat by shorting, much like members of a cartel. 
 42. Pizzo, supra note 36. 
 43. The 11 percent figure is never actually stated in federal statutory or regulatory materials, but 
was widely understood within the S&L industry. E.g., Taggart, supra note 29, at 18. Prior to 1980, 
Federal savings and loans lacked authority to invest in corporate debt securities. The Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 authorized investment in corporate debt 
securities, but limited the investment authority for corporate debt securities and consumer loans 
together to 20 percent of an S&L’s assets. Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 401, 94 Stat. 132, 153 (1980). This 20 
percent cap was removed by the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982. Pub. L. No. 97-
320, § 329, 96 Stat. 1469, 1502 (1982) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(2) (1982)), and replaced with a 
30 percent cap on consumer loans, but no explicit cap on corporate debt securities, which were “as 
defined and approved by the [Federal Home Loan Bank] Board. Id. Confusingly, the section heading in 
the United States Code was never amended, so it still reads “Loans or investments limited to 20 per 
centum of assets,” despite statutory language stating that the limits are set forth in subparagraphs, 
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high-powered incentive to innovate. They needed a way to package junk 
bonds so as to end-run the regulatory barriers. 
A potential packaging template had been invented only recently, 
namely securitization. Securitization was first pioneered in the mortgage 
market, starting in 1970, but developments in the 1980s made it a much 
more sophisticated transaction form. In a mortgage securitization, a bank 
takes a bundle of residential mortgages out of its portfolio and sells them to 
an SPE that it itself creates.44 The SPE in turn goes to the public securities 
 
including the higher limit for consumer loans. 
  The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (“FHLBB”) implementing regulations stated that 
investments in corporate debt securities had to be in securities “rated in one of the four highest grades 
by at least two nationally recognized investment rating services at their respective most recent 
published rating before the date of purchase of the security,” meaning that the corporate debt securities 
had to be investment grade. 12 C.F.R. § 545.75(b)(2) (1984). However, the rule making permitted 
S&Ls to invest up to 1 percent of their assets in corporate debt securities irrespective of their rating “if 
in the exercise of its prudent business judgment it determines that there is adequate evidence that the 
obligor will be able to perform all that it undertakes to perform in connection with such securities, 
including all debt service requirements.” Id. § 545.75(d). In other words, on their face, the regulations 
permitted up to 1 percent of S&Ls’ assets to be invested in junk bonds if the S&L believed that the 
bonds would not default. 
  In its Federal Register release publishing the regulations, however—but not in the regulation 
itself—the FHLBB stated that “the Board wishes to clarify that an investment in notes, paper, or debt 
securities may be treated as a commercial loan to the issuer whether or not they satisfy the rating, 
marketability, and other requirements of § 545.75.” 48 Fed. Reg. 23032, 23045 (May 23, 1983). This 
meant that S&Ls could purchase junk bonds and treat them as “commercial loans” for the purposes of 
investment regulation. Accordingly, the applicable limit for S&L junk bond purchases was the 10 
percent of assets limit set for commercial loans. 12 C.F.R. § 545.46(a) (1984). This 10 percent limit 
could then be added to the 1 percent facially permitted junk bond limit, as S&Ls were permitted to elect 
the “classification of loans or investments,” namely that the S&L could choose which limit would apply 
to a particular loan or investment if multiple limits could apply. Id. § 545.31. This should not be 
confused with regulatory classification of loans for Allowance of Loan and Lease Losses (ALLL) 
purposes. 
  Thus, an S&L could opt for the 10 percent limit plus the 1 percent limit to get up to 11 
percent of its assets in junk bonds. See 52 Fed. Reg. 25870, 25876 (July 9, 1987) (referring to the 11 
percent limit); Taggart, supra note 29, at 18. This 11 percent limit was somewhat mitigated by the fact 
that junk bonds were competing with other financing products for the 11 percent cap—true unsecured 
commercial loans, commercial paper, financing leasing, overdraft loans on demand accounts, unsecured 
loans made by S&L service corporation subsidiaries, and inventory and floor plan loans to consumer 
goods dealers. 
 44. Here we describe a private-label mortgage securitization, not a securitization guaranteed by 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or Ginnie Mae. The first private-label mortgage-securitization deal is often 
dated to 1977, with credit being awarded to a $100 million Bank of America deal issued on September 
21, 1977. See Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n, SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 SEC No-Act. 
LEXIS 1343 at *5–7 (May 19, 1977) (describing Bank of America MBS transaction); Michael D. 
Grace, Alternative Mortgages and the Secondary Market, AM. BANKER, Oct. 13, 1982, at 5 (describing 
the integration of mortgage and bond markets in the 1970s as well as the Bank of America deal). It 
appears that this was in fact the third mortgage securitization, but the first true private pass-through 
securitization. The first modern private mortgage bond appears to have been the California Federal 
Savings and Loan’s September 25, 1975, a $50 million bond issuance secured by FHA-insured / VA-
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markets and sells long-term notes. The SPE uses the cash proceeds of the 
sale of its notes to pay the bank the purchase price of the pool of 
mortgages. The mortgages in the SPE’s pool secure the notes, generating a 
stream of cash that pays the notes’ principal and interest. 
Early mortgage securitizations were pass-through certificates, 
representing a pro rata claim on the cash flows from the pool of mortgages. 
But between 1983 and 1986 mortgage securitizations began to appear that 
featured “tranching”—the slicing of cash flows into various unequal strips. 
At first, tranching was done solely to ameliorate interest rate risk, but by 
1986, tax rules permitted tranching for credit risk as well.45 This meant that 
SPEs could issue notes in different series, dividing the claims on the 
“waterfall” of cash generated by the mortgages into tranches: junior, 
mezzanine, and senior. The juniors bear the first-loss risk on the mortgages 
in the pool, the mezzanine holders the next level of risk, and the seniors the 
residual risk. 
The greater the risk, the higher the interest rate on the notes in the 
tranche. Thus, a pool of mortgages bearing an average 7 percent coupon 
could be divided into bonds a third of which (seniormost) would have 6 
percent coupons, a third (mezzanine) 7 percent coupons, and a third 
(juniormost) 8 percent coupons. In practice, most notes in securitizations 
are in the senior tranches—as a rule of thumb, 80–90 percent.46 Thus, for a 
pool of 7 percent mortgages, we might have 90 percent of the notes be 
senior with a coupon of 6.5 percent, 8 percent be mezzanine with a coupon 
of 10 percent, and 2 percent be junior with a coupon of 17.5 percent. The 
 
guaranteed mortgages. Mortgage Bonds, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 13, 1975, at 86. The second 
private-label deal was a $200 million bond issuance by the Home Savings and Loan Association (Los 
Angeles, California) on June 23, 1977, secured by conventional mortgages. Grace, supra. The Bank of 
America deal was a true pass-through; the prior deals appear to have been secured bonds, meaning that 
the revenue to pay the bondholders was not necessarily from the mortgages in the first instance. The 
private-label mortgage securitization market remained small until 2004–2008. 
 45. In early 1986, an Internal Revenue Service Private Letter Ruling enabled securitizers to 
retain a credit-enhancing junior tranche of up to 10 percent. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-20-014 (Feb. 7, 
1986). In October of 1986, the Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit provisions of the Internal 
Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 860A–G, were enacted. These provisions enabled the sale of junior tranches 
as well as senior. See Mark Basch, Salomon Offers Two-Class Mortgage Security; Lending Institution 
Retains Subordinate Class of Pass-Through Certificate, AM. BANKER, Feb. 26, 1987, at 3 (discussing 
the first use of the senior/subordinated structure for commercial mortgages after the 1986 tax code 
changes); Richard Chang, Coast Holds Risk on Commercial MBS, NAT’L MORTGAGE. NEWS, Mar. 9, 
1987, at 14 (discussing issue of $53 million of commercial mortgage backed securities whose risks are 
“largely held by the originator in a subordinated class”); Jed Horowitz, Salomon Sells Junior Portion of 
Remic Security, AM. BANKER, June 18, 1987, at 15 (discussing first Real Estate Mortgage Investment 
Conduit (“REMIC”) with junior tranche sold for Residential Funding Corp). 
 46. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 82 
(2011) (noting that many mortgage-backed securities received AAA credit ratings because of tranches). 
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average coupon rate is constant, but the distribution among tranches can be 
tailored to match investors’ preferences for risk and reward. This sort of 
structured security enables issuers to cater to idiosyncrasies in market 
demand. 
Securitization lets the bank transform illiquid assets (there is no 
trading market for individual residential mortgages) into liquid assets 
traded on the bond market. But why would the bond market accept debt 
securities issued by a shell entity like an SPE? The market looks through 
the entity to the value of the assets inside it. So long as the transfer to the 
SPE is deemed a “true sale” and the SPE is constructed to be “bankruptcy 
remote” from the bank, the market deems the mortgages to be locked into 
the SPE.47 In addition, the mortgages in the SPE’s pool are geographically 
diverse, and the SPE’s notes are rated by credit rating agencies. Add it up, 
and the return on the SPE’s notes is higher than would be obtainable on a 
corporate bond with the same rating. The bank emerges free to make new 
loans from the principal returned upon the transfer to the SPE, transactions 
that generate new fees. Finally, for accounting and bank capital purposes 
the mortgages are deemed removed from the bank’s balance sheet. (In 
future years, the widespread availability of securitization would stoke the 
mortgage markets, leading to a surfeit of subprime lending and ultimately 
the financial crisis. But that is not our story.) 
The securitization model enhanced liquidity. There was nothing, 
however, that limited securitization to mortgages. Other types of assets, 
such as junk bonds, could potentially be securitized just like mortgages. 
Experimentation proceeded at two intertwined Drexel clients, Imperial 
Savings and an insurance company named First Executive Life, which was 
also the largest shareholder of Imperial Saving’s parent corporation.48 
1.  Imperial Savings 
Imperial Savings Association, a California S&L run by the former 
head of Freddie Mac, joined Drexel to apply the securitization technique to 
 
 47. See William McInerney, From Bankruptcy Remote to Risk Remote, N.Y.L.J. (Aug. 23, 2010), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=120247072324 (describing the primary features of bankruptcy-
remoteness as restricted ability to file for bankruptcy and single purpose). Here, bankruptcy remote 
means that the assets of the SPE will not be consolidated with those of the bank in the event the bank is 
put into receivership. Bankruptcy remote also has a separate, distinct meaning, namely that the SPE 
itself will not or cannot file for bankruptcy. 
 48. Susan Burkhardt, Partner of Target in SEC Probe Owns Nearly 10% of Imperial, SAN DIEGO 
UNION, Sept. 19, 1987, at C1. Other Milken-associated entities also owned large stakes in Imperial. 
Susan Burkhardt, Denver Firm Buys 6.9% of ICA Stock, SAN DIEGO UNION, Nov. 6, 1987, at C1. 
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junk bonds.49 Imperial was the
 
sixteenth largest S&L in the country when it 
was seized by the FDIC on February 23, 1990.50 Between 1986 and 1989, 
Imperial purchased more than $1.6 billion in Drexel-underwritten junk 
bonds,51 and its $1.5 billion junk bond portfolio52—10 percent of its 
assets53—was the second largest of any thrift.54 
In 1987, Imperial, together with Drexel as underwriter, issued the first 
collateralized debt obligation.55 Imperial transferred $200 million of junk 
bonds to an SPE called “Long Run Bond Corp.” The bonds were priced at 
99.73 (virtually at par);56 they were diversified by industry; and they 
carried ratings greater than or equal to B- or BBB (low investment grade).57 
The SPE then issued $100 million in collateralized notes with a three-year 
maturity.58 Between the two-to-one overcollateralization59 and the 
diversification of the bonds by issuer and industry, Imperial and Drexel 
were able to convince Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s to award the CDO 
an AAA-rating.60 There does not appear to have been senior-subordinate 
tranching for credit support. It seems likely that Imperial retained the 
 
 49. The Chairman of the Board of Imperial’s parent, Imperial Corporation of America, was 
Victor Goulet, a Milken-financed raider. IMPERIAL CORP. OF AM. ANNUAL REPORTS (1986–1988). 
 50. Greg Johnson, Imperial S&L's Parent Files for Chapter 11 Thrifts: The Action, Which Was 
Expected, Won't Affect Depositors, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1990, at D4, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/1990-03-01/business/fi-2401_1_imperial-savings. 
 51. FDIC Complaint, supra note 36, at 169. 
 52. Bates & Johnson, supra note 35. 
 53. Susan Burkhardt, Junk-Bond Based Imperial Offering Wins Triple-A Rate, SAN DIEGO 
UNION, Sept. 25, 1987, at E1. 
 54. Bates & Johnson, supra note 35. The largest cache was the more than $4 billion holding of 
Columbia Savings and Loan of Beverly Hills, California (located conveniently near the Drexel junk 
bond desk). Richard W. Stevenson, California Saving Unit Seized, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1990, at 33, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/24/business/california-saving-unit-is-seized.html. 
 55. Major Debt and Equity Offerings by Financial Companies; In September (Dollar Amounts in 
Millions), AM. BANKER, Oct. 13, 1987, at 6. Technically, the collateralized debt obligation was a 
collateralized bond obligation or CBO. A CBO would be distinguished from a collateralized loan 
obligation or CLO—one contains bonds, the other loans. We are eliding the difference in this paper, 
using CDO as a term encompassing both. 
 56. Press Release, Bus. Wire, Imperial Savings Offers $100 Million in Notes Backed by High-
Yield Bonds (Sept. 24, 1987). 
 57. Burkhardt, supra note 53. 
 58. Major Debt and Equity Offerings by Financial Companies; In September (Dollar Amounts in 
Millions), supra note 55. 
 59. See Leslie Gifford, Drexel Prices First Issue Ever Backed by Corporate Junk Bonds; Prices 
Down, BOND BUYER, Sept. 25, 1987, at 5 (noting that Moody’s rating criteria were 165–250 percent 
overcollateralization, diversification, marked-to-market collateral monthly, updated every two weeks 
for price volatility, market price, and credit rating). Implied in this is that Imperial had an obligation to 
top off the collateral pool if its value declined. 
 60. Richard Chang, Imperial Securities to Be Backed by Junk Bond Collateral, NAT’L 
MORTGAGE NEWS, Aug. 31, 1987, at 10. 
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residual equity interest in the SPE. 
The effect was to enable institutional investors prohibited from 
holding non-investment-grade investments to invest in junk bonds, thereby 
expanding the market. The terms of the CDO made them quite attractive—
the bonds were AAA-rated, but with a yield eighty-five basis points above 
comparable duration Treasuries.61 A third of the bonds were sold to S&Ls 
(presumably including some Milken daisy chain participants), the rest to 
pension and investment funds.62 
The deal gave Imperial immediate liquidity63—instant cash instead of 
bonds that would pay out over years. Presumably, retention of the equity 
interest in the SPE precluded off-balance-sheet accounting treatment, but 
there was a give back. Retaining the SPE equity meant that Imperial could 
benefit from SPE’s overcollateralization and the spread between the high 
coupons on the junk bonds and the lower rates on the notes issued by the 
SPE,64 as the SPE’s revenue, beyond what was needed to pay the CDO 
notes and the CDO trustee, would presumably go back to Imperial. 
The possibilities held out by the Imperial CDO were not lost on the 
investment banking world. As one observer noted, “Investment bankers 
clearly see a gold mine in this product. The total volume of corporate bonds 
currently outstanding is about $600 billion, and securitization offers 
investors the opportunity to transform their holdings into cash.”65 
Even so, Imperial seems to have had second thoughts about the two-
to-one ratio of junk bonds to collateralized notes. So when Imperial 
packaged a second CDO in late 198866 it more closely followed the 
 
 61. Gifford, supra note 59. 
 62. Burkhardt, supra note 53. 
 63. We detect no additional or alternative motivation for the Imperial deals. There does not 
appear to have been a regulatory capital arbitrage. While federally chartered S&Ls were limited to 
holding 11 percent of their assets in junk bonds, see supra text accompanying note 43, Imperial was a 
California chartered thrift, and California removed all limits on S&L junk bond investment. PAUL 
TESKE, REGULATION IN THE STATES 109, 113 (2004). The Federal Savings & Loan Insurance 
Corporation (FSLIC), which insured Imperial, had no restrictions on junk bond investment. See id. at 
111–15 (discussing the FSLIC’s permissive regulatory policies).The motivation for the CDOs might 
simply have been to enable Imperial to raise funds against its junk bond holdings, rather than against its 
overall asset base. We also cannot rule out Milken / Drexel as the driving force in the transaction, as the 
creation of the CDOs effectively expanded the market of junk bond purchasers, a development that 
benefitted Milken and Drexel. 
 64. Gifford, supra note 59. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Imperial Offering “Junk Bond” CMO, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS, Aug. 8, 1988, at 25 
(discussing a planned offering). See also R. RUSSELL HURST, FIRST UNION SECURITIES, INC., CDO 
QUARTERLY REVIEW app. A (May 2000), available at http://www.securitization.net/pdf/cdo_0500.pdf 
(listing a $126 million rated portion of a CDO issued by Long Run Bond Corp, with Imperial S&L and 
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residential mortgage securitization model, using a senior-subordinate 
structure. The second deal featured three tranches. The first (and 
presumably largest) was AAA-rated and sold to investors.67 The second 
tranche was lower rated and held in portfolio by Imperial’s parent 
company.68 The third, unrated tranche was given to a pair of San Diego 
charities (following a model developed in other securitizations).69 This 
apparently enabled Imperial to get off-balance-sheet treatment for the 
CDO70 even as it retained a slice of the risk and return on the junk bonds by 
retaining the SPE’s second tranche. Figure 2, below, presents a summary 
version of the transaction. 
 
Capwood Christian as managers and Drexel as agent with an issuance date of 11/1/1988). The second 
deal seems to have been considerably larger than the first, although we have not been able to identify a 
precise figure. See Eric Homer, Phoenix Lights Up Murky World of CDOs, PRIVATE PLACEMENT 
LETTER, June 18, 2001, at 1 (noting that the two Imperial deals totaled $606 million). 
 67. Imperial Offering “Junk Bond” CMO, supra note 66. It was insured by Financial Security 
Assurance, a monoline bond insurer, which had the ability to veto the sale or purchase of bonds by the 
CDO. Telephone Interview with Thomas Saake, Administrator, Long Run Bond Corp., (Aug. 6, 2012). 
Mr. Saake worked at Imperial and then at Capwood-Christian, the Long Run Bond Corp.’s manager, in 
which Imperial had purchased a controlling stake. According to Mr. Saake, FSA only approved sales of 
the bonds in Long Run Bond Corp.’s portfolio, in keeping with its interest as a senior creditor in 
liquidating assets. Id. After Imperial’s failure, the Resolution Trust Corp. took over Imperial’s interest 
in the mezzanine bonds. Id. 
 68. Imperial Offering “Junk Bond” CMO, supra note 66. 
 69. Saake Interview, supra note 67. 
 70. Imperial Offering “Junk Bond” CMO, supra note 66. 
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FIGURE 2.  The Imperial Savings Association CDO 
These Imperial deals did not beget a scandal. Instead, they slightly 
inflated the junk bond bubble and in the end were no more than a minor 
footnote at the juncture of the Milken / Drexel compliance scandal and the 
S&L debacle.71 The third CDO, however, had a closer tie to scandal as part 
and parcel of the “largest insurance company failure in U.S. history.”72 
2.  First Executive 
First Executive (“FE”) was a life insurance company run by CEO Fred 
Carr, a close personal acquaintance of Milken, and “Milken’s biggest and 
 
 71. The FDIC and RTC settled all of their civil claims with Milken, other Drexel executives, and 
their insurers for $1.3 billion. Alison Leigh Cowan, F.D.I.C. Backs Deal by Milken, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
10, 1992, at D1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/10/business/fdic-backs-deal-by-
milken.html. This was on top of a $400 million settlement Milken reached with the SEC. Id. It was 
followed in April 1990 by a criminal plea by Milken. Kurt Eichenwald, Milken Defends “Junk Bonds” 
As He Enters His Guilty Plea, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1990, available at 
www.nytimes.com/1990/04/25/business/milken-defends-junk-bonds-as-he-enters-his-guilty-plea.html? 
pagewanted=all&src=pm. In 1989, Congress passed the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and 
Enforcement Act (“FIRREA”), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183, which eliminated S&Ls’ ability to 
invest in junk bonds and required divestment of existing holdings over a five-year period. 
 72. DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Gilson, supra note 35, at 288. 
  
806 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:783 
best customer.”73 FE was a “controversial upstart in an otherwise mostly 
staid life insurance industry.”74 Under Carr’s management, FE had 
experienced dramatic growth,75 famously marketing a new insurance 
product, the single-premium deferred annuity.76 This promised a hefty 
payment in the future in exchange for a small amount today, a return only 
possible because FE in turn earned high returns on a junk bond portfolio.77 
Indeed, FE held the largest junk bond portfolio in the world,78 totaling 
nearly $11 billion in 1989, when the entire junk bond market’s value was 
around $205 billion.79 Carr accorded Milken trading discretion over the 
bonds in FE’s account,80 and Milken held an equity stake in FE.81 Milken 
exercised his discretion copiously, turning over $40 billion in FE trades 
between 1982 and 1987.82 
FE was in financial distress by 1988.83 It had an unpleasant choice: 
 
 73. FISCHEL, supra note 41, at 284. 
 74. DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Gilson, supra note 35, at 289. 
 75. Kathy M. Kristof, Behind Executive Life’s Fall: Regulators Are Taking the Heat for Letting 
the Insurer’s Problems Go on, Entrapping Thousands of Its Policyholders, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1991, 
at D1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1991-09-01/business/fi-2535_1_executive-life. Its 
insurance in force increased from $700 million in 1974 to nearly $60 billion in 1989. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. GARY SCHULTE, THE FALL OF FIRST EXECUTIVE: THE HOUSE THAT FRED CARR BUILT 190 
(1991). 
 79. DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Gilson, supra note 35, at 290. 
 80. See STEIN, supra note 4, at 88–94 (discussing Milken’s influence and power within FE); 
STEWART, supra note 1, at 67 (1992) (explaining that Milken would “freely trade” with Carr’s portfolio 
without consulting Carr). 
 81. CONNIE BRUCK, THE PREDATORS’ BALL: THE INSIDE STORY OF DREXEL BURNHAM AND THE 
RISE OF THE JUNK BOND RAIDERS 276 (1988). 
 82. SCHULTE, supra note 78, at 190. 
 83. First Executive started running into trouble in 1986, when New York insurance regulators 
forced it to restate its financials by $180 million, leaving it with less than $90 million in equity value. 
Kristof, supra note 75. From then on, First Executive bounced from one set back to another until its 
final collapse in 1989. By 1987, default rates on junk bonds had gone up and Milken and Drexel were 
under investigation in connection with the Ivan Boesky insider trading scandal. Associated Press, 
Milken Said to Be Subpoenaed by House Panel, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 22, 1988), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1988-04-22/business/fi-1740_1_house-panel. Given First Executive’s large 
junk bond holdings and CEO Carr’s close personal affiliation with Milken, investors and policyholders 
began to exhibit jitters. In 1987, New York insurance regulators found the First Executive’s New York 
insurance subsidiary had taken millions of dollars in credits for phony or backdated reinsurance from 
First Stratford Life Co. of Delaware, a joint venture between First Executive and a holding company 
owned 49 percent by Milken and some of his Drexel affiliates, and issued a record fine. Scot J. Paltrow, 
Enigmatic Fred Carr, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1990, at D1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1990-04-
08/business/fi-1602_1_junk-bond (backdating); Sabin Russell, State Probing Deal by Insurer to Cut Its 
Debts, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 4, 1990, at C1 (discussing First Stratford Life Co.); Scot J. Paltrow, Wheel of 
Fortune Turns Against First Executive, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 26, 1990), http://articles.latimes.com/1990-01-
26/business/fi-657_1_junk-bonds (discussing negative press and “nervous” investors). First Stratford 
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either raise new equity capital or stop writing new business and go into 
wind down.84 This set the stage for the third CDO. It was not an 
underwritten product, and so we found no direct evidence of participation 
by Milken and Drexel. We associate them by proximity, confident that we 
are fair in so doing. 
FE’s California insurance subsidiary Executive Life Insurance 
Company (“ELIC”) set up six SPEs,85 formally distancing itself from them, 
but in fact enjoying very close proximity. The SPE corporations were 
wholly owned by limited partnerships, in which ELIC had a 99 percent 
limited partnership stake.86 The SPEs were managed by an ELIC 
consultant, formerly ELIC’s second most highly compensated employee.87 
The SPEs were based in ELIC’s former headquarters building, in a suite 
occupied by a four-person securities firm formerly known as First 
Executive Securities Company.88 FE’s general counsel was the entities’ 
agent for service of process.89 
ELIC transferred $789 million in junk bonds to the SPEs in exchange 
for six tranched CDOs.90 The CDOs, taken together, were FE’s second-
largest investment position.91 The exchange of the debt for the bonds 
appears to have been done at par rather than at fair market value; the six-
 
had 69 percent of its own assets in junk bonds, the highest percentage for any life insurer. Sabin 
Russell, Junk-Bond Woes Snare Insurers, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 22, 1990, at C1. Reinsurance from First 
Stratford supported $558 million of Executive Life of New York’s reserves. Id. The New York 
insurance regulation action forced Executive Life of New York to raise its capital. Kristof, supra note 
75. The California subsidiary, ELIC, was permitted to give its New York sister $151 million to meet 
New York regulators’ capital demands. Id. But the California Department of Insurance then wanted 
ELIC to boost capital. ELIC received $175 million in cash and $170 million in a (backdated) note from 
its parent—raising its net worth to $204 million in 1987. Id. 
 84. Kristof, supra note 75. 
 85. ELIC held around 65 percent of its assets in junk bonds. Sabin Russell, State Reviewing Deal 
by LA Insurance Firm, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 23, 1989, at B1. 
 86. Press Release, Bus. Wire, DOI Completes Executive Life Exam, Orders Action (Jan. 19, 
1990). 
 87. Executive Life’s Junk Bonds—A Case Study in the Manipulation of Investments to Improve 
Their Apparent Quality and Provide Surplus Relief, 17 INS. FORUM 81, 81 (1990). The periodical’s first 
reporting on the transaction has the transfer as $771 million in junk bonds to six corporations, rather 
than partnerships. Id. at 82. 
 88. Id. at 81–82. 
 89. Id. at 81. 
 90. Insurer Failures: Regulators Failed to Respond in Timely and Forceful Manner in Four 
Large Life Insurer Failures: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the 
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong. 10 (1992), [hereinafter GAO Insurer Failures] 
(statement of Richard L. Fogel, Assistant Comptroller General, General Government Programs, 
Government Accounting Office), available at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat6/147526.pdf. 
 91. Executive Life’s Junk Bonds–A Case Study in the Manipulation of Investments to Improve 
Their Apparent Quality and Provide Surplus Relief, supra note 87, at 82. 
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way split avoided the requirement of reporting the investments in FE’s 
annual report.92 The CDOs do not appear to have been rated,93 and ELIC 
never resold them.94 
Indeed, it never sought to do so, for the transaction was purely a 
regulatory arbitrage play. Insurance companies are required to maintain a 
special reserve of capital to protect against losses to their investment 
portfolio. This reserve, known historically as the Mandatory Securities 
Valuation Reserve (“MSVR,” now called the Asset Valuation Reserve or 
“AVR”), was determined based on risk-based capital factors set by the 
Securities Valuation Office of the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners. Different types of assets in insurance companies’ 
investment portfolios received different risk-based capital factors, which 
determined the level of the MSVR required for the asset.95 For example, 
junk bonds (rated CCC and lower) carried a 20 percent reserve 
requirement,96 whereas BBB-rated bonds had just a 2 percent requirement, 
and bonds rated A or higher had a 1 percent requirement.97 Thus, $100 
million in junk bonds required $20 million in reserves, whereas $100 
million in AAA-rated bonds required only $1 million in reserves. 
For unrated bonds, the regulator assigned reserve requirements based 
on various bond characteristics. Bonds that were either an “amortizable 
privately placed bond, or other amortizable bond for which no market 
quotation is readily available,” are categorized as “Yes” and get a 2 percent 
reserve requirement.98 Bonds classified as “No*” or “No,**” namely bonds 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. See Anise C. Wallace, Making “Junk Bonds” Respectable, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1989, at 
D1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/15/business/market-place-making-junk-bonds-
respectable.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (providing no ratings for FE’s CDOs). 
 94. Id. Daniel Fischel argues that the CDO was “designed to be easier to sell than the underlying 
high-yield bonds” and implies that the California Insurance Department wrongly concluded that the 
CDO was merely designed to improperly lower reserve requirements. FISCHEL, supra note 41, at 290. 
Fischel’s argument fails, however, if First Executive never resold the CDOs. There is no evidence that it 
did. 
 95. GAO Insurer Failures, supra note 90, at 10, 14. 
 96. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-93-35, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: INSURANCE REGULATION, WEAK OVERSIGHT ALLOWED EXECUTIVE 
LIFE TO REPORT INFLATED BOND VALUES 13 (1992) [hereinafter GAO INSURANCE REGULATION 
REPORT]. 
 97. Shauna Ferris, “Someone Else’s Problem,” The Failure of the Guarantee Security Life 
Insurance Company, 16 AUSTL. ACTUARIAL J. 1, 26 (2010), available at http://www.actuaries.asn.au/ 
Libraries/Information_Knowledge/46305_AAJ_v16i1_comp.sflb.ashx. 
 98. Executive Life’s June Bonds–A Case Study in the Manipulation of Investments to Improve 
Their Apparent Quality and Provide Surplus Relief, supra note 87, at 83. See also GAO INSURANCE 
REGULATION REPORT, supra note 96, at 36 (providing the rating system). 
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“classified as eligible for amortization only for life insurers which have 
established and are maintaining a mandatory securities valuation reserve,” 
receive 10 percent or 20 percent reserve requirements, respectively.99 
All of the bonds ELIC transferred to the SPEs were likely “No*” or 
“No.**”100 The two senior classes of CBOs ELIC received in return for its 
junk bonds—around 90 percent of the deal—were classified as “Yes,” with 
the junior class classified as “No.**”101 Figure 3, below, depicts the 
transaction. 
 
FIGURE 3.  The First Executive CDO 
By turning “No*” into “Yes,” ELIC was able to reduce its reserve 
requirements by at least $110 million102 and thereby inflate its surplus, 
despite the assets and the risks being exactly the same.103 As a FE 
executive explained to the Wall Street Journal, the deal “create[d] 
securities that were worth more than the underlying assets.”104 
 
 99. Executive Life’s Junk Bonds–A Case Study in the Manipulation of Investments to Improve 
Their Apparent Quality and Provide Surplus Relief, supra note 87, at 83. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 84 (finding that ELIC reduced its reserve requirements by $126 million); Kathy M. 
Kristof, First Executive to Take Big Loss on Junk Bonds, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1990, at D1, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/1990-01-20/business/fi-112_1_junk-bond; Martin Mayer, Viewpoints: The 
Latest Junk Bond Scam? L.A. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1990, at D3, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1990-
01-07/business/fi-82_1_junk-bonds/2 (finding that ELIC reduced its reserve requirements by $110 
million). 
 103. GAO Insurer Failures, supra note 90, at 14–15. 
 104. Mayer, supra note 102. 
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As a matter of economic theory, such alchemy is impossible.105 But 
economic theory assumes away regulation. When a real world regulated 
company faces a regulator’s demands for new capital, any legerdemain on 
the right side of the balance sheet that provides relief is extremely valuable. 
Other entities in the Milken menagerie took note of FE’s success. As one 
news account related: 
Thomas Spiegel, who built Columbia Savings & Loan of Beverly Hills, a 
rival of Carr’s First Executive as Milken’s premiere customer, has 
resigned from the deteriorating S&L and plans to work with the Wall 
Street house of First Boston to repackage Columbia’s nearly $4-billion 
junk bond portfolio into [CDO]s that can be sold for more than the assets 
are worth.106  
The CDO structure was now part of the Wall Street playbook. 
Unfortunately for FE, its regulators didn’t buy it. A negative write up 
in the industry press107 prompted the California Insurance Department to 
examine the treatment.108 Disallowance followed in January 1990, forcing 
FE to increase reserves by $110 million.109 The regulator probably had 
little choice. January 1990 also saw FE disclose a $968 million loss on its 
investment portfolio during the previous year.110 Similar losses on the junk 
bonds in the SPE held out starkly negative implications for the value of the 
CDO. The junk bond market had collapsed. California’s insurance 
commissioner shut down ELIC in April 1991111 followed shortly thereafter 
by the shutdown of FE’s New York insurance subsidiary by that state’s 
insurance commissioner.112 Michael Milken pled guilty to six counts of 
securities fraud in April 1990, and in May 1991 FE filed for bankruptcy.113 
It was the largest insurance company failure in U.S. history.114 The go-go 
 
 105. See Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and 
the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261, 262 (1958) (explaining that “marginal yield on 
physical assets is equal to the market rate of interest”). 
 106. Mayer, supra note 102. 
 107. Eric N. Berg, An Eye on the Insurance Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1990, at D1, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/1990/04/17/business/an-eye-on-the-insurance-industry.html (noting that 
regulators first noticed the First Executive CBO because of a newsletter by Indiana University 
insurance professor Joseph M. Belth, THE INS. FORUM). 
 108. DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Gilson, supra note 35, at 327. 
 109. Id. at 328. See also GAO Insurer Failures, supra note 90, at 15 n.6 (“In December 1989, 
California regulators made Executive Life reverse the bond transactions and recalculate its MSVR.”). 
 110. DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Gilson, supra note 35, at 293. 
 111. Id. at 298. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Scott E. Harrington, Policyholder Runs, Life Insurance Company Failures, and Insurance 
Solvency Regulation, 15 REGULATION 27, 28–29 (1992). 
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junk bond era was over. 
C.  SUMMARY 
What was so wrong with FE’s deal structure? As a formal proposition, 
the junk bonds were transferred pursuant to a contract of sale between the 
company and an independent entity. But in substance the SPE transferee 
was FE’s alter ego. FE held 99 percent of the equity interest in the SPE, 
using a limited partnership structure to vest nominal control in a general 
partner, who happened to be a former FE executive. The entity was 
physically lodged with another FE affiliate. Meanwhile, the “independent” 
entity had no assets other than the swapped bonds, which were booked at 
par and paid for with its own promissory note. Any decrease in the bonds’ 
value meant nonpayment on the note with the resulting loss of value 
flowing back to FE’s balance sheet dollar for dollar. In truth, there was no 
there, there. FE was swapping pieces of paper with itself. Eleven years later 
Enron would do the same thing. 
The media coverage of the Milken scandal never delved deeply into 
Milken’s financial dealings. Instead, the press focused on the clash of 
cultures between a white shoe Wall Street and a larger-than-life, upstart 
Jewish bond trader,115 and lurid tales of insider trading, bad toupees, 
partying, and excess.116 Even a quarter century later, we still do not have 
the full story of Michael Milken’s dealings. 
The true Milken scandal lay in the alleged but unproven junk bond 
daisy chain and its connection to takeover transactions that made money for 
some but caused economic and social dislocation for others. Junk bonds’ 
economic disruption was the occasion for, but not the subject of, Rudy 
Giuliani’s prosecution and conviction of Michael Milken for relatively 
trivial securities law violations.117 The mismatch was to be repeated. 
 
 115. See, e.g., FISCHEL, supra note 41, at 4–7 (attributing Milken’s prosecution to “the public’s 
historic distrust and envy of financiers”); BRUCK, supra note 81, at 205, 331 (describing anti-Semitic 
reactions to Drexel’s success). 
 116. See BRUCK, supra note 81, at 11, 14–15. 
 117. See, e.g., PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS & LAWRENCE M. STRATTON, THE TYRANNY OF GOOD 
INTENTIONS 96–97 (2000) (arguing that prosecutors “criminalized regulatory infractions"). Daniel 
Fischel described U.S. Attorney Rudolf Guliani’s prosecutorial approach as follows: 
Giuliani saw RICO’s amorphous language as a potent weapon to rubber-hose and coerce 
guilty pleas and punish those who refused to cooperate. He had already pioneered the 
criminalization of such standardless offenses as insider trading, stock parking, and 
manipulation. Now the government could claim that the same underlying conduct that 
supposedly provided the basis for these standardless offenses also constituted a “pattern of 
racketeering activity” that justified a RICO prosecution. By this bootstrapping logic, Giuliani 
was able to drop the equivalent of a nuclear bomb on any target, at any time, no matter how 
trivial or harmless the underlying conduct. 
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III.  THE FULCRUM: BISTRO 
In following years, other more respectable insurance companies 
succeeded where FE failed, getting junk bonds off of their balance sheets 
and into SPEs funded by CDOs with their regulators’ approval. In these 
deals, either the insurer or its holding company would take the junior CDO 
tranche, with the most concentrated risk, while the senior pieces would be 
sold to outside investors.118 Regulatory capital relief was achieved, even if 
most risk remained within the insurers’ corporate groups. Indeed, as the 
1990s progressed, structured financings involving the securitization of 
bonds and loans became a routine affair. By 1996 annual issuance of CDOs 
 
FISCHEL, supra note 41, at 123. 
 118. In 1991, Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. did a CDO deal, selling $375 million on 
junk bonds and junk private-placements to the CDO, which financed the purchase by issuing notes and 
equity. Steven Bavaria, Will Connecticut Mutual’s Junk CBO Start a Trend? INVESTMENT DEALERS’ 
DIG., Dec. 23, 1991, at 25. Connecticut Mutual was the investor for a $90 million cushion of equity and 
junior debt that comprised a 24 percent first loss position. Id. The effect of Connecticut Mutual’s deal 
was much like FE’s—it moved $375 million of junk from the insurer’s books and replaced it “with 
$90M of assets containing more concentrated but less publicly visible risk.” Id. The $90 million 
retained had a considerably higher yield than the original $375 million. Id. The transaction reduced the 
junk asset percentage of Connecticut Mutual’s investment portfolio. Id. This was important because 
junk asset percentage was the public litmus test of insurer risk after the failures of First Executive and 
another life insurance company, First Capital, both of which were major junk bond investors. Id. 
Having a lower percentage of junk assets in portfolio helped Connecticut Mutual’s agents market its 
policies, as “Questions about junk bond holdings are at the top of the list of questions potential 
policyholders ask when considering one company versus another.” Id. Connecticut Mutual’s 
securitization was again being done to mask a company’s real financial position. As with First 
Executive, some insurance officials were concerned, describing the deal “as mere window dressing.” Id. 
But an important distinction should be noted. Even as Connecticut Mutual retained the residual risk on 
the portfolio, it sold most of the risk to third parties. 
  A few years later, the Equitable Life Assurance Society of America undertook a CDO, EQ 
Asset Trust 1993, to upgrade the credit quality of its portfolio, by swapping out junk assets, including 
numerous defaulted bonds, for higher rated CDO assets. Anne Schwimmer, Equitable Clears Decks of 
Junk with $700M Deal, INVESTMENT DEALERS’ DIG., Oct. 18, 1993, at 12. Equitable Life sold $703 
million of privately placed notes to a CDO it created. Equitable Debt Sale Yields $700 Million, 
PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Jan. 24, 1994, at 78. Equitable Life and its affiliate Equitable Variable Life 
then purchased the $200 million mezzanine Class B tranche of the CDO’s notes. Anne Schwimmer, 
Equitable Clears Decks of Junk with $700M Deal, INVESTMENT DEALERS’ DIG., Oct. 18, 1993, at 12. 
Half of the Class B notes were rated investment grade, thereby giving Equitable Life relief from its 
NAIC reserve requirements, which only applied to the life insurer itself, not its holding company, The 
Equitable Companies, which purchased the $50 million of Class C junior notes and $50 million of the 
CDO’s equity. Id. Equitable Life’s affiliate DLJ purchased the entire $325 million AAA tranche, which 
it resold in the private placement Rule 144A market. Equitable Debt Sale Yields $700 Million, 
PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Jan. 24, 1994, at 78. Equitable Life used the cash proceeds from the sale to 
purchase investment grade assets. Id. The transaction allowed Equitable Life to transmogrify its junk 
assets into investment grade assets, while still maintaining the yield—and the risk—within its corporate 
family. 
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had risen to $18.6 billion.119 But, there were some structural sticking 
points. This part describes the Bistro securitization, the deal that 
surmounted the sticking points, situating it in the business context of a 
hypothetical bank in 1997. Section A begins with the transaction structures 
that served as Bistro’s building blocks—asset securitization and the credit 
default swap. Using a hypothetical bank, this section highlights the 
functions that securitization and credit default swaps performed, but also 
identifies transactional problems they were unsuited to solve. Section B 
goes on to show Bistro emerge as a hybrid of the two structures suited to 
solve the problems. 
A.  MOTIVATIONS 
Imagine a large bank that makes loans to corporations and then holds 
those loans to maturity. The bank has a corporate lending department that 
maintains relationships with quality borrowers. There are constraints on the 
relationships. The bank’s internal risk management policies limit the 
amount that can be loaned to any given borrower, and the restriction 
sometimes interferes with client relationships.120 Additionally, the bank is 
required to support the loan portfolio with equity capital. Under the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision rules (“Basel I”), adopted by domestic 
bank regulators, corporate loans require 100 percent support,121 which 
translates into an equity cushion amounting to 8 percent of the loans’ 
principal amounts.122 The bank seeks a way to reduce the required amount 
of equity because its alternate sources of funding, deposits and borrowing, 
are cheaper. Cheaper capital means a higher return on assets and a higher 
stock price. At the beginning of 1997, there were two ways to attack the 
problems of lending limits and required capital, CDOs and CDSs. 
As we saw in Part I, securitization provides an expeditious way to 
liquidate the loans and turn them into cash. The bank already is doing this 
with its portfolio of residential mortgages, getting them off of its balance 
sheet by securitizing them and then relending the funds received from the 
sale of the mortgage-backed securities. The replay loans generate fees for 
 
 119. Karen Sibayan, 1987 to Present: A Walk Down CDO Lane, ASSET SALES REP., Apr. 17, 
2000. Multi-asset deals that mixed bonds and loans were being done also. Id. 
 120. TETT, supra note 12, at 44–45 (describing lending limits and other bank techniques used to 
limit default risk). 
 121. BASLE COMM. BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL 
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS 22 (1988), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.pdf. 
 122. Id. at 14. 
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the bank. The bank also will have a contract with the SPE pursuant to 
which it manages (or “services”) the loans in the securitized pool, an 
additional source of fee income.123 Meanwhile, the bank’s base of assets is 
smaller, but that is a good thing. When a smaller bank generates more 
income, fundamental performance yardsticks like return on assets and 
return on equity improve, and the bank’s stock price goes up. The bank is 
now “asset light.” 
Our bank could do more or less the same thing with its corporate 
loans, transferring them to an SPE, which would issue CDOs. 
Unfortunately, there are some sticking points. Here the interest rate profile 
is unattractive. Our bank is large and strong and enjoys a low cost of 
borrowing (in part from its access to deposits), as does its excellent 
collection of borrowers. But even AAA-rated securities issued by an SPE 
must pay a higher rate of interest than the bank does. So the bank loses an 
advantageous spread by securitizing. In addition, CDOs work for 
completed loans but not for committed but undrawn loans: the bank is 
looking for ways to shift the risk of its loan commitments as well. Finally, 
if the bank transfers a loan to an SPE, it must notify the borrower or, in 
some cases, even obtain the borrower’s consent. Either way, the bank’s 
relationship with the borrower, which is built on a confidentiality 
agreement,124 is disrupted.125 
The bank can surmount these problems with credit default swaps. 
CDSs, which first appeared in the early 1990s,126 are derivative 
transactions pursuant to which parties transfer the risk of default on debt 
securities, called “reference obligations.” To sketch out a simple scenario, 
 
 123. Levitin & Twomey, supra note 46, at 37. 
 124. See J.P. MORGAN, THE J.P. MORGAN GUIDE TO CREDIT DERIVATIVES 73 (1999), available at 
http://www.investinginbonds.com/assets/files/Intro_to_Credit_Derivatives.pdf [hereinafter MORGAN 
GUIDE] (noting that credit derivatives allow banks to transfer risk but maintain confidentiality). 
 125. Cf. id. at 8–10 (observing that credit derivative confidentiality preserves borrower 
confidentiality, protecting customer relationships). An additional sticking point should be noted. It is 
common for the originating bank to retain the first loss tranche of a CDO, but if the tranche amounts to 
8 percent of the principal amount in the pool, the bank ends up with no regulatory capital relief. Id. at 
72. 
 126. The precise origin of the CDS seems shrouded in history. Various instruments for separating 
credit risk from other risks, such as guarantees and bond insurance, have existed for decades. But the 
particular derivative form of the transaction seems to date back to the early 1990s. Bankers Trust has 
been credited with some of the earliest deals as far back as 1991. SATYAJIT DAS, TRADERS, GUNS, AND 
MONEY: KNOWNS AND UNKNOWNS IN THE DAZZLING WORLD OF DERIVATIVES 269–70 (2006); TETT, 
supra note 12, at 45–46. Morgan did its first deal in 1993, arranging for the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development to assume the credit risk on a $4.8 billion line of credit to Morgan’s 
long-standing client Exxon, which was facing a $5 billion fine for the Exxon Valdez oil tanker spill. 
TETT, supra note 12, at 46–47. 
  
2013] TRANSACTIONAL GENEALOGY OF SCANDAL 815 
the bank enters into a swap that references a loan in its portfolio. The bank 
is the “protection buyer” and its swap counterparty is the “protection 
seller.” The protection seller agrees to pay the principal amount of the loan 
in the event the borrower defaults. In exchange for this commitment, the 
protection seller receives periodic premium payments from the protection 
buyer, here the bank; the riskier the reference obligation, the higher the 
premium. Economically, the protection seller is selling insurance on the 
reference obligation, making the protection seller “long” on the 
obligation’s performance and the protection buyer “short” on the 
obligation’s performance. From the point of view of the bank, no loss will 
befall it on a loan under a CDS until two defaults occur—first, the loan 
itself defaults, and second, the swap protection seller defaults.127 
The CDS holds out an advantage over securitization because the loan 
the CDS references is not transferred128—derivatives are contracts that 
specify payments based on the performance of external securities; the 
parties to the derivative need not own the securities referenced. As a result, 
the loans referenced by the CDS just sit in the bank’s portfolio as if nothing 
had happened. The bank retains its funding cost advantage accordingly.129 
Effective risk transfer under a swap also frees up room under the bank’s 
internal risk management guidelines for more lending to the client. More 
importantly, risk transfer to another bank means regulatory capital relief. 
Where corporate obligations carry a 100 percent equity capital 
requirement—the full 8 percent—obligations guaranteed by another bank 
require only 20 percent of the 8 percent or 1.6 cents of equity for every 
dollar of principal amount. The regulatory authorities accept bank swap 
counterparties as the functional equivalent of bank guarantors.130 And 
banks do swap with other banks as a means to the end of loan portfolio 
diversification.131 
Unfortunately, to limit the universe of swap counterparties to other 
 
 127. MORGAN GUIDE, supra note 124, at 16. 
 128. There are, accordingly, neither accounting nor tax issues. Id. at 15. 
 129. Id. at 16. 
 130. Id. at 59. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., DIV. OF BANKING SUPERVISION 
AND REGULATION, SR 96-17, SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE FOR CREDIT DERIVATIVES (1996), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/1996/sr9617.htm; BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. 
RESERVE SYSTEM, DIV. OF BANKING SUPERVISION AND REGULATION, SR 97-18, APPLICATION OF 
MARKET RISK CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS TO CREDIT DERIVATIVES (1997), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/1997/SR9718.HTM. Note that the bank protection 
seller must, in turn, support the risk taken with its own equity capital, limiting the utility of the device. 
MORGAN GUIDE, supra note 124, at 59. 
 131. See WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 394 (7th ed. 
2012) (identifying the CDS as a means to limit banks’ risks). 
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banks is to limit access to the swaps market, in which hedge funds and 
other institutional investors that are not primary lenders take on the risk and 
return of corporate lending without actually having to have money to lend 
or the capacity to service loans.132 This is not the only limitation respecting 
the use of CDSs to shift the risk of the bank’s corporate loans. Matching up 
a given corporate loan with a given swap counterparty entails transaction 
costs—you have to find an institution looking for that particular risk. A 
further problem arises if the potential protection sellers want to conduct due 
diligence on the borrower, for the bank’s confidentiality agreement with the 
borrower gets in the way.133 
In sum, the bank wants two things: to shift the risk of corporate loans 
and to obtain regulatory capital relief. A conventional CDO would shift the 
risk of corporate loans by transferring the loans. The bank, however, does 
not want to transfer the loans. A CDS would accomplish the risk shift 
without the transfer. But, in order to reduce transaction costs and surmount 
the confidentiality problem, the loans to be swapped must be bundled into a 
portfolio that can be evaluated as such as is the case with CDOs. In theory, 
a CDS could be done on a portfolio basis. That portfolio CDS, however, 
would not simultaneously satisfy the bank’s second objective of obtaining 
regulatory capital relief.  
B.  BISTRO BREAKTHROUGH 
Bistro solves the bank’s problems. It builds on the “credit linked note” 
(“CLN”), a contraption that literally splices a securitization together with a 
credit default swap.134 
Let’s construct a simple CLN for the bank. Assume the bank is 
 
 132. Or to book the loans on their balance sheets. See MORGAN GUIDE, supra note 124, at 16. 
 133. See TETT, supra note 12, at 57 (explaining that banks were originally hesitant to issue CDOs 
for fear of breaking confidentiality and losing customers). 
 134. Anne Schwimmer & Philip Maher, Derivatives Pros Snubbed on Latest Exotic Product, 
INVESTMENT DEALERS’ DIG., Nov. 29, 1993, at 5. SBC Warburg created a similar structure at the same 
time, a $1.7 billion vehicle known as SBC Glacier Finance, Ltd. Glacier was completely funded via 
CLNs, whereas Bistro had an unfunded super senior position. Ronald E. Thompson Jr., & Eva F.J. Yun, 
Collateralized Loan and Bond Obligations: Creating Value Through Arbitrage, in HANDBOOK OF 
STRUCTURED FINANCIAL PRODUCTS 251, 261–62 (Frank J. Fabozzi ed., 1998). 
  There appear to have been some early attempts to marry securitization with credit 
derivatives, under the name of “credit derivative bonds.” We have been able to locate little information 
about these products. Apparently they were marketed by “derivatives dealers including Citibank, 
Bankers Trust Co., JP Morgan, Merrill Lynch, and Salomon Brothers.” Schwimmer & Maher, supra, at 
5. It is unclear whether any deals ever closed. These products seem to have involved an issuer that was 
a party to swaps on a pool of reference assets, presumably owned by the swap counterparty. The 
product was “essentially a synthetic version of a CBO equity tranche.” Id. 
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seeking regulatory capital relief for a loan portfolio of $700 million 
principal amount. We form an SPE. The SPE sells CLNs into the public 
markets, raising $700 million in exchange for $700 million principal 
amount. Since the SPE is not buying any mortgages or notes from the bank, 
it retains the $700 million and invests it in U.S. Treasury securities. We 
cannot stop here, for at this point the SPE is in a position only to pay its 
note investors the rate on U.S. Treasuries minus its own transaction costs, 
an uncompetitive yield. So we have the SPE enter into a CDS with the bank 
that references the $700 million loan portfolio; the SPE is the protection 
seller, and the bank the protection buyer. The SPE is now getting the CDS 
protection premiums, which enable it to provide a higher yield on its 
notes.135 
But what is the point of swapping with a shell entity like an SPE? The 
answer is the same as the one given in regard to the purchase of a note 
issued by an SPE—it depends on the assets in the SPE. This one has $700 
million of Treasury securities to cover the risk of default on the reference 
portfolio and so makes sense as a CDS counterparty; the SPE is fully 
funded and conducts no other business in which it could lose money, so it 
does not present the counterparty default risk of a real operating entity. To 
the extent that defaults occur in the reference portfolio, they come at the 
expense of the note holders. The SPE will liquidate its Treasury securities 
to the extent necessary to cover its obligations under the swap; as the 
collateral in the SPE disappears, the value of the CLNs declines 
proportionately, with the holders of the SPE’s junior tranches taking the 
first loss, then the mezzanine, and finally the senior. 
Importantly for the bank, the bank regulators accept credit default 
swaps with SPEs as a basis for equity capital relief, looking through to the 
assets in the SPE in setting the capital minimum.136 In our CLN set up, the 
SPE holds sovereign debt securities that have a zero percent risk-weighting 
under Basel I capital requirements, which means the bank no longer needs 
to support the loan portfolio with equity capital.137 For the bank, the CLNs 
add up to a good deal so long as the value of the regulatory capital relief 
exceeds the cost of the periodic payments on the swap. Importantly, the 
relief is only from regulatory capital; there is no relief for purposes of 
 
 135. See MORGAN GUIDE, supra note 124, at 24–25, 74 (noting that the additional risk of CLNs is 
recognized by the fact that their yield “is higher than that of the underlying collateral and the premium 
on the [c]redit [s]wap individually”). 
 136.  Id. at 59–61. 
 137. Id. Note that we could tweak the returns on the CLNs upwards by placing debt securities 
with higher yields in the SPE—securities like AAA CMOs. So doing will have a regulatory impact, 
diminishing the extent of the minimum capital relief. Id. at 60–61. 
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generally applicable accounting principles (“GAAP”) because even though 
the risk of the reference portfolio is transferred from the bank to the SPE, 
the actual title is not. 
We now turn to the Morgan bank in 1997, where transaction engineers 
were busy inventing Bistro. They wanted equity capital relief on more than 
a mere $700 million loan portfolio. Thus, the first Bistro structure sold 
$700 million of CLNs and deposited the proceeds in an SPE, using the SPE 
as a swap counterparty to cover a Morgan loan portfolio made up of, not 
$700 million of loans, but $9.7 billion to 307 borrowers!138 The mismatch 
between the $700 million collateral in the SPE and the $9.7 billion in credit 
exposure referenced by the swap amounted to a considerable departure 
from the traditional securitization model.139 
This was the tricky part. The purported solution lay in a combination 
of credit risk analysis and tranching of the notes issued by the SPE.140 For 
simplicity, assume that the Bistro SPE was structured to issue three 
tranches of notes—junior, mezzanine, and senior (called “super senior” in 
this context). Assume further that the SPE planned to issue and sell only 
the junior and mezzanine CLNs, not the super senior CLNs. It turned out 
that there was no way to package marketable super senior CLNs—the yield 
would be too low to attract buyers.141 Accordingly the deal will be 
structured on an “as if” basis. The SPE will sell $700 million junior and 
mezzanine CLNs, the rights of which will be determined by reference to a 
hypothetical super senior interest. Morgan took this package to the credit 
rating agencies armed with an analysis asserting that it was inconceivable 
that the widespread default on the reference portfolio could exhaust the 
$700 million in the SPE.142 The agencies agreed and rated the junior 
(which made up one-third of the pot) Ba2 and the mezzanine (the 
remaining two-thirds) AAA.143 
So far, so good.144 But the unfunded “super senior” tranche remained 
a problem. Morgan planned to retain the super senior risk on the reference 
 
 138. TETT, supra note 12, at 54–55. 
 139. MORGAN GUIDE, supra note 124, at 75. 
 140. Id.  
 141. TETT, supra note 12, at 53.  
 142.  Id. at 54–55. 
 143. Id. at 55. 
 144. Bistro securities were accepted in the debt markets based on investment-grade portfolios. The 
names of the borrowers and amounts were disclosed to the note buyers; in some European countries the 
names were withheld due to bank secrecy laws, with only the “type” of credit being disclosed. MORGAN 
GUIDE, supra note 124, at 78. The practice was that the loans in the reference portfolio were set as of 
the closing date—there was no active management or trading of the portfolio loans. Id. at 79. 
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portfolio.145 But it simultaneously wanted to get regulatory capital relief for 
the entire $9.7 billion based on the $700 million in the SPE.146 It argued 
that the “real” risk had been transferred to the holders of the junior and 
mezzanine tranches. But Morgan’s regulator, the Federal Reserve Board 
(“Fed”), did not buy it. So Morgan turned around and swapped the super 
senior risk with an AAA-rated insurance company, AIG.147 AIG was paid 
$0.02 cents per year per dollar of risk undertaken in the swap. This the Fed 
accepted, AIG being the functional equivalent of a bank counterparty.148 
The square was circled. 
Bistro was a hit. Morgan promptly marketed the structure to other 
banks looking for regulatory capital relief (and still other banks promptly 
copied the structure and competed with Morgan).149 When marketing 
Bistro deals to others, Morgan finessed the problem of super senior risk by 
standing between the bank doing the protection buying and the SPE doing 
the protection selling by swapping with both. When the smoke cleared, 
Morgan had swapped with its bank customer for the super senior risk on 
the other bank’s loan portfolio, taking the role played by AIG in its own 
deal.150 Having Morgan as swap counterparty on the super senior meant 
regulatory capital relief. Instead of holding eight cents of capital for every 
dollar of loan, the bank would only have to hold a fifth of that—1.6 cents 
for every dollar of loan on its books.151 Eventually, after marketing a bunch 
of Bistro deals, Morgan decided it had accumulated too much super senior 
risk on its balance sheet and looked to swap it with another party. 
Ominously, Morgan went back to AIG, which was always willing to take 
the risk.152 
C.  SUMMARY 
Morgan’s Bistro followed from the same motivation as First 
Executive’s CDO. In both cases a regulated financial company devised an 
 
 145.  TETT, supra note 12, at 63–64. 
 146. Id. at 55. 
 147. Id. at 60–62. 
 148. MORGAN GUIDE, supra note 124, at 63. 
 149. Id. at 57–58. 
 150.  TETT, supra note 12, at 62–63, 70. 
 151. See id. at 59 (describing capital relief shift from 100 percent to 20 percent). A question arises: 
Aren’t Morgan’s bank capital requirements stacking up as it accumulates super-senior risk on the 
portfolios of other banks? The answer is yes but not onerously so, due to the magic of a combination of 
value at risk credit analysis and trading book treatment. Id. at 75. (“Provided that the third party bank is 
able to apply internal models to its residual risk position in a trading book, this risk will not consume a 
disproportionate amount of regulatory capital for the intermediating bank.”). 
 152. Id. at 70. 
  
820 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:783 
innovative variation on securitization in order to get relief from mandatory 
capital regulation. There also were striking structural similarities. In both 
cases the regulated financial company “swaps” with a self-created entity. In 
FE’s case the swap is the junk-for-note exchange; in Morgan’s case the 
swap is a derivative contract. In both cases an asset-less SPE without an 
equity base gets its asset on credit. 
But there were also material differences. FE filled its SPE with assets 
in exchange for the SPE’s own note, which meant that the SPE obligation 
that bootstrapped FE’s regulatory capital was ultimately undermined by a 
matching obligation on the original junk-for-note swap. The Bistro 
structure brought in new risk capital, both on the sales of the CLNs and on 
the super senior swap. 
Let us strip Bistro down to its essentials. A promoter that seeks to 
swap away the risk of a portfolio of securities sets up an SPE; the SPE 
funds itself with borrowed money; the borrowed money is invested in super 
safe securities that support a swap between the SPE and the promoter; and 
the SPE’s note holders assume the economic risk of a decrease in the value 
of the promoter’s securities portfolio, taking as compensation the swap 
premium and the interest on the collateral—the SPE’s super safe 
investment in Treasuries. 
The structure could be tweaked in various ways. Could Treasuries be 
replaced with any other valuable securities as collateral? Could the outside 
investors be entities other than buyers in the market for securitized notes? 
Might not another mode of financing do just as well? In Part IV we will see 
Enron answer these questions in the affirmative, creating a toxic variant on 
Bistro that bears a more than passing resemblance to the failed FE CDO. 
Note also that Bistro employs a derivative contract to effect a hedge 
for the holder of a portfolio of securities.153 That party reduces its risk, 
selling it to another party that seeks to take the risk. This is one of the two 
primary uses of a CDS. The other possible function is speculation—a party 
can enter into a derivative contract to bet for or against the reference 
obligation without actually owning it. Derivatives make it easier to place 
such bets, because the bettor is not required to front the money to purchase 
the asset on which the bet is made (when the bet is that the asset’s value 
will increase, a long position) or to incur the cost of borrowing the asset 
(when the bet is that the asset’s value will decrease, a short position). 
Bistro accordingly could be adapted for speculation as well as 
 
 153. See MORGAN GUIDE, supra note 124, at 74–76.  
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hedging. Nothing requires the party in the position of the bank to own the 
reference portfolio. The reference portfolio can be any debt portfolio, with 
the protection buyer in effect making a bet that the portfolio will default. In 
addition, nothing requires full funding of the SPE by the buyers of the 
CLNs. After all, why pay the full amount of the note where the proceeds 
are going to be invested in Treasury securities or some other low risk, low 
return debt paper? The note buyer can hold onto that capital and make its 
own investments. In this scenario, the Bistro deal cuts to the chase, putting 
the note buyer on the hook as the CDS counterparty.154 After 1999, most 
Bistro deals, by then termed “synthetic securitizations,” had both of these 
features, so that the party in the bank’s position was neither required to 
own the reference portfolio nor to procure full funding for the SPE. These 
variations will be implicated in Goldman’s ABACUS deal, discussed in 
Part VI. 
IV.  THE ILLEGITIMATE CHILD: ENRON’S SWAPS 
Down in Houston, Enron was watching the banks as they 
disaggregated their balance sheets and raised returns. Much enthused, 
Enron resolved to adapt the asset light strategy and high tech financial 
innovation to the old industrial economy, grandly claiming that it would 
transform the fundamentals of industrial organization. Unfortunately for 
Enron, grand claims are one thing and making money another, and the face 
of American industry would remain untransformed. One thing Enron did 
manage to transform was the Bistro transaction structure. But Bistro, once 
Enronized, would blow up in its creators’ faces and bring down their 
company. This part looks at the explosion, highlighting the surprisingly 
close connection between financial innovation at the banks, Enron’s 
business plan, and the transactions at the center of the Enron scandal. 
A.  ASSET LIGHT FROM WALL STREET TO MAIN STREET 
To understand Enron’s business plan is to see the positive side of 
Bistro. One must momentarily resist the temptation to compare Bistro to 
the latest tax shelter and dismiss it as a financial innovation motivated by 
regulatory avoidance and holding out no other advantages. To see the 
 
 154. See Michael S. Gibson, Understanding the Risk of Synthetic CDOs 1 (Fed. Reserve Bd., 
FEDS Working Paper No. 2004-236, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/apaers.cfm? 
abstract_id=596442) (“CDO ‘investors’ take on exposure . . . effectively selling credit protection to the 
CDO ‘issuer.’”). In this scenario, any regulatory capital relief for the protection buyer will depend on 
the identity of the note holder. But because the protection buyer does not own the reference portfolio, 
regulatory capital relief is not its objective. 
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argument in favor is to begin with Bistro’s two building blocks, 
securitization and CDSs. Both enable arm’s-length risk transfers that 
theretofore had not existed. Both facilitate the reallocation of bank 
exposures to non-bank parties willing to take the risks. Securitization also 
opens access to new sources of liquidity and funding by the banks. 
Investors in securities issued by SPEs and CDS counterparties get access to 
classes of investment that formerly were the banks’ exclusive preserve.155 
As more investors take on more risk from the banks, risk becomes diffused 
more widely, making the financial system safer (or so said many prior to 
the financial crisis). 
Bistro’s synthetic aspect also adds something—the opportunity to 
create bespoke products. Risk and portfolio modeling have become more 
sophisticated. Managers need products fitting very specific risk-return 
profiles. Synthetic credit products, unlike primary credit products, can be 
tailored to meet specific demands. 
Summarizing the positive case, transactional technicians at the banks 
created markets where no markets existed, creating opportunities for value-
maximizing exchanges. Their innovations helped complete markets and 
improved the banks’ financial profiles by facilitating active management of 
loan portfolios and increased return on assets. 
Jeffrey Skilling, who became CEO of Enron in 2001,156 was much 
impressed by the pattern of innovation in the financial sector and in 
particular by the resulting increase in return on assets. Financials were 
yielding better returns on capital than the energy industry: “[I]t’s very hard 
to earn a compensatory rate of return on a traditional asset 
investment. . . . In today’s world, you have to bring intellectual content to 
the product, or you will not earn a fair rate of return.”157 
Enron aspired to make like the banks. If the banks could become more 
nimble and profitable by transferring assets from their balance sheets to 
buyers in new liquid trading markets, so could Enron. It would leave 
behind its original business, the asset-laden production and transport of 
natural gas, to become a pure financial intermediary. Enron would make 
 
 155. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, THE JOINT FORUM: REPORT ON SPECIAL PURPOSE 
ENTITIES 7 (2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/joint23.pdf. For some originators, 
securitization also meant access to cheaper borrowing—by securitizing an A-rated borrower could 
segregate a portfolio of assets 90 percent of which, once tranched, could command an AAA rating. Id. 
at 12. 
 156. OnLine Extra: Q & A with Enron’s Skilling, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE (Feb. 12, 2001), 
http://www.businessweek.com/2001/01_07/b3719010.htm?scriptFramed [hereinafter Skilling Q&A]. 
 157. Id. 
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money by making other companies asset light in turn. Much as the banks 
were doing with securitization and CDSs, Enron’s intermediary business 
would create markets where none existed. This wasn’t just an aspiration—
Enron was starting up markets that covered not just energy but anything 
which could be traded—pulp and paper, metals, even broadband services. 
Few limits were acknowledged—only “unique” products (“knickknacks”) 
could not be brought into Enron’s trading space.158 Within the trading 
space, Enron did another thing the banks were doing—it offered a line of 
risk management products, most prominently over the counter derivatives 
addressed to its customers’ exposure to price risks.159 
To see how all of this was supposed to work, hypothesize the creation 
by Enron of a new market in pulp and paper products. Jumpstarting a 
market where none existed meant asset purchases by Enron; to be a pulp 
and paper seller one needs an assured source of supply. If supply contracts 
are unavailable, one must own the source of the product directly, here 
timber tracts. Thus, matching pulp and paper buyers and sellers meant an 
investment in land. Once Enron established itself as a seller, it would bring 
other sellers together with timber buyers. As Enron saw it, such a new 
market could grow spectacularly if many timber users had captive sources 
of supply. Vertically-integrated forest products companies would notice the 
Enron market. At first they would draw on it for marginal supplies. Over 
time they would see that the Enron market had sufficient volume to supply 
their needs at lower prices than did their captive timber sources. They also 
would see that the Enron market made available price stability through the 
purchase of derivative contracts. The product users would add this up: 
where they once purchased captive sources of supply to insulate themselves 
from upward price fluctuations in times of high demand, they now could 
get both the lowest price and price stability through Enron’s intermediary 
operation.160 Unbundling followed naturally: the companies in the industry 
would go asset light, selling off their forest tracts and pocketing the gain. 
Enron, having started the process by buying timber tracts, would in the end 
 
 158. Id. 
 159. See id. (noting Enron’s transformation into a “buyer and seller of . . . energy-related financial 
derivatives”). 
 160. As Enron stated in its 2000 Annual Report: 
In Volatile Markets, Everything Changes But Us. When customers do business with Enron, 
they get our commitment to reliably deliver their product at a predictable price, regardless of 
the market condition. This commitment is possible because of Enron’s unrivaled access to 
markets and liquidity. . . . We offer a multitude of predictable pricing options. Market access 
and information allow Enron to deliver comprehensive logistical solutions that work in 
volatile markets or markets undergoing fundamental changes, such as energy or broadband. 
ENRON, ENRON ANNUAL REPORT 2000, at 6 (2000), available at http://picker.uchicago.edu/ 
Enron/EnronAnnualReport2000.pdf [hereinafter ENRON, ANNUAL REPORT 2000]. 
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divest the hard assets too, and continue to profit on its proprietary market. 
Enron took two further cues from the banks. Just as mortgage pools 
created value by diversifying risk across different borrowers and regional 
housing markets, so did Enron claim to reduce risk for those who bought a 
product through the network of contacts brought together in its market, a 
risk reduction that isolated producer-sellers in the industry could not 
duplicate. Skilling explained: 
[T]he fundamental advantage of a virtually integrated system vs. a 
physically integrated system is you need less capital to provide the same 
reliability. . . . Nondelivery is a nonsystematic risk. If a pipeline blows 
up or a compressor goes down or a wire breaks, the bigger your 
portfolio, the greater your ability to wire around that. So, if for example, 
I’m just starting in the gas merchant business and I’m selling gas from 
central Kansas to Kansas City, if the pipeline blows up, I’m out of 
business. For Enron, if that pipeline blows up, I’ll back haul out of New 
York, or I’ll bring Canadian gas in and spin it through some storage 
facilities. If you can diversify your infrastructure, you can reduce 
nonsystematic risk, which says there’s a . . . very strong tangible network 
effect. . . . But you’ve got to get big, you’ve got to get that initial market 
share, or you’re toast.161 
Moreover, just as the banks tailored risk management products for their 
customers’ needs, so did Enron. It claimed that its financial innovators 
provided a level of intelligence higher than that of a traditionally-conceived 
marketplace: “[We] provide high-value products and services other 
wholesale service providers cannot. We can take physical components and 
repackage them to suit the specific needs of customers. We treat term, price 
and delivery as variables that are blended into a single, comprehensive 
solution.”162 
In the end, Enron aspired to outdo the banks, bringing virtual 
integration to the old economy and a new dawn of industrial organization: 
There’s only been a couple of times in history when those costs of 
interaction have radically changed . . . . One was the railroads, and then 
the telephone and the telegraph. . . . [W]e’re going through another one 
right now. The costs of interaction are collapsing because of the Internet, 
and as those costs collapse, I think the economics of temporarily 
assembled organizations will beat the economics of the old vertically 
integrated organization.163 
 
 161. Skilling Q&A, supra note 156. 
 162. ENRON, ANNUAL REPORT 2000, supra note 160, at 2. 
 163. Jerry Useem, And Then, Just When You Thought the “New Economy” Was Dead . . ., BUS. 
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In Skilling’s projection, virtual integration would replace vertical 
integration and force Big Oil, Big Coal, or Big Anything to split up into 
multitudinous of micro firms, each working a niche. Enron would put the 
whole back together through its trading operation, all the while securing 
lower prices for all.164 The nexus of contracts firm hypothesized by Jensen 
and Meckling would be realized in fact.165 
B.  A BISTRO OPENS IN HOUSTON 
Problems festered beneath Enron’s veneer of big think. Enron had 
been reporting steady increases of revenue and earnings. Its stock rose from 
a low of $17 in 1996 to a peak of $90 in 2000 on expectations of further 
increases.166 Meeting those expectations was becoming more difficult. For 
one thing, there were competitors. It turned out that entry barriers were low 
once Enron opened a new territory to market trading. Dozens of 
competitors were vying for its bread and butter businesses, undercutting its 
profit margins.167 For another thing, Enron had just made a particularly big 
gamble that was not coming in. It had invested $1.2 billion to jumpstart a 
market in bandwidth by building a national fiber optic network.168 In 2001 
the broadband operation was burning $710 million a year with no profit in 
sight.169 Worse, the stock market, besotted with broadband in 2000, 
abruptly changed its mind as overcapacity and financial distress hit the 
business. That meant trouble for Enron, whose stock had levitated to close 
to $90 on broadband enthusiasm. Enron’s stock fell along with all the 
others,170 losing 39 percent of its value in the first six months of 2001.171 
 
2.0, Aug.–Sept. 2001, at 69, 74. 
 164. A Survey of Energy: The Slumbering Giants Awake, ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 2001, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/497418. 
 165. Jensen and Meckling took the large firm and explained it as by-product of equilibrium 
contracting by rational economic actors. Given the complexity of relations among actors in the 
complex, agency cost reduction emerged as the problem for solution in the economics of firm 
organization. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 16, at 310. For an explication of the theory, see William 
W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1478–80 (1989). Enron 
aspired to use real world market contracting to unwind Jensen and Meckling’s contractual complexes 
into simpler, more transparent units. With each unit directly disciplined by the market for its own 
product, agency costs inevitably would be less of a problem. 
 166.  C. William Thomas, The Rise & Fall of Enron, 193 J. ACCT. 41 (2002), available at 
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2002/Apr/TheRiseAndFallOfEnron.htm. 
 167.  Wendy Zellner & Stephanie Anderson Forest, The Fall of Enron, BUS. WK., Dec. 16, 2001, 
at 30, available at http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2001-12-16/the-fall-of-enron. 
 168.  Id. 
 169. George J. Benston, Fair-Value Accounting: A Cautionary Tale from Enron, 25 J. ACCT. & 
PUB. POL’Y 465, 474 (2006). 
 170. Zellner & Forest, supra note 167, at 34–35. 
 171. Id. at 33. Enron also had made a number of big-ticket, old-economy investments abroad, all 
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Compounding its losses, Enron had a portfolio of “merchant 
investments” stuffed with large block holdings of stock in technology and 
energy companies. Enron’s income statement had reflected unrealized 
gains on the portfolio as the tech bubble rose. A falling market would do 
the opposite. Exacerbating the problem, the stock issues were illiquid and 
thinly traded; hedges were either expensive or unavailable.172 This left 
Enron in roughly the position of Morgan in 1997: It needed a swap 
counterparty for a portfolio of illiquid investments. As the market was not 
bringing forth that counterparty, Enron, like Morgan, needed to create it. 
1.  Chewco and LJM 
Enron was a heavy user of SPEs.173 This followed from the asset light 
strategy—it was easier to engineer the transfer of an asset to an SPE than to 
negotiate a sale to a third party. It also followed from the need to 
manufacture earnings—once an asset was off balance sheet in an SPE, 
Enron could engineer transactions with it that generated earnings. Asset 
light also meant debt light. Enron needed to maintain an investment grade 
credit rating to maintain credibility as a trading entity, and that meant 
limiting the amount of debt on its balance sheet. SPEs were useful there 
too, for they could be used as off-balance-sheet borrowing conduits. 
Finally, Enron sometimes wanted to transfer an asset to an SPE and book a 
gain but could not find a third-party lender. It went ahead anyway, just 
taking the SPE’s own promissory note as payment. 
Under the accounting rules of the day, Enron’s SPEs fell into a 
residual, somewhat underspecified category.174 As with securitization, a 
 
of which were performing badly. Among others, there was a $3 billion power plant in Dahbol, India; a 
$1.3 billion purchase of the main power distributor to Sao Paulo Brazil; and a $2.4 billion purchase of 
the Wessex Water Works in Britain. Id. at 32 (providing the cost figure for the purchase of the Dahbol 
plant); MIMI SCHWARTZ & SHERRON WATKINS, POWER FAILURE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COLLAPSE 
OF ENRON 194–95 (2003) (providing the cost figures for the Sao Paulo and Wessex plants). 
 172. See WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE 
COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. 77 (2002) [hereinafter POWERS REPORT] 
(regarding stock in Rhythms NetConnections, Inc., the report explains, “given the size of Enron's 
position, the relative illiquidity of Rhythms stock, and the lack of comparable securities in the market, it 
would have been virtually impossible (or prohibitively expensive) to hedge Rhythms commercially”). 
 173. Enron’s 2001 10-K listed more than 3,000 affiliated entities. William W. Bratton, Enron and 
the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1305 (2002). 
 174. Compare ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS AND SERVICING OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND 
EXTINGUISHMENT OF LIABILITIES, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 125 (Fin. Accounting 
Standards Bd. 1996), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas125.pdf (defining SPEs generically), with 
ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS AND SERVICING OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND EXTINGUISHMENT OF 
LIABILITIES, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 140 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2000), 
available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas140.pdf (providing specific guidelines for defining and 
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true sale to a bankruptcy-remote entity was necessary to qualify as an 
SPE.175 It was also thought that 3 percent of the SPE’s total capital must 
come from an outside equity investor,176 who had to have the power to 
control the disposition of the asset in the SPE.177 In addition, the outside 
equity capital had to be “at risk”—Enron, as originator, could not guarantee 
the investment’s results.178 
The outside equity requirement had a way of getting in Enron’s way. 
Enron’s managers wanted deals done quickly and outside risk money could 
be hard to scare up. In 1997, Skilling decided that a cluster of assets (with 
associated liabilities) needed to be put into an SPE on the double. Enron’s 
managers dutifully formed an SPE called Chewco (after the Star Wars 
character, the wookie Chewbacca) to buy the asset with borrowed money 
guaranteed by Enron.179 Enron went on to book “nearly $400 million” of 
revenue and gains respecting transactions with Chewco.180 Unfortunately, 
Enron had never gotten around to finding the 3 percent outside equity 
investor needed to qualify Chewco as an independent SPE, concealing the 
fact. The arrangement came to light within Enron in fall 2001. All previous 
accounting entries respecting the SPE were disqualified with the result that 
Enron’s earnings from 1997 to mid-2001 were retroactively reduced by 
$405 million.181 Meanwhile, the SPE’s return to Enron’s balance sheet 
 
transferring SPEs). 
 175. ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS AND SERVICING OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND 
EXTINGUISHMENTS OF LIABILITIES, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 140, at 4–5, 7, 9–10 
(Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2000), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas140.pdf. 
 176. The 3 percent test is an SEC accounting rule. It originated in a 1991 letter of the Chief 
Accountant of the SEC issued in respect of a leasing transaction. The GAAP authorities were EITF 
Topic D-14, “Transactions involving Special Purpose Entities,” EITF 90-15, “Impact of Nonsubstantive 
Lessors, Residual Value Guarantees and Other Provisions in Leasing Transactions, “ and EITF 96-21, 
“Implementation Issues in Accounting for Leasing Transactions involving Special Purpose Entities.” 
The SEC insisted that there is no bright line 3 percent test and that the level of outside funding should 
follow from the nature of the transaction. William W. Bratton, Rules, Principles, and the Accounting 
Crisis in the United States, 5 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 7, 22–23 & n.50 (2004). The accounting 
profession nonetheless treated the standard as a numerical rule. Id. 
 177. Testimony of Edmund L. Jenkins, Chairman, Financial Accounting Standards Board, Before 
the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 
107th Cong. 11 (2002), available at http://www.fasb.org/testimony/testimony.pdf [hereinafter Jenkins 
Testimony]. This meant that the outside equity holder had to hold at least a majority of the SPE’s equity. 
Id. If the equity participation is minimal—at the 3 percent level—then it must own 100 percent of the 
equity. Id. at 9. 
 178. Id. at 10. 
 179. POWERS REPORT, supra note 172, at 42–44. 
 180. John Emshwiller, Fall of an Energy Giant: Andersen CEO Apparently Testified Inaccurately, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2002, at A4. 
 181. See POWERS REPORT, supra note 172, at 41 (setting out Enron’s annual profit disallowances 
from 1997 to 2000). 
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increased Enron’s total indebtedness by $628 million.182 We will see that 
this was not even the largest SPE disqualification to occur at Enron in fall 
2001.183 
Enron’s CFO, Andrew Fastow, concocted a convoluted solution to the 
outside equity problem. In 1999, he organized two limited partnerships, 
LJM Cayman. L.P. (“LJM1”) and LJM2 Co-Investment L.P. (“LJM2”).184 
LJM1 and LJM2 raised $390 million from institutional investors on the 
promise of a piece of the best deals from Enron.185 In fact, the entities were 
formed to participate as the outside equity investor in SPEs set up by 
Enron, solving the compliance problem that had led to under-the-table 
dealings at Chewco.186 Fastow controlled LJM1 and LJM2, serving as the 
managing member of their respective general partners.187 The setup, rife 
with self-dealing, looked more than a little awkward.188 Indeed, it bore a 
more than passing resemblance to the sham limited partnership FE had set 
up for its CDO swaps. But at least asset light transactions could be set up 
and executed smoothly and quickly. 
2.  Bistro Inferno 
Recall that Enron was worried about the income statement effect of 
losses on a portfolio of tech and energy stocks. Equity swaps might have 
solved this problem. These are everyday hedging vehicles for holders of 
large, undiversified equity stakes, such as executives holding sizable 
positions in their own companies’ stock. Ordinarily the counterparty is a 
financial institution and the swap’s duration is short or intermediate term. 
To describe a very simple transaction, if the stock subject to the swap goes 
up during the period of the swap, the executive pays the bank the amount of 
the price increase. Since the executive is hedging and owns a block of stock 
in the company, the transaction is a wash so far as the executive is 
concerned because the loss on the swap is matched by the gain on the 
stock. If the stock goes down, the bank pays the amount of the decrease to 
 
 182.  Id. at 42. 
 183. See Enron Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 5 (Nov. 8, 2001) (discussing the 
disqualification of additional Enron income). 
 184. POWERS REPORT, supra note 172, at 67–70 (discussing the formation of LJM1 and LJM2). 
 185. The investors included J.P. Morgan Chase, Citigroup Inc., Credit Suisse First Boston, and 
Wachovia; Merrill Lynch, which marketed the interests, also kicked in $22 million. John R. 
Emshwiller, Anita Raghavan & Jathon Sapsford, How Wall Street Greased Enron’s Money Engine: The 
Financial Firms’ Many Well-Paid Roles Raised Many Conflicts, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2002, at C1. 
 186. POWERS REPORT, supra note 172, at 3. 
 187. Id. at 73–74. 
 188. The Powers Report questions whether an adequate separation of control ever really was 
achieved. Id. at 74–75. 
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the executive. The bank in turn hedges its downside risk on the stock by 
selling the stock short or purchasing a put option on the stock. 
But the swap market did not have the depth to cover the equity 
securities in Enron’s portfolio.189 So Enron took a cue from Morgan and 
Bistro and created a series of SPEs to act as counterparties. 
Enron’s first step was to find a 3 percent outside equity investor, a 
step unneeded with Bistro due to different accounting rules. That was 
LJM’s job, and it invested in every SPE in the series. (Whether these 
investments were large enough to meet the 3 percent test is a much mooted 
question.190 Let us assume for the moment that they were.) 
The remaining steps in Enron’s swap setup admit a direct comparison 
with Bistro. The next step, as at Bistro, was funding the SPE followed by 
investment by the SPE. The result was an asset base within the SPE that 
provided the financial wherewithal to support a swap. With Bistro, the 
funding came from outside lenders, with the proceeds of the loan being 
used by the SPE to buy super safe debt securities. With Enron’s SPEs, the 
asset base was Enron stock transferred to the SPE by Enron in exchange for 
a promissory note from the SPE to Enron. In all, Enron transferred to the 
LJM-related SPEs $1.2 billion worth of stock and rights to purchase more 
stock plus $150 million of Enron notes in exchange for $1.5 billion face 
amount SPE notes.191 Enron also increased its shareholders’ equity by $1.2 
billion to reflect the issue of its stock to the SPEs.192 As with Bistro, then, 
there was debt financing, but not from an outside source—it was as if 
Morgan itself had loaned the money to its SPE swap counterparty. As with 
Bistro, the SPE ended up with an asset base, but here that asset base was in 
its own promoter’s common stock, rather than in super safe debt 
securities.193 
Note too that in Enron’s case no money changed hands at the funding 
stage. The SPE was funded by shunting pieces of paper across a table at 
 
 189. Id. at 96–98. 
 190. Id. at 83–84. 
 191. ENRON, ANNUAL REPORT 2000, supra note 160, at 48–49. 
 192.  POWERS REPORT, supra note 172, at 24. 
 193. In one particularly egregious arrangement, Enron’s middle management had no Enron stock 
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consumers. The enterprise flopped rather badly. Rebecca Smith, New Power Saga Shows How Enron 
Tapped IPO Boom to Boost Results, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 2002, at A1, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1017015132933556040.djm,00.html. 
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Enron rather than through arm’s-length investments by outsiders. At Bistro, 
in contrast, third-parties parted with $700 million cash. In fact, the closer 
resemblance lies with the First Executive CDO setup, but at a step down 
the credibility ladder. FE at least transferred a bond portfolio in exchange 
for the SPE’s promissory note. Enron manufactured new shares of stock 
out of whole cloth, betting that its stock market price would remain 
buoyant and cover its tracks. 
The SPEs entered into equity swap contracts with Enron with a 
notional amount of $2.1 billion194 with the SPEs relying on their holdings 
of Enron common stock to maintain enough value to cover any losses on 
the swaps. The shares referenced by the swaps promptly went down, 
however. Across the last five fiscal quarters before Enron entered 
bankruptcy, the value of the referenced stock fell by $1.1 billion.195 Enron 
marked the value of its rights under the swap contracts to market for 
income statement purposes, even though no gain had been realized. The 
swaps, by thus covering $1.1 billion of losses, added $1.1 to Enron’s 
income during the period.196 In the end, the swaps contributed 72 percent of 
the net income reported.197 
Even as Enron was using the swaps to cover losses on its income 
statement, its SPE counterparties were collapsing. The Enron common used 
to fund the SPEs fell along with the stock referenced by the swaps. Once 
Enron stock’s value fell below the SPEs’ exposure on their swaps, the SPEs 
became insolvent. Enron’s middle managers tried a series of seat-of-the-
pants restructurings of the SPEs, concealing the difficulties from the board 
of directors.198 But it was all to no avail. The stock protected by the swaps 
was not going to go back up; the loss had to be covered by the Enron stock 
or not at all and the Enron stock kept going down. Enron finally threw in 
the towel, folding the SPEs and the swaps back onto its balance sheet in the 
third quarter of 2001, restating past earnings downward and unwinding the 
entry of $1.2 billion shareholders’ equity made upon the issue of the stock 
to the SPEs.199 
 
 194. ENRON, ANNUAL REPORT 2000, supra note 160, at 48–49 
 195.  POWERS REPORT, supra note 172, at 98. 
 196.  Id. 
 197. Id.  
 198. Id. at 118–19. 
 199. Actually, that entry never should have been made in the first place. Under GAAP, notes 
received in exchange for a company’s own common stock must be booked as deductions from 
shareholders’ equity. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., EMERGING ISSUES TASK FORCE, 
CLASSIFYING NOTES RECEIVED FOR CAPITAL STOCK ISSUE NO. 85:1, at 1 (1985); SEC Staff Accounting 
Bulletin No. 40, 46 Fed. Reg. 11513, 11522 (Jan. 23, 1981). The newly issued stock is credited to the 
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Enron was bankrupt within a month of these disclosures.200 Later 
investigations would reveal a long list of other sham transactions.201 But 
the LJM swaps were by far the greatest in magnitude and, by virtue of their 
disclosure before the bankruptcy, take pride of place as the transactions that 
brought down the company. 
C.  IMPLICATIONS 
What was so scandalous about these swaps? Bistro holds out a 
comparative tool that helps us appreciate the insidious nature of Enron’s 
structure. Where the Bistro SPE relied on outside lenders for its funding, 
Enron’s SPEs followed the lead of First Executive and did their borrowing 
from Enron itself, which also happened to be the party whose balance sheet 
risk was being covered by the borrowed money. The risk accordingly was 
never really externalized—if the SPE lost heavily on the swaps but without 
exhausting the value of the Enron stock with which it was funded, it still 
would have had no capital left to repay the loan from Enron. Thus Enron, 
having covered $1.1 billion of losses under the swaps in the short run, 
would in the long run have to write off $1.1 billion of SPE notes payable 
(or a portion thereof). The only scenario that would avoid the write-off is if 
the value of the Enron stock in the SPE increased by $1 for every $1 of loss 
covered by the swaps. 
The transaction structure would have been subject to question even if 
the Enron stock had gone up. Stock goes up because of projected earnings 
increases. Earnings projections depend in turn on recent earnings results. In 
this case, Enron was stoking its earnings with a swap contract that derived 
its economic substance from Enron stock, which in turn derived its 
economic substance from positive earnings reports, reports that would not 
be forthcoming absent the swap contract. This causal chain of stock to 
earnings to stock to earnings to stock made the transaction and accounting 
result intrinsically unsound. 
The substance came down to this: Enron issued its own common stock 
to cover a loss on its own income statement. This violates the most basic 
rules of accounting, and indeed, the most basic rules of capitalism. 
Corporations issue stock to raise capital. They then use the capital to do 
 
capital stock account at the purchase price, but the capital stock accounts elsewhere are debited 
(reduced) in the amount of the note. 
 200. Bratton, supra note 173, at 1322–23. 
 201. See Regan, supra note 14, at 1156–62, 1180–86, 1191–95 (describing various Enron sham 
transactions). 
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business and generate income. They are not permitted to skip the step and 
enter the proceeds of the sale of stock directly into income. The value of a 
firm stems from its ability to take the capital and earn money over time; its 
stock market capitalization reflects projections of its ability so to do. Enron 
used SPEs and swaps to subvert the system, using its market 
capitalization—the value of its common—to support the value of its 
common. 
The surprising thing about the Enron scandal is that, for all the outrage 
and fulmination, little attention was paid to the transaction structure’s 
substantive implications. Everybody got the point that Enron’s earnings 
were fake. Almost no one worked through the smoke and mirrors to see 
how Enron had faked it and how fine the line was that separated Enron’s 
fraud from transaction structures that were moving billions daily. 
Significantly, Enron never concealed the LJM structures. Its financials 
provided the financial community an adequate basis to do the analysis 
above and start asking questions about the soundness of Enron’s results.202 
Apparently, it lay beyond the system’s ability to comprehend. Transaction 
engineers were inventing structures that only other engineers could 
understand. The engineers worked with their eye on the asset light prize but 
without working through the implications of downside scenarios, whether 
for the promoter or the economy at large. 
V.  THE STILLBORN SCANDAL: THE SIVS 
Enron also used SPEs as off-balance-sheet resting places for 
underperforming assets and associated indebtedness. The arrangements 
were conditional and put Enron back on the hook for the debt if its stock 
price fell below stated levels. It received its final kick into bankruptcy 
when those off-balance-sheet obligations came due.203 They went off like 
roman candles during its last week of life.204 
 
 202. Enron noted the arrangement in the footnotes to its 2000 Annual Report. ENRON, ANNUAL 
REPORT 2000, supra note 160, at 48. The report tells us of the hedges. Further, “Enron recognized 
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1999, at 59 (1999). 
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Tighter accounting rules followed the Enron scandal.205 Indeed, for all 
intents and purposes, a full set of accounting rules for SPEs only emerged 
following Enron. Prior to Enron, some types of SPEs, such as CDOs and 
other securitizations, were already covered by elaborate rules promulgated 
by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”), a private body 
that sets forth generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”).206 In 
contrast, accounting treatments respecting the residual category of SPEs 
that included Enron’s SPEs developed at the level of practice. The “3% 
outside equity rule” was not GAAP at all, but a convenient inference drawn 
by reporting companies and their auditors from an SEC opinion letter about 
a lease.207 The FASB had been grumbling about consolidation and off-
balance-sheet treatments for years, but never got enough political wind at 
its back to facilitate intervention.208 Enron changed the climate, opening a 
door for a FASB pronouncement on the residual category, described as 
“variable interest entities” (“VIEs”)209 in FASB Interpretation Number 
46(R) (“FIN 46(R)”).210 The objective of the standard was to set out 
principles, as opposed to rules, for identifying when entities related to a 
reporting company but less than majority-owned should nonetheless be 
consolidated with the reporting company due to contingent contractual ties 
between them.211 
 
FINANCIAL ASSETS AND EXTINGUISHMENTS OF LIABILITIES, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards 
No. 125 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1996). It was followed by ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS AND 
SERVICING OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND EXTINGUISHMENTS OF LIABILITIES, Statement of Fin. 
Accounting Standards No. 140 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2000). For the most recent iteration, see 
ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS OF FINANCIAL ASSETS—AN AMENDMENT TO FASB STATEMENT NO. 
140, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 166 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2009). 
 205. See Bratton, supra note 176, at 8–11 (detailing the enactment of stricter accounting rules 
following Enron). 
 206. See William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley, and Accounting: Rules Versus Principles 
Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023, 1043–44 (2003). 
 207. Id. See also BARRY J. EPSTEIN, RALPH NACH & STEVEN M. BRAGG, WILEY GAAP 2010: 
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES 677–78 
(2009). 
 208. Bratton, supra note 206, at 1040. 
 209. See CONSOLIDATION OF VARIABLE INTEREST ENTITIES, FASB Interpretation No. 46, at 11–
12 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2003) (listing the conditions by which an entity becomes an VIE). 
 210. Id. There was also a series of follow-up FASB interpretations. E.g., DETERMINING THE 
VARIABILITY TO BE CONSIDERED IN APPLYING FASB INTERPRETATION NO. 46(R), Staff Position No. 
FIN 46(R) (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2006). 
 211. The bank regulators would not produce a response to Enron abuses until 2007. In 2003, in the 
wake of Enron, the U.S. Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations called on federal financial 
regulators to “immediately initiate a one-time, joint review of banks and securities firms participating in 
complex structured finance products with U.S. public companies to identify those structured finance 
products, transactions, or practices which facilitate a U.S. public company’s use of deceptive 
accounting in its financial statements or reports.” PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE 
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In the wake of Enron, the FASB’s prior rules-based approach to 
standard setting had been widely criticized as ineffective and 
manipulable.212 FIN 46(R) showed that the FASB had internalized the 
criticism and was eminently capable of taking a principles-based approach. 
The new standard elevated substance over form, looking through to the 
economic risks of enterprise regardless of legal form.213 Historically, 
consolidation followed from control in the form of ownership of a majority 
of the voting equity. SPEs revealed this approach’s limitations. Exhaustive 
contractual instructions and high leverage combined to render the equity 
interest more nominal than real, a formal incident without relevance to 
either the entity’s management or its risks and returns, including the 
residual risk and return. FIN 46(R) abandoned “equity ownership” as the 
determinative mode of participation in favor of an open-ended concept of 
“subordinated financial support.” If a party was exposed to most of the 
entity’s losses, to most of the entity’s gains, or to both, consolidation would 
follow.214 Sponsorship also mattered: on some fact patterns, the fact that an 
interest holder “designed” the entity (or participated significantly therein) 
 
S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, FISHTAIL, BACCHUS, SUNDANCE, AND SLAPSHOT: FOUR 
ENRON TRANSACTIONS FUNDED AND FACILITATED BY U.S. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 36–37 (2003). 
Delayed by intense lobbying, it took four years for the federal regulators to issue their final 
“Interagency Statement on Sound Practices Concerning Elevated Risk Complex Structured Finance 
Activities.” See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: 
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 205 (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-
FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [hereinafter FCIC FINAL Report] (outlining reasons for the final statement’s 
delay). The guidance instructed financial institutions to apply greater diligence, be more circumspect, 
and better document elevated risk complex structured finance activities. Examples of such activities 
were deals that: 
[l]ack economic substance or business purpose; [were] designed or used primarily for 
questionable accounting, regulatory, or tax objectives, particularly when the transactions are 
executed at year end or at the end of a reporting period for the customer; [r]aise concerns that 
the client will report or disclose the transaction in its public filings or financial statements in a 
manner that is materially misleading or inconsistent with the substance of the transaction or 
applicable regulatory or accounting requirements; [i]nvolve circular transfers of risk (either 
between the financial institution and the customer or between the customer and other related 
parties) that lack economic substance or business purpose; [and] [i]nvolve oral or 
undocumented agreements that, when taken into account, would have a material impact on the 
regulatory, tax, or accounting treatment of the related transaction, or the client’s disclosure 
obligations.  
72 Fed. Reg. 1372, 1378 (Jan. 11, 2007). This guidance did not contemplate transactions that banks 
undertook for themselves, such as the creation of SIVs. Instead, it was designed to prevent banks from 
facilitating Enrons, not making their own Enrons. 
 212. Bratton, supra note 206, at 1040. 
 213. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, GUIDE TO ACCOUNTING FOR VARIABLE INTEREST 
ENTITIES: FIN 46R AND OTHER RELATED ISSUES 54–55 (2007) [hereinafter 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS] (detailing the new principle-based approach). 
 214. EPSTEIN, NACH & BRAGG, supra note 207, at 684. 
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brought the entity into the VIE category.215 
Consider a hypothetical. A sponsor floats an SPE, financing it with 3 
percent outside equity and 80 percent outside debt. The remaining 17 
percent of financing is a subordinated loan from the sponsor to the SPE. 
The sponsor has also issued a guarantee to the lender representing half of 
the outside debt. There would be a case for consolidation under FIN 46(R) 
because the sponsor, while having provided only 17 percent of the capital, 
bears the next 57 percent of the loss after the 3 percent outside equity and 
thus most of the risk of loss on the entity. More generally, if the outside 
equity amounted to less than 10 percent of the total invested in the SPE, 
substantive scrutiny of contractual ties to a sponsor is particularly likely 
under FIN 46(R). Since an equity layer under 10 percent was too thin to 
soak up the expected losses, other interest holders potentially could be 
deemed to hold the residual economic interest, or in the FASB’s 
terminology, the “primary beneficiary.” 
FIN 46(R) was a big step forward. Even so, the big banks managed to 
continue with Enron-style off-balance-sheet investing and borrowing 
without triggering consolidation. Their purpose was to expand levered debt 
portfolios without showing the borrowing on their own balance sheets. 
SPEs called Structured Investment Vehicles or SIVs were the means.216 
At their height, SIVs were a $400 billion cutting-edge part of the 
financial sector.217 They were touted as efficient financial innovation,218 the 
“Rolls-Royce of modern finance,”219 and a must-have for any self-
respecting major financial institution.220 Yet the entire SIV sector 
disappeared in little over a year between 2007 and 2008. The collapse of 
the SIVs was a major step toward complete market breakdown in the fall of 
2008. Despite this, the SIVs have attracted comparatively little attention, 
both because their failure was dwarfed by later events and because they 
were a little-known, esoteric part of the already complex structured finance 
landscape. In our view, the demise of the SIVs is the scandal that never 
 
 215. More particularly, FIN 46(R) has a scope exception for conventional operating businesses 
that is blocked for a designing interest holder. Id. at 682. 
 216. Once-Thriving SIV Market In Financial Throes, ASSET BACKED ALERT (Feb. 22, 2008), 
http://www.securitization.net/news/article.asp?id=364&aid=7988. 
 217. John Mauldin, Taking Out the SIV Garbage, SAFE HAVEN (Oct. 20, 2007), 
http://www.safehaven.com/article/8662/taking-out-the-siv-garbage.
 
 218. See, e.g., Donna Mitchell, SIV Market Grows, So Do SIV-lites, ASSET SECURITIZATION REP. 
(Aug. 21, 2006), available at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-149763401.html. 
 219. HENRY TABE, THE UNRAVELLING OF STRUCTURED INVESTMENT VEHICLES: HOW LIQUIDITY 
LEAKED THROUGH SIVS 8 (2010). 
 220. Id. 
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was, but should have been. 
A.  STRUCTURED INVESTMENT VEHICLES 
The origins of the SIVs, like those of Bistro, lay in bank capital 
regulations. The first round of risk-weighted bank capital regulations 
(Basel I) went into effect in 1988. Basel I made it expensive for banks to 
hold certain types of assets. Citigroup recognized that by creating an SPE 
and transferring high risk-weight assets to the SPE, it could reduce its 
regulatory capital requirements while at the same time using the structure 
of the SPE to retain the economic benefits of the high risk-weight assets.221 
The result was Alpha, the first SIV.222 
The purpose, then, of a SIV was to do the same business as a bank, 
arbitraging the spread in yields between long-term debt investments and 
short-term liabilities but without relying on deposit-based funding. SIVs 
had diversified portfolios of actively-managed, highly rated assets funded 
through the issuance of medium-term notes and commercial paper. They 
combined features of hedge funds, securitization, and traditional 
banking.223 Like hedge funds, SIVs were thinly regulated and had a highly 
sophisticated investor base.224 Also like hedge funds, the SIVs had 
sponsors who maintained a continuing advisory relationship; the better the 
SIV’s returns, the higher the stream of payments on the sponsor’s 
management contract.225 Like securitization vehicles, SIVs were off-
balance sheet, bankruptcy remote, and constrained in their activities by 
operating limits and guidelines.226 And like traditional banks, SIVs were 
levered with short-term borrowing and long-term assets.227 
The difference between a SIV and a bank was that the SIV took no 
deposits and hence was unregulated—a category of shadow bank. There 
was thus a motivational tie to the Bistro structure. When a bank sold an 
asset to a SIV the bank got regulatory capital relief plus liquidity leading to 
further lending. Similarly, as with plain vanilla securitization, the issuance 
of structured debt by SIVs enabled banks to capitalize the investment off-
 
 221. Id. at 46–47. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 5–7. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 78. 
 226. Id. The sponsor devised an “operating manual” in consultation with the credit rating 
agencies. The manual laid down the entity’s investment and financing strategy, constraining the 
discretion of the manager. Id. at 78–80. 
 227. Id. at 78. 
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balance sheet. There was even a cost advantage. Recall that when Bistro 
was invented, the bank’s cost of borrowing was lower than that available 
through securitization. SIVs solved that problem, earning AAA-interest 
rates that could be lower than the rate paid by the bank on its own 
borrowing. 
SIVs’ assets were generally diversified but included some U.S. 
mortgage-related securities.228 Whatever the asset class, virtually all SIV 
assets were high investment grade, at least at the time of purchase. SIVs did 
not want to be exposed to credit risk, on the theory that a base of super high 
quality assets would lead to a maximal credit rating and a minimal cost of 
borrowing. SIVs raised funds for their purchases of long-term assets by 
issuing shorter-term liabilities.229 And, because all else being equal short-
term liabilities are less risky than long-term liabilities, they have lower 
yields and thus result in a lower cost of borrowing. A duration arbitrage 
resulted, allowing the SIVs to capture a spread. Because SIVs’ debt was 
AAA-rated, they were able to invest in apparently safe assets and still make 
a durational arbitrage profit—the spread between the return on their long-
term assets and the lower costs of their short- and medium-term borrowing. 
As the SIVs offered slightly higher yields than other AAA-rated short-term 
debt, they were easily able to attract capital.230 
Related to SIVs was a smaller class of entities known as SIV-lites 
(memorably referred to by Gillian Tett as SIVs’ “mutant cousins”).231 SIV-
lites tended to invest more heavily in mortgage-related securities than 
traditional SIVs.232 SIV-lites also differed from basic SIVs in that their 
funding tended to be shorter term.233 The weighted average life of SIV-lite 
liabilities was three to six months, half of that of the basic SIVs.234 They 
also tended to have slightly lower leverage than basic SIVs as 
 
 228. Id. at 78. Newer SIVs tended to invest more heavily in mortgage-related securities. Once-
Thriving SIV Market In Financial Throes, supra note 216; Jacob Gaffney, In One Week, Two European 
SIVs Face Liquidations, ASSET SECURITIZATION REP. (Sept. 17, 2007), http://www.securitization.net/ 
knowledge/article.asp?id=421&aid=7625. 
 229. TABE, supra note 219, at 6–7. 
 230. Id. at 122. 
 231. Gillian Tett, Why Financiers Have Missed the New Monster, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2007, 9:50 
PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9ffb0bea-5cac-11dc-9cc9-0000779fd2ac.html. SIV-lites were a 
concept born on the CDO desk of Barclays. NICHOLAS DUNBAR, THE DEVIL’S DERIVATIVES 194 
(2011); Helen Thomas, Barclays and Cairn Capital Declare $1.6bn “SIV Restructuring Success”, FT 
ALPHAVILLE (Aug. 31, 2007), available at http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2007/08/31/6965/barclays-
and-cairn-capital-declare-16bn-siv-restructuring-success/. 
 232. Once-Thriving SIV Market In Financial Throes, supra note 216; Gaffney, supra note 228. 
 233. Primarily via one to three month repos or three to twelve month commercial paper. TABE, 
supra note 219, at 125–26. 
 234. Id. at 129. 
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compensation for their greater rollover risk.235 
SIVs’ capital structures were relatively simple. They had notional 
equity held by Cayman Islands or Jersey charitable trusts (an arrangement 
not unlike Imperial Savings Association giving the junior tranche of its 
second CDO to charity),236 and they issued short-term and medium-term 
debt with a senior-subordinate structure.237 The most junior debt often had 
an equity-like aspect in the form of a performance-sensitive upside cut of 
the SIV’s returns.238 
Why, though, would a bank give up the profit yielded by the spread to 
an independent entity? The answer was that it need not and did not. The 
bank entered into a management contract with the SIV and drained out 
profits in the form of incentive compensation under the contract.239 In 
addition to acting as investment advisors, SIV sponsors acted as dealers for 
their SIVs’ investments and connected their SIVs with debt investors.240 
 
 235. Id. at 128. 
 236. SIVs’ formal equity was generally shares with a par value of $500 or $1000, which were held 
by charitable trusts based in the Cayman Islands or Jersey for tax purposes. Id. at 119. SIVs would 
generally have a Delaware subsidiary. Id. The SIV itself would issue Euro-denominated debt, and the 
subsidiary would issue dollar-denominated debt (often co-issued with the SIV) that was eligible for 
purchase by U.S. insurance companies. The debt would be collateralized by all assets other than those 
pledged for repo transactions. Id 
 237. The majority of SIV debt was in the form of medium term notes (“MTNs”) with tenors of 
one to ten years, but typically of thirteen to eighteen months. Id. at 124. MTNs made up 80 percent of 
the typical SIV’s funding. Id. at 120. The other 20 percent was primarily commercial paper (“CP”) with 
tenors of under a year. Id. The MTN and CP typically received AAA ratings and were tranched by 
maturity and / or in senior-subordinate structures. SIVs also issued subordinated debt in the form of 
“capital notes” or “income notes” with ten year tenors. Id. at 122. The capital notes were the SIV’s 
functional equity, in that they bore the residual risk, and they sometimes had an “equity kicker” that 
gave them excess spread and boosted yields by 200 bps. Id. at 121. The SIV’s managers shared profits 
pari passu with the capital note investors, Id. at 160, and the SIV’s sponsor typically invested in the 
capital notes. SIVs were not particularly leveraged. Their leverage ratio—in terms of senior debt (MTN 
and CP) to capital notes tended to be around 13x, meaning that there were $92.30 in senior debt for 
every $7.70 in capital notes. Id. at 127. Taken as a whole, the weighted average life (“WAL”) of SIV 
liabilities was six to twelve months. Id. at 129. 
 238. Michael Ehrlich, Innovation, Regulation and Financial Bubbles: The Evolution of Structured 
Investment Vehicles 8–11 (Leir Ctr. for Fin. Bubble Research, Working Paper No. 8, 2012), available at 
http://www.leirbubblecenter.org/2012/03/innovation-regulation-and-financial.html. 
 239. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 155, at 55–56; INT’L ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS BD., INFORMATION FOR OBSERVERS 3–5 (July 23, 2008). 
 240. This function also could be outsourced. Former Moody’s SIV analyst Dr. Charles Tabe 
describes SIV compensation arrangements as follows: 
 [M]anagement compensation was structured as a base fee and a performance fee. The base 
fee was typically 25 basis points of capital raised. The performance fee was typically half the 
vehicle’s profits or amounts left after the repayment of senior investors, ancillary costs, and 
the fixed income component of capital note returns (Libor flat or Libor plus a small spread 
which was again set at about 25 basis points). 
 An example might be helpful. Suppose the SIV manager raised US$1.5 billion in capital 
notes and levered this 13.33 times, yielding an asset portfolio of US$20 billion (which was 
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They also were often invested in their SIVs, taking subordinated debt that 
was as a practical matter the equity in the entity and also soaked up a slice 
of the profit. So long as the sponsors were not deemed to exercise control 
over their SIVs for accounting and regulatory capital purposes, it was 
another heads-I-win-tails-I-win asset light play. 
The nature of SIVs’ funding meant that SIVs had to refinance between 
20 percent and 50 percent of their debt every year, more in the case of SIV-
lites. Therein lay the risk. Investing long-term with short-term funds 
requires periodic refinancing of debt in order to match maturities. This 
made the SIVs dependent on steady access to the credit markets. Any 
disruption to capital markets could spell disaster for SIVs that found 
themselves illiquid. 
Relationships between SIVs and their sponsors get complicated at this 
point in the story. Bank sponsors committed to give their vehicles 
“liquidity support,” that is, to provide funding (or to promise to repurchase 
SIV assets) if the external markets proved unwilling. Under Basel I rules, 
the banks were excused from holding regulatory capital against these 
liquidity facilities.241 Such support was limited, however, typically in the 
range of 5 to 10 percent of the entity’s asset base.242 As a result the SIVs 
were highly exposed to disruptions in debt markets and the possibility of 
having to liquidate assets quickly to pay down debt in the wake of the 
lenders’ refusal to roll over their obligations.243 
 
not atypical of second generation vehicles at their apogee). Net earnings after the repayment 
of senior debt and ancillary costs typically averaged 35 basis points of the entire portfolio, or 
US$70 million. Of this amount, capital note investors typically received their fixed income 
payment of US$48.75 million (assuming a through-the-cycle Libor rate of 3%). After 
subtracting this fixed income component and the base management fee of US$3.75 million, 
the vehicle had US$17.5 million left to share equally between the manager (performance fee) 
and the capital note investor (equity component of capital note returns). Thus, the SIV 
manager received a total of US$12.5 million for the year in this example. 
Email from Dr. Charles Tabe to Adam Levitin (July 29, 2012) (on file with author). 
 241. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, app. A, § 3(b)(4) (2009) (10 percent conversion factor for unused 
portions of asset-backed commercial paper liquidity facilities of less than one year maturity); Id. 
§ 3(b)(5) (0 percent risk-weighting for other unused commitments with less than one-year maturity or 
for unused commitments with longer maturities that are unconditionally cancellable by the bank.). 
 242. EMMA-JANE FULCHER ET AL., FITCH RATINGS, THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TRADITIONAL 
ABCP CONDUITS AND SIVS, ABCP/EUROPE SPECIAL REPORT 2 (2008), available at 
http://www.immfa.org/about/faq/ABCPconduits.pdf. Early era SIVs (that is, during the 1990s) were set 
up differently. The bank sponsor offered 100 percent liquidity support for a one-year duration; all notes 
issued were senior. As SIVs shifted to a mixed senior / subordinated note structure, the liquidity 
commitment contracted. Ehrlich, supra note 238, at 7–11. By 2007 only about half of the SIVs were 
sponsored by banks. The other half was sponsored by hedge funds. Id. at 11. Hedge funds sponsors 
contracted with banks for back up lines of credit. 
 243. The risk created by SIVs’ asset-liability duration mismatch is perhaps clearest when 
compared to a similar type of structured financial vehicle, the asset-backed commercial paper 
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Even so, SIV investors often believed that there was unconditional 
100 percent liquidity support, just as there was implicit credit risk recourse. 
Fitch Ratings has observed, “Some investors believed that the investment 
banks that were affiliated to the SIV management companies were 
providing implicit liquidity support. The rationale was the potential 
reputational risk faced by the bank if the SIV defaulted.”244 
 
FIGURE 4.  The Structured Investment Vehicle (SIV) 
In sum, the asset-liability duration mismatch in the SIVs’ business 
model posed a major risk. If SIVs were not able to roll over their short-term 
liabilities, they would have to liquidate their assets to maintain leverage 
 
(“ABCP”) conduit. ABCP conduits only issued short-term commercial paper (ten or equal to or less 
than 364 days), whereas SIVs issued both commercial paper and medium term-notes (“MTN”). This 
means ABCP conduits were more exposed to rollover risk than SIVs. To compensate, however, ABCP 
had 100 percent liquidity facility support. This means that ABCP investors were exposed to credit risk 
on the conduit’s assets, but not to market value risk, as the conduit would not be forced to liquidate its 
assets at market prices to pay off its commercial paper that it could not refinance. SIVs, in contrast, had 
only very limited liquidity support. TABE, supra note 219, at 175–76. 
 244. FULCHER ET AL., supra note 242, at 2. The former Moody’s SIV analyst has noted, 
“Although sponsors had no legal obligation to support their vehicles, it was thought that a sponsor 
would not allow its vehicle to default in senior debt for reputational reasons.” TABE, supra note 219, at 
135. 
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ratios and to satisfy investor redemptions. The business model assumed that 
in the event of rollover failure, the SIV could delever by selling assets at 
marked-to-market values without huge losses. This had been the case prior 
to 2007 on the few occasions when SIVs got into trouble.245 
It seems that no one seriously considered the possibility of a market-
wide freeze, in which a rollover failure would force multiple SIVs 
simultaneously to liquidate assets at depressed fire-sale prices, setting off a 
“death spiral.” This is precisely what unfolded starting in the summer of 
2007, as a panic swept up first the SIV-lites, then the newer SIVs that had 
SIV-lite asset-characteristics, and then finally the older, more-established 
SIVs. 
B.  THE SIV PANIC 
The U.S. residential mortgage market—and thus all the securities 
based on it—began showing signs of stress in the spring of 2007. Some 
subprime mortgage originators had already failed under the stress of 
putback claims from investors.246 But the scope of the subprime mortgage 
problem only became clear on Wall Street in June 2007 when two Bear 
Stearns-sponsored hedge funds displayed signs of distress.247 Both were 
invested in assets very similar to SIV-lites, including large exposures to 
U.S. subprime mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”) and CDOs. 
Bear Stearns attempted to bail out the healthier fund by extending it a 
$1.6 billion collateralized repo line of credit,248 in order to buy the fund 
time to recover. Bear did not extend funding to the other fund, and by mid-
 
 245. TABE, supra note 219, at 136–38. 
 246. Ownit Mortgage Solutions filed for bankruptcy in December 2006; Mortgage Lenders 
Network USA filed for bankruptcy in January 2007. Worth Civilis & Mark Gongloff, Subprime 
Shakeout: Lenders That Have Closed Shop, Been Acquired or Stopped Loans, WALL. ST. J. ONLINE, 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/info-subprimeloans0706-sort.html (last visited Apr. 
22, 2013). New Century Financial filed for bankruptcy on April 2, 2007. Julie Creswell, Mortgage 
Lender New Century Financial Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2007), 
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 247. These two funds, the High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Leveraged Fund and the High-
Grade Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage Fund, were the focus of early SEC financial 
crisis litigation. Complaint at 1–2, SEC v. Cioffi, 868 F. Supp. 2d 65 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 
08CV02457), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2008/comp20625.pdf. 
 248. Letter from Bear Stearns to hedge fund clients (July 17, 2007), 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/WSJ071707_Bear_Stearns_Co.pdf [hereinafter Bear 
Stearns Client Letter]. Originally, Bear Stearns indicated it that it would provide $3.2 billion in funding. 
Julie Creswell & Vikas Bajaj, $3.2 Billion Move by Bear Stearns to Rescue Fund, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 
2007, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/23/business/23bond.html?pagewanted= 
all&_r=0. 
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July, Bear announced that it would seek an “orderly wind down” for both 
funds.249 Both funds lost almost all their value,250 and their failure spooked 
the market regarding anything invested in subprime mortgage markets. The 
market was further unnerved when credit rating agencies Moody’s and 
Standard & Poor’s downgraded hundreds of MBS on July 10, 2007. 
Commercial paper investors such as money market funds refused to roll 
over the paper of the SIV-lites and a run ensued.251 
Absent a rollover, the SIV-lites had to sell assets. Unfortunately, the 
run occurred, not coincidentally, at the very time the assets’ market value 
was falling because of the ratings downgrades, making it harder for the 
SIV-lites to generate liquidity by selling their assets. As the SIVs 
conducted a mass fire sale of their MBS and CDO securities they drove 
down their prices still further.252 Two SIV-lites failed by mid-August,253 
their notes having been dramatically downgraded directly from AAA to 
CCC.254 The precipitous downgrade set off a full-blown stampede from 
anything with the SIV label.255 As one investor noted, “This is an 
environment where there has been a big loss of confidence and nobody is 
distinguishing between apples and oranges.”256 
Many of the SIVs were taken back onto their sponsor’s balance sheets, 
despite the absence of any legal obligation to do so.257 The sponsors were 
 
 249. Bear Stearns Client Letter, supra note 248. 
 250. Id.; Kate Kelly, Serena Ng & Michael Hudson, Subprime Uncertainty Fans Out, WALL ST. J. 
(July 18, 2007), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118470713201469384.html. 
 251. Credit Suisse’s Institutional Money Market Fund’s Prime portfolio alone withdrew almost $9 
billion in funding from the SIV sector between June and October 2007. TABE, supra note 219, at 10–11. 
 252. Paul J. Davies, SIV-lite Sector Raises Fresh Credit Concerns, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2007, 
10:55 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d8ea9a64-5019-11dc-a6b0-0000779fd2ac.html# 
axzz2R2n3YcTx. 
 253. TABE, supra note 219, at 11. 
 254. David Henry, Anatomy of a Ratings Downgrade, BUS. WK. (Sept. 30, 2007), 
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2007-09-30/anatomy-of-a-ratings-downgrade. 
 255. The panic spread from SIV-lites to SIVs proper with the collapse of Rhineland Funding, a 
SIV sponsored by the German bank IKB. Rhineland had nearly $27.3 billion in commercial paper notes 
outstanding in July of 2007. Davies, supra note 253; Gillian Tett, Paul J. Davies & Norma Cohen, 
Structured Investment Vehicles’ Role In Crisis, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2007, 7:28 PM), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8eebf016-48fd-11dc-b326-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz2QybYEltv. Its 
commercial paper investors refused to roll over some of the notes, and IKB refused to provide a credit 
line because it was itself experiencing a liquidity crunch, in part related to the failure of Sachsen 
Funding, a $7 billion SIV-lite IKB sponsored. Tett, Davies & Cohen, supra. The panic then spread to 
Cheyne Capital’s Cheyne Finance SIV. Harald Berlinkicke, Subprime Contagion, RISK, Sept. 2007, at 
105, 106, available at http://www.risk.net/data/risk/pdf/articles/2007/105-107_Risk_0907.pdf. 
 256. Tett, Davies & Cohen, supra note 255. 
 257. See, e.g., Michael Connolly, HSBC’s SIV Bailout May Increase Pressure on Other Banks, 
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 27, 2007), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119612785731704755.html (noting that 
HSBC took $45 billion in SIV assets onto its balance sheet); Aaron Kirchfeld & Neil Unmack, 
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often obligated to provide liquidity puts, but rarely for the full value of the 
SIVs’ assets. The banks provided liquidity nonetheless, assuming the SIVs’ 
debt as they attempted to protect their reputational capital and damper 
distress in the market, perhaps fearing that fire-sale prices would create low 
marks for their own mark-to-market assets, forcing them to raise more 
capital. 
In the end, none of the six-SIV-lites or 28 SIVs in existence in July 
2007 survived; the last SIV, Sigma Finance, failed in October 2008.258 In 
little over a year, all of the SIVs and SIV-lites were either put into 
insolvency proceedings or taken back onto their sponsors’ balance sheets. 
A $400 billion sector of the financial services industry had disappeared, but 
with little public outcry or understanding. 
C.  REVENGE OF THE SIV: THE NON-SCANDAL 
The SIV collapse is the scandal that wasn’t. The scandal lay not in the 
fact of financial collapse—that reran the classic fact pattern of asset-
liability duration mismatch and panic. The scandal lay partly in the 
accounting and regulatory capital treatment: What were these multibillion 
liabilities doing off of the banks’ balance sheets? The scandal also lay in 
the sponsors’ reactions: Since when is it a bank’s business to bail out 
exposed creditors of a separate entity? If the SIVs were the truly 
independent entities the banks had claimed them to be for accounting and 
regulatory purposes, the banks would never have assumed their liabilities. 
It can be argued that the SIV rescue followed from reasonable 
business judgments. For sponsors the move made sense because of 
reputational risks that were real even if there was really not supposed to be 
any recourse, and banks with their own subprime MBS exposure may have 
 
Dresdner Rescues $19 Billion SIV, Follows Citigroup, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 21, 2008), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=arZ_ycdFEkRk&refer=home (noting 
that Dresdner Bank AG took $18.8 billion in SIV assets on balance sheet and a total of $140 billion in 
SIV assets taken back on other banks’ balance sheets); Parmy Olson, Barclays Bails Out Avendis Fund, 
FORBES.COM (Sept. 12, 2007, 2:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2007/09/12/barclays-golden-key-
markets-equity-cx_po_0912markets08.html (noting that Barclays had bailed out four SIV-lites it had 
sponsored, paying one-hundred cents on the dollar despite only being obligated to pay twenty-five cents 
on the dollar); Neil Unmack & Doug Alexander, Bank of Montreal Raises SIV Bailout to $12.7 Billion, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 19, 2008, 4:41 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive& 
sid=aJzO9pEcoL5w; David Wighton, Citi Launches $49bn SIV Rescue, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2007), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6626b45e-a9dd-11dc-aa8b-0000779fd2ac.html (noting that Citigroup 
took $49 billion in SIV assets on balance sheet). 
 258. TABE, supra note 219, at 6. Gwen Robinson, Sigma Collapse Marks End of SIV Era, FT 
ALPHAVILLE (Oct. 2, 2008), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2008/10/02/16576/sigma-collapse-marks-
end-of-siv-era/. 
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been desperate to avoid low marks from fire sales that would force them to 
raise capital to meet Basel ratios. For SIV managers, the sponsor bank 
buyout was the best deal they could get. Yet, the unavoidable fact is that 
the whole SIV game was founded on the benefits of implicit recourse even 
as the SIVs were held forth to the world as standalone entities and were 
regulated (or more precisely not regulated) as such. 
Given that, were the SIVs properly omitted from the banks’ balance 
sheets? It is a nice question. The answer depends on one’s reading of FIN 
46(R). Consider a hypothetical SIV, financed 90 percent with medium-term 
notes and asset-backed commercial paper and 10 percent with subordinated 
notes split fifty-fifty between the sponsoring bank and a hedge fund. The 
trivial equity interest is in a charitable trust. Finally, there is an implicit 
guarantee. 
We will first read FIN 46(R) to require consolidation. The implicit 
guarantee is supposed to be put on the table for purposes of determining the 
appropriate accounting treatment; under FIN 46(R), implicit guarantees 
should be taken into account as variable interests.259 Since the guarantee 
potentially puts the bank on the hook for the entire risk of the SIV, the bank 
absorbs a majority of the economic risk of the entity and arguably should 
be deemed the “primary beneficiary.”260 Under FIN 46(R) consolidation 
with the sponsor’s financial statements is the result.261 Of course, the nature 
of an implicit guarantee is that it is implicit—the guarantee does not exist 
until it is acted upon. This makes it more than a little awkward to include it 
in an accounting treatment. 
Now let us try a different reading of FIN 46(R) under which the bank 
would not be the primary beneficiary as of the time the SIV was set up. 
Under FIN 46(R), a VIE’s “expected loss” is not determined as a matter of 
hypothetical exposure on an extreme downside. It instead follows from a 
present valuation of the entity’s expected cash flows.262 In other words, 
FIN 46(R) looks at the likely, rather than potential losses. Given the 
assumptions inherent in AAA-rated assets, such a valuation would project 
only a small likelihood of loss. For the above bank, a trivial expected loss 
 
 259. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 213, at 74; IMPLICIT VARIABLE INTERESTS UNDER 
FASB INTERPRETATION NO. 46, Staff Position No. FIN 46(R)-5, at 1 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 
2005). 
 260. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 213, at 12. 
 261. Id. at 11. A question does arise: What does it mean to bring an “implicit” guaranty into an 
accounting determination? It would seem that so doing would transform implicit into explicit and with 
it the nature of the obligation. “Implicit” leaves the bank the option to walk away; “explicit” invites 
reliance and binding obligation. 
 262. EPSTEIN, NACH & BRAGG, supra note 207, at 684–85. 
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would be completely soaked up by the subordinated notes. So long as the 
bank did not hold more than 50 percent of the notes, it would not be on the 
hook for a majority of the loss and would not be the principal beneficiary. 
Later deterioration in asset values did not reverse the treatment: FIN 46(R) 
did not require periodic updating of valuation assumptions. Note that under 
this reading, it would make no difference whether the guarantee was 
implicit or explicit. 
Actual bank disclosures were consistent with the second 
interpretation. They make for strange reading today. For example, Citibank, 
in its 2006 financial statements, reported in a footnote that it had $227.8 
billion in unconsolidated VIE assets.263 It added the following: 
The Company may be a party to derivative contracts with VIEs, may 
provide loss enhancement in the form of letters of credit and other 
guarantees to the VIEs, may be the investment manager, and may also 
have an ownership interest in certain VIEs. Although actual losses are 
not expected to be material, the Company’s maximum exposure to loss 
as a result of its involvement with VIEs that are not consolidated was 
$109 billion . . . .264 
The $109 billion presumably regarded only the “explicit” guarantees. 
In any event, it seems to us that a $109 billion exposure is a little too large 
to be popped off without further explanation in a footnote. 
Yet the SIV episode prompted no enforcement actions concerning bad 
accounting treatments or audit failure, although there certainly was 
criticism once the red ink started to flow.265 By hypothesis, either the 
implicit guarantees were deemed appropriately left off the table when the 
accounting treatment was determined, or low risk of loss valuations made 
all guarantees irrelevant for accounting treatment purposes. 
Significantly, the FASB significantly amended FIN 46(R) in the 2009 
 
 263. Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 147 (Feb. 23, 2007), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/831001/000119312507038505/d10k.htm#fin49490_57. 
 264. Id. See also Bank of Am. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 132 (Feb. 28, 2007), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/70858/000119312507042036/d10k.htm 
(explaining that Bank of America had $51.9 billion of assets in unconsolidated VIEs, and its total 
maximum loss exposure for these VIEs was $46 billion); SunTrust Banks, Inc., Annual Report (Form 
10-K), at 48 (Mar. 1, 2007) available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/750556/ 
000119312507043429/d10k.htm (explaining that SunTrust had $2.2 billion of assets in unconsolidated 
VIEs, and its total maximum loss exposure for these VIEs was $32.2 million). 
 265. See Jonathan Weil, Citigroup SIV Accounting Looks Tough to Defend, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 24, 
2007, 12:13 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a6dgIOAfMIrI 
(criticizing Citigroup’s accounting analysis). 
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Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 167.266 The new rule, 
which flows through to bank capital regulation,267 recasts the primary 
beneficiary inquiry, emphasizing the power to direct the activities that 
“most significantly impact the entity’s economic performance,”268 in 
addition to the majority risk of loss. The effect is to make it more likely 
that a sponsor that enters into a management contract with an SPE will be 
deemed the primary beneficiary, particularly if the contract includes 
performance-based compensation. Additionally, quantitative analysis is to 
be displaced by a qualitative approach.269 In other words, primary 
beneficiary status is no longer determined by loss percentage numbers. 
Finally, a sponsor’s status must be reconsidered on a going concern basis, 
and financial distress can trigger a change in treatment.270 Apply these 
factors, and the SIVs would have been consolidated.271 
D.  ENRON REDUX? 
Enron and the SIV collapse certainly are distinguishable: scandal in 
the former case, no scandal in the latter. Enron was self-consciously 
shunting junk assets away from itself, doing everything it could to 
construct transactions that pumped its earnings in the process. The banks 
that set up SIVs apparently thought in good faith that an AAA credit rating 
implied safety and soundness. Enron also pushed the accounting rules 
much harder than did the banks, and when it all came tumbling down, 
Enron resorted to concealment. 
But the benefit of hindsight permits us to identify core properties in 
common. Both cases involved sales to captive entities that turned out to be 
 
 266. AMENDMENTS TO FASB INTERPRETATION NO. 46(R), Statement of Fin. Accounting 
Standards No. 167 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2009) [hereinafter SFAS 167]. 
 267. See 12 C.F.R., pt. 3, app. A., § 3(a)(6) (2009) (requiring banks to maintain risk-based capital 
based on consolidation of VIEs if consolidation is required for accounting purposes by GAAP); 12 
C.F.R. § 3.4(b) (2009) (reserving the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s right to require a bank 
to treat exposures as if they were on balance sheet for regulatory capital purposes); 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, app. 
A, § 5 (2009) (optional transition rules for SFAS 167 for VIEs); 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, app. C, pt. V, § 41 
(2009) (incorporating GAAP sale treatment for determination of whether risk-based capital must be 
held against securitized assets for internal ratings-based and advanced measurement approaches under 
Basel II); 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, app. C, pt. X, § 81 (2009) (optional transition rules for SFAS 167 for internal 
ratings-based and advanced measurement approaches under Basel II). 
 268. SFAS 167, supra note 266, at 7. 
 269. Id. at 3 (“Judgment, based on consideration of all the facts and circumstances, is needed to 
distinguish substantive terms, transactions, and arrangements from nonsubstantive terms, transactions, 
and arrangements.”). 
 270. Id. at 6 (discussing events that could trigger a change in treatment). 
 271. The FASB’s examples in SFAS 167 make this abundantly clear. Id. at 32–39 (examples 3 
and 4). 
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shams when the chips were down. In both cases the SPEs were ticking time 
bombs, and their detonation had materially negative consequences for the 
sponsors’ financial statements. In both cases, the structures were set up on 
the overly optimistic assumption that highly regarded assets, whether 
Enron stock or subprime CDOs, always retain their value. Risk was 
formally transferred but in substance never left the sponsor. Form overtook 
substance. The accounting standards were gamed in both cases, and the 
FASB reacted in exactly the same way, taking the occasion to redraft the 
standards to assure that the events in question do not recur. 
VI.  THE RIGHTFUL HEIR: GOLDMAN SACHS’S SYNTHETIC CDOS 
On July 15, 2010, Goldman agreed to pay a record penalty of $550 
million to the SEC to settle securities fraud charges arising from a synthetic 
CDO transaction known as ABACUS 2007-AC1.272 The nub of the SEC’s 
complaint was that Goldman, as placement agent for the SPE’s notes, had 
told investors that the CDO’s assets were chosen by an independent agent 
when a hedge fund that was short on the assets had in fact played a 
“significant role” in the selection.273 
The ABACUS 2007-AC1 transaction became the leading symbol of 
Wall Street excess during the housing bubble.274 The deal was structurally 
generic and unremarkable among synthetic CDOs. ABACUS 2007-AC1 
was one of forty-seven synthetic CDOs that Goldman did between 2004 
and 2007.275 Other banks did similar deals; Citibank has agreed to settle a 
similar enforcement action for $285 million, although the district court 
refused to approve the settlement on the basis of the agreed-upon factual 
record.276 
 
 272. Press Release, SEC, Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges 
Related to Subprime Mortgage CDO (July 15, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/ 
2010/2010-123.htm [hereinafter SEC Goldman Settlement Release].  
 273. Complaint at 1–2, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 
1:10CV3229), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp-pr2010-59.pdf 
[hereinafter SEC Goldman Complaint]. 
 274. Goldman also had to deal with an enforcement action by the UK Financial Services 
Authority, which charged that Goldman had failed to inform the FSA that Fabrice Tourre, a Goldman 
employee, received a Wells notice from the SEC, which indicated that SEC was going to bring an 
enforcement action against him. Chris V. Nicholson, F.S.A. Fines Goldman over ABACUS 
Investigation, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Sept. 9, 2010, 3:14 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/09/ 
09/goldman-sachs-said-to-be-fined-30-9-million-in-britain. Goldman was required to inform the UK 
Financial Services Authority about the Wells notice, but did not do so until seven months after the 
notice was issued. Id. 
 275. FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 211, at 145. 
 276. The settlement was announced on October 19, 2011 and involved a $1 billion hybrid cash-
synthetic CDO called Class V Funding III. Press Release, SEC, Citigroup to Pay $285 Million to Settle 
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As a matter of transaction structure, ABACUS was a Bistro replay, but 
with a twist. Bistro, along with First Executive and Enron, involved captive 
entities created to enable contracts that dodged regulatory or accounting 
requirements applied to actual portfolios of securities. The CDSs 
securitized in Bistro were being used to hedge Morgan’s existing exposure. 
In contrast, the CDSs in ABACUS were not undertaken to hedge 
Goldman’s existing exposures. Instead, they were “naked” CDSs, in which 
the protection buyer has no “insurable interest” in the reference assets. The 
CDSs in ABACUS were not hedges, but pure gambles on the reference 
assets’ performance. This means that none of the parties to the ABACUS 
transaction actually owned the referenced securities. Instead, the reference 
portfolio was hypothetical, constructed for the occasion out of the universe 
of existing debt obligations. It was just a list of debt securities. Synthetic 
CDOs like ABACUS had moved beyond asset light and dispensed with 
assets entirely. 
Given a list of securities, bets can be placed on its performance, much 
as a bookie takes bets on the outcome of a sporting event. The Bistro 
structure provides a vehicle particularly well suited for this purpose. Recall 
that the SPE enters into a credit default swap in which it is the protection 
seller. The SPE funds itself by issuing credit-linked notes (“CLNs”). The 
holders of the CLNs issued by the SPE in effect bet that that the referenced 
securities will not default. Given that outcome, their notes pay handsomely. 
The counterparty to the SPE’s credit default swap bets that the referenced 
obligations will default. Given that outcome, it makes a killing, while the 
holders of the CLNs get stuck with a nonperforming investment. Figure 5 
summarizes. 
 
 
SEC Charges for Misleading Investors About CDO Tied to Housing Market (Oct. 19, 2011), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-214.htm. The SEC said Citigroup set up the CDO to 
hedge a proprietary position, rather than acting as a dealer between the CLN investors and a third-party 
short, and failed to disclose that it was using the CDO as a hedge, rather than as a dealer. Id. The 
settlement was not approved by the district court because it wanted a more robust factual basis for 
determining the fairness of the settlement. SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 
335 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals stayed the trial in the district court pending 
appeal of the rejection of the settlement. SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 169 (2d 
Cir. 2012). Separately, Citigroup banker Brian Stoker was acquitted in a jury trial for his alleged 
securities violations in the sale of the CDO. Chad Bray & Jean Eaglesham, Loss in Citi Case Deals 
Blow to U.S., WALL. ST. J., July 31, 2012, at C3, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10000872396390444860104577561380191553796.html. 
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FIGURE 5.  Synthetic Collateralized Debt Obligations (Synthetic CDOs) 
Goldman and the other banks viewed these structures as a source of 
new inventory for their armies of dealers. While a synthetic CDO occasions 
no new investment in producing assets, it does occasion the brokering of 
arm’s-length risk trades between willing long and short investors. From 
Goldman’s perspective, the ABACUS transaction was nothing more than 
putting together matched sets of contracts and making a spread, a normal 
derivatives dealer operation. 
But for the catastrophic losses on the deal following from the 
subprime mortgage market’s collapse, no one would have cared. But when 
the deal performed dismally, Goldman found that not everyone accepted its 
dealer-based framing. A synthetic CDO is not just a swap. It is a swap with 
an SPE “sponsored” by Goldman that was created to issue debt securities. 
When a traditional operating company sells its own securities, it is not 
viewed as an arm’s-length contract seller. A massive regulatory apparatus 
is there to make sure it tells the truth about itself. It certainly can be argued 
that a sale by an SPE in a structured transaction is different and should be 
viewed contractually, particularly in view of the fact that the securities are 
privately placed. But this is ambiguous, uncharted territory. Thus did 
Goldman stumble into a securities law infraction in the position of a 
securities issuer with disclosure duties to its purchasers rather than as a 
dealer in a freewheeling world of caveat emptor. Dealers that manufacture 
their own securities inventories start to look like issuers. 
A.  THE ABACUS 2007-AC1 TRANSACTION 
Goldman created ABACUS 2007-AC1 at the request of Paulson & 
  
850 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:783 
Co., a hedge fund to which Goldman provided prime brokerage services, an 
important source of Goldman’s revenue.277 Paulson had previously gone to 
at least one other investment bank—Bear Stearns—with the request to 
create the CDO, but was refused.278 
Paulson’s motivation for pursuing the deal was a belief that mortgage 
default rates were going to soar. Accordingly, Paulson was looking for 
ways to be short on mortgages. Mortgages, however, cannot be shorted 
directly, as they rarely, if ever, trade.279 A mortgage-backed security 
(“MBS”), however, can be shorted by taking a derivative short position 
using a credit default swap with the MBS as the reference asset. 
Paulson wanted to take a short position on MBS using a CDS. As we 
have seen, a CDS requires two parties: a short, known as the protection 
buyer, and a long, known as the protection seller. Goldman agreed to sell 
protection to Paulson only if it could enter into a closely matched set of 
swaps with a third-party in order to hedge its exposure.280 In effect, 
Goldman was looking to act as a swap dealer, selling protection to Paulson 
out of one pocket while buying it from another party out of the other 
pocket, a very typical arrangement in the swaps market.281 
1.  The SPE 
That third-party protection seller was to be the ABACUS 2007-AC1, a 
synthetic CDO that Goldman created for the purpose of marketing the long 
 
 277. WILLIAM D. COHAN, MONEY AND POWER: HOW GOLDMAN SACHS CAME TO RULE THE 
WORLD 489–90 (2011). 
 278. Complaint at 8, ACA Fin. Guaranty Corp. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 650027/11, 2012 
N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1940 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 23, 2012), available at https://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/ 
fbem/DocumentDisplayServlet?documentId=Npp7667JRe2pWxCEf63SUw==&system=prod 
[hereinafter ACA Goldman Complaint] (“At least one investment bank that Paulson approached before 
approaching Goldman Sachs declined to assist Paulson out of concern for its reputation. Scott Eichel of 
Bear Stearns, who reportedly met with Paulson several times, has been quoted as saying that Paulson 
wanted: ‘especially ugly mortgages for the CDOs, like a bettor asking a football owner to bench a star 
quarterback to improve the odds of his wager against the team.’ According to Eichel, such a transaction 
‘didn’t pass [Bear’s] ethics standards; it was a reputation issue, and it didn’t pass our moral compass. 
We didn’t think we should sell deals that someone else was shorting on the other side.’” (alteration in 
original)). 
 279. Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. L.J. 1177, 
1242 (2012). 
 280. See Submission on Behalf of Goldman, Sachs & Co. at 11, In re ABACUS CDO, No. HO-
10911 (Sept. 10, 2010) [hereinafter Goldman SEC Submission], available at 
http://av.r.ftdata.co.uk/files/2010/04/Goldman-defence-doc-Part-I.pdf (explaining how Goldman 
structured two transactions to minimize its risk). 
 281. See JOSEPH CILIA, FED. RESERVE BANK OF CHI., ASSET SWAPS: CREATING SYNTHETIC 
INSTRUMENTS 13 (1996) (illustrating Merrill Lynch’s STEERS deal, showing Merrill as the SPE’s 
original swap counterparty swapping out its risk with a third party). 
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position on a swap that matched its swap with Paulson. Goldman’s 
synthetic CDO followed the Bistro template. The promoter, here Goldman, 
creates an SPE that funds itself by selling CLNs. The SPE, backed by the 
proceeds of the sale of the notes, enters into a CDS as protection seller. The 
CDS references a portfolio of securities, in this case MBS. The SPE invests 
the proceeds from the sale of the notes in AAA-collateral, typically 
Treasuries. The interest on the Treasuries together with the premiums on 
the CDS flow through to the note holders as interest (and also pay the 
SPE’s expenses). In the event of a default on the reference portfolio, the 
Treasuries in the SPE are liquidated to pay the protection buyer. The note 
holders take the loss. 
Formally, ABACUS 2007-AC1 was a Delaware corporation and the 
wholly-owned subsidiary of a Cayman Island limited liability company.282 
Its assets were securities purchased with the proceeds of its credit-linked 
notes and the right to premiums on CDS on a $2 billion portfolio comprised 
of ninety reference assets.283 No asset substitution was allowed.284 The 
reference portfolio consisted solely of subprime or midprime MBS rated 
Baa2 by Moody’s.285 The reference portfolio was also diversified in terms 
of issuers, tranches, and servicers.286 
 
 282. GOLDMAN SACHS, ABACUS 2007-AC1: $2 BILLION SYNTHETIC CDO REFERENCING A 
STATIC RMBS PORTFOLIO SELECTED BY ACA MANAGEMENT, LLC 19 (2007) [hereinafter ABACUS 
FLIPBOOK], available at http://www.math.nyu.edu/faculty/avellane/ABACUS.pdf. The Delaware co-
issuer was necessary to make the CLNs marketable to U.S. insurers, which are sometimes restricted in 
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FRANK J FABIOZZI, COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS: STRUCTURES AND ANALYSIS 14 (2d ed. 
2006). See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-102c(d) (2012) (limited investments in foreign-issued 
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Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. See Donald Gray Carden & Zey Nasser, U.S. Tax Operating 
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FINANCE 2007, at 120 (2007), available at http://www.globalsecuritisation.com/07_americas/DB07_ 
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order to avoid entity-level U.S. taxation. Whereas RMBS and CMBS can obtain pass-through U.S. tax 
status if they qualify as a Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit (“REMIC”) under 26 U.S.C. 
§ 860A–G (2006), CDOs do not qualify as REMICs unless they hold solely untranched mortgage pass-
through certificates. CDOs avoid U.S. entity-level taxation by being foreign issued, as merely investing 
and holding U.S. securities is not considered as being engaged in business or activity in the United 
States, which would subject the CDO to U.S. taxation. Carden & Nasser, supra, at 123. 
 283. ABACUS FLIPBOOK, supra note 282, at 11–12. 
 284. Id. at 12. 
 285. Id. at 11. 
 286. Id. at 12. None of the assets were themselves CDOs or RMBS backed by option ARMs. Id. 
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2.  The Credit-Linked Notes 
Recall that in Bistro only a part of the risk on the reference portfolio 
was covered by the CDS with the SPE. It was the same with ABACUS. To 
illustrate, if the SPE does not sell its most junior tranches of CLNs, 
tranches comprising 10 percent of the possible notes that might be issued, 
the SPE would not write CDS protection on the first 10 percent of the 
losses in the reference portfolio; the wager is only on losses above 10 
percent, much like a wager on who will finish in the top three in a race, 
rather than on the order of finish of the complete field. The unsold (and 
unoffered) tranches of CLNs are ghost tranches with only a notional 
existence. Flexibility results: synthetic CDOs allow sponsors to tailor risks 
to the specific demands of their investors’ portfolio managers. 
So, even as ABACUS referenced a $2 billion portfolio, the SPE did 
not actually write $2 billion of protection. Instead, it only wrote protection 
for the losses between 21 and 44 percent,287 and then only to the extent it 
sold the tranches of CLNs in that range. With Goldman acting as placement 
agent for a private placement under Rule 144A,288 ABACUS sold slightly 
over half of the CLNs for the bottom 21–34 percent range of its capital 
structure (class A-2) and a quarter of the CLN for the 35–44 percent range 
(class A-1). 
The buyers were IKB, a German bank, which purchased all $50 
million of class A-1 notes and $100 million of the class A-2 notes. ACA 
Capital Management, LLC, which also acted as the portfolio selection 
agent, purchased $42 million of class A-2 notes.289 
Thus, if the $2 billion reference portfolio incurred losses of less than 
$420 million (21 percent), ABACUS would not be obligated to pay out on 
the CDS. If the losses exceeded $420 million, however, ABACUS would 
have to pay on the CDS, but would not be liable for losses on the portfolio 
beyond $880 million (44%). Based on the principal amount of CLNs 
actually sold, ABACUS was liable for just over half of the portfolio’s 
losses between $420 and $700 million (21–34 percent) or up to $142 
million, and for a quarter of the portfolio’s losses between $700 and $880 
million (35–44 percent) or up to $50 million. As to these losses, IKB and 
ACA bore the risk. 
 
 287. We assume, but are not sure, that losses were calculated on the net portfolio, rather than on 
an individual reference asset basis. 
 288. Goldman SEC Submission, supra note 280, at 11. 
 289. It purchased for itself and three CDOs it managed. ACA Goldman Complaint, supra note 
278, at 16. 
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3.  The Credit Default Swap and the Portfolio Selection Agent 
We turn now to the ABACUS CDS. The direct protection buyer from 
the SPE was not Paulson, but Goldman; Paulson was not mentioned in the 
offering documents. As with Morgan and Bistro, Goldman was swapping 
with its own SPE. Yet because of Paulson’s subsequent matched swaps 
with Goldman,290 Paulson, rather than Goldman, was economically the 
short party in interest, just as the CLN holders were economically the real 
long parties in interest. The press has made much of Goldman’s place as 
initial swap counterparty.291 But it was not an unusual arrangement. Many 
CDO sponsors, such as Deutsche Bank and Morgan Stanley, did their 
synthetic CDOs this way.292 There was a business justification: with the 
sponsor on the hook on the swap directly, the CLNs benefitted from the 
sponsor’s credit rating regarding the certainty of the stream of premiums on 
the CDS; Goldman was a safer counterparty than Paulson. 
Indeed, it was not even necessarily problematic for the synthetic 
CDO’s sponsor to be the short as an economic proposition, so long as the 
reference assets were selected independently or negotiated at arm’s length 
between the short and long interests. And such was the practice. Before the 
promoter took a synthetic CDO to market, it designated an entity, the 
“portfolio selection agent” to negotiate the selection of the issues in the 
reference portfolio on behalf of the yet-to-exist CLN investors. For 
ABACUS 2007-AC1, the portfolio selection agent was ACA Capital 
Management, LLC, which would also be a note purchaser. ACA Capital 
Management was a wholly-owned subsidiary of a monoline bond insurance 
company, ACA Financial Guaranty Corp., which also managed assets like 
CDOs.293 ACA was supposedly incentivized to take care in portfolio 
selection because it received a percentage fee on each tranche, with larger 
fees for more junior tranches.294 As ABACUS 2007-AC1 was not an 
actively managed CDO, ACA’s involvement was therefore limited to 
 
 290. Goldman SEC Submission, supra note 280, at 11. 
 291. E.g., Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, Banks Bundled Debt, Bet Against It and Won, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/24/business/ 
24trading.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. Goldman also entered into an interest rate swap and a liquidity 
put provision with the CDO. ABACUS FLIPBOOK, supra note 282, at 15, 50. 
 292. Morgenson & Story, supra note 291.  
 293. For purposes of this discussion the distinction between the entities in the ACA family is 
immaterial and both will be referred to as ACA. 
 294. ABACUS FLIPBOOK, supra note 282, at 27 (“A portion of management fees are subordinated 
and performance based.”). It is not clear if ACA collected management fees on unissued CLNs based 
solely on the performance of the reference portfolio. If so, then the functional management fee was 
substantially higher than stated and partially subordinated to the issued CLNs. 
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selecting the reference assets for the swap.295 After the initial selection, 
ACA’s role as portfolio selection agent was over. 
4.  The Super Senior Swaps 
Recall that the “super senior” tranche of the CDO created a sticking 
point when Morgan constructed Bistro.296 No super senior credit-linked 
notes could be sold out of the SPE, for the arithmetic did not work out. The 
yields on any super senior notes just would not have been competitive. To 
get the Fed to sign off on the deal, Morgan had to find an investment grade 
CDS counterparty to sell unfunded protection on the super senior credit risk 
of the reference portfolio and found that counterparty in AIG. 
When we fast-forward to synthetic CDOs, we find that a super senior 
CDS also has become strictly optional. As no one is looking to the 
synthetic structure for regulatory capital relief,297 super senior comes into 
the deal only because someone wants to make a super-senior bet. As it 
happened, Paulson did. Thus Goldman entered into a CDS with Paulson 
covering losses on the ABACUS reference portfolio across the loss range 
from 21–100 percent. Goldman’s swap with the ABACUS SPE covered 
21–45 percent of the range. That left the remaining 45–100 percent of 
exposure—the super senior—to be shifted away from Goldman via a 
matched swap with a third party. ACA proved willing to be the 
counterparty on the reference portfolio range from 50–100 percent—a 
nearly $1 billion super-senior commitment.298 As with Bistro, this super 
senior CDS was entered into on the side, directly between the parties rather 
than with the SPE. Note that the swap with ACA didn’t quite go the 
distance, covering 50–100 percent but leaving Goldman an unhedged long 
on the 45–49 percent band, a $100 million exposure.299 
The swap left Goldman relying on ACA’s creditworthiness as a 
counterparty to the tune of $1 billion. Goldman was not comfortable with 
ACA and so recruited the Dutch bank ABN Amro to serve as a swap 
intermediary.300 ABN Amro entered the swap on the 50–100 percent slice 
 
 295. The CDO’s operations—namely providing investors with reporting and collecting and 
disbursing funds, were handled by LaSalle Bank NA, in its capacities as indenture trustee, note 
calculation agent, and payment agent. Id. at 19. 
 296.  See supra Part III.A. 
 297. IKB, the German bank that purchased the CLNs, was looking for low-risk weighted assets 
with high returns. 
 298. Goldman SEC Submission, supra note 280, at 14. 
 299. See id. (describing how ABN Amro entered into a CDS with ACA, agreeing to be liable for 
its risk in the deal.) 
 300. Id. 
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of the reference portfolio with Goldman and into a matched set of swaps 
with ACA on which it took a spread for intermediating.301 If ABN Amro 
had to pay out on the swap it would turn around and look to be made whole 
by ACA, which economically was the ultimate long on the senior half of 
the reference portfolio risk. ABN Amro also seems to have had some 
concerns about ACA, for it followed up the matched swaps by taking out 
$27 million in corporate CDS protection on ACA from Goldman.302 Figure 
6 summarizes the critical parts of the ABACUS 2007-AC1 transactions. 
 
FIGURE 6.  Complete ABACUS 2007-AC1 Transaction (elements not 
disclosed in dashes) 
B.  THE HITCH 
Let us put ourselves in the position of a client who goes to the 
Goldman swap desk looking to sell credit protection. It enters into a swap 
 
 301. ACA Goldman Complaint, supra note 278, at 14–15, 19. 
 302. Goldman SEC Submission, supra note 280, at 14 n.3 (noting that the CDS entitled ABN to 
payment if ACA’s credit rating fell below a certain level). ACA was to receive a $4.5 million annual 
premium on the swap from ABN Amro. ACA Goldman Complaint, supra note 278, at 15. 
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with Goldman as the short, fully expecting that the swap desk will then 
hedge, seeking out a counterparty to enter into the short position on a 
matched swap. Now let us put ourselves in the position of buyers of CLNs 
from a synthetic CDO, the reference portfolio of which is selected by an 
independent agent and the swap counterparty of which is Goldman. The 
expectation about the swap desk and the third-party matched swap is 
exactly the same. Indeed, Goldman would have no reason to sponsor the 
CDO if it did not already have or fully expect to find such a swap 
counterparty.303 In the world of derivatives, every long presupposes a short. 
Indeed, Goldman swapped over its short risk starting with its first synthetic 
CDO, ABACUS 2004-1,304 and the ABACUS 2007-AC1 investors had no 
basis for assuming that Goldman would not hedge. Paulson (or the 
equivalent) had to be there. 
But packaging a synthetic CDO is more complicated than acting as 
dealer matching conventional CDS sellers and buyers.305 With a synthetic, 
the reference portfolio is the substance over which the buyers and sellers 
trade risk. It is not a given; it must be created. Therein lay the problem with 
ABACUS. 
ACA was touted to investors as the “portfolio selection agent,” and 
the ABACUS offering materials emphasized that there was an “Alignment 
of Economic Interest” between ACA and the CLN holders based on ACA’s 
compensation and investment.306 ACA’s name was used to sell the deal: an 
internal Goldman email noted “we expect to leverage ACA’s credibility 
and franchise to help distribute this Transaction.”307 
Further, ACA did formally select the assets in the reference portfolio. 
But Paulson also had input on the selection and seems to have vetoed the 
inclusion of several reference securities.308 The result was that a party that 
was economically short on the deal (and thus had every incentive to choose 
 
 303. There was the possibility, of course, that the promoter was hedging a proprietary position, as 
was the case with Citigroup’s Class V Funding III CDO. See supra note 276 and accompanying text 
(discussing the possibility that Citigroup set up a CDO as a hedge). 
 304. FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 211, at 143. 
 305. See Robert B. Thompson, Market Makers and Vampire Squid: Regulating Securities Markets 
After the Financial Meltdown, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 323, 338–39 (2011) (observing how in synthetic 
securitization “the dealer or market maker is no longer a neutral provider of inventory seeking to make 
money on the spread. Rather, like a traditional underwriter, the dealer becomes a producer of a synthetic 
inventory, selling incentives that will distort the neutral market maker function.”). 
 306. ABACUS Flipbook, supra note 282, at 11, 27. 
 307. Felix Salmon, Goldman’s Abacus Lies, REUTERS (Apr. 10, 2010), 
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/04/16/goldmans-abacus-lies/. Some communications went 
from Paulson to Goldman and thence to ACA. SEC Goldman Complaint, supra note 273, ¶ 24. 
 308. Goldman SEC Submission, supra note 280, at 12–13. 
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the junkiest assets in the class) had a voice in determining the economic 
profile of the issuer of the securities sold in the deal. This fact was not 
disclosed to the securities purchasers. 
The omission was arguably material. Why otherwise would Goldman 
make such a show of interposing a properly-incented independent 
decisionmaker at the risk-return margin? But a strong counter argument can 
be made. In this case the independent agent is not only an expert on the 
asset class but a purchaser of CLNs from the SPE. If Paulson’s portfolio 
choices were unacceptably risky, ACA presumably would have pushed 
back. Finally, the other long parties were sophisticated debt investors and 
understood that the deal had to be constructed so as to be satisfactory to a 
short-side bettor, be it Goldman or some ultimate short. 
Now let us thicken the plot: ACA knew that Paulson had its hand in, 
although it is not clear if ACA knew the extent of Paulson’s input.309 At the 
same time, ACA appears to have been misled about Paulson’s role in the 
deal. ACA allegedly believed, based on representations from Goldman 
employee Fabrice “Fab” Tourre, that Paulson was actually going to be 
investing in the ABACUS notes, purchasing the most junior CLNs at the 
first loss position of up to 10 percent.310 That would have made Paulson the 
longest of the longs, rather than the short. Accordingly, ACA had no reason 
to object to Paulson’s involvement, as it is common practice in structured 
finance issuance for the buyer of the most junior or “equity” tranche to 
have a say in portfolio selection.311 Because ACA believed Paulson was in 
fact long, it did not think Paulson’s involvement in the asset selection was 
unusual or contrary to its interest; nor, presumably, would the other 
 
 309. See id. (“There is no indication that ACA ‘rubber stamped’ any of the securities suggested by 
Paulson, or that it behaved in any way inconsistent with the normal obligations of a Portfolio Selection 
Agent.”). 
 310. SEC Goldman Complaint, supra note 273, at 13–15. 
 311. With RMBS and CMBS, the equity or “B-piece” investor has “kickout rights,” allowing it to 
inspect and eliminate assets from a deal before sale. Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, The 
Commercial Real Estate Bubble, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1978264. 
  The infamous Magnetar deals also involved the equity investor selecting the synthetic CDO’s 
assets. Jesse Eisinger & Jake Bernstein, The Magnetar Trade: How One Hedge Fund Helped Keep the 
Bubble Going, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 9, 2010, 11:59 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/all-the-
magnetar-trade-how-one-hedge-fund-helped-keep-the-housing-bubble. In the Magnetar deals, the 
Magnetar hedge fund’s equity investment (the junior tranche) was real, but the Magnetar hedge fund 
was also short on the mezzanine tranches via CDS. Id. Magnetar used its privileged equity position to 
urge the selection of assets that would cause losses not just to its junior tranche, but also to the 
mezzanine tranches on which it was short. Id. The Magnetar’s purchase of the equity tranches was the 
sacrificial lamb, the buy in for being able to select junk assets that it could then short. Id. 
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ABACUS investors have objected.312 
C.  THE RECKONING 
The ABACUS 2007-AC1 reference assets performed dismally, just as 
Paulson had hoped. By the fall of 2007, 83 percent of them were in 
default.313 By January 2008, 99 percent of the reference portfolio had been 
downgraded, resulting in near total losses for ABACUS longs.314 The CLN 
investors lost their investments.315 ABN Amro closed out its super senior 
swap with Goldman by paying $841 million, which Goldman turned over 
to Paulson on its matched swap.316 ABN Amro then turned to ACA for 
payment on its matched swap, but ACA was by then insolvent.317 ABN 
Amro, as a claimant in ACA’s insurance receivership, ended up with $15 
million cash and some “surplus notes” of dubious value.318 Even Goldman 
seems to have lost: it claimed a $100 million loss on the deal, which 
matches its unhedged long position on the 45–49 percent level of the 
reference portfolio.319 
The SEC seemed to have been investigating the transaction as early as 
August 2008.320 Why? The Enron precedent holds out an explanation: you 
can spin structures, get lawyers and accountants to sign off on them, and 
 
 312. ACA seems to have recognized that the 0–9 percent CLN tranche never sold, but not to have 
recognized the significance, namely that Paulson was not long. See Salmon, supra note 307 (observing 
that ACA never intended to sell the 0–9 percent tranche). 
 313. ACA Goldman Complaint, supra note 278, at 18. See also Morgenson & Story, supra note 
291 (reporting that by September 2007, “the ratings on 84 percent of the mortgages underlying [the 
CDO] had been downgraded, indicating growing concerns about borrowers’ ability to repay the loans”). 
 314. ACA Goldman Complaint, supra note 278, at 18. 
 315. Except to the extent they had received payments prior to default. 
 316. ACA Goldman Complaint, supra note 278, at 19. 
 317. Cecile Gutscher & Christine Richard, ACA Agrees to Give Regulator Some Control Over 
Unit, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 27, 2007), http://marketpipeline.blogspot.com/2007/12/aca-gives-control-to-
regulator-to-avert.html (noting that ACA agreed to give up control to regulators to avert bankruptcy). 
 318. ACA Goldman Complaint, supra note 278, at 20. Adding in ABN Amro’s CDS on ACA, it 
seems that ABN Amro (and thus its interim purchaser, the Royal Bank of Scotland) lost $799 million 
on the transaction, less the spread in protection payments made and received on the matched super 
senior swaps. 
 319. Landon Thomas, Jr., A Routine Deal Became an $840 Million Mistake, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 
2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/23/business/23cdo.html?_r=0. It is not clear 
what Goldman’s bottom line was net of fees (such as an upfront premium from Paulson). ACA 
Goldman Complaint, supra note 278, at 10. Goldman may also have received pre-default CDS 
premiums, including those from ABN Amro for the protection on ACA, and the payout on the CDS 
protection sold to ABN Amro on ACA. Also, note that Goldman’s swap desk might have hedged its 
ABACUS exposure. 
 320. Susanne Craig, Kara Scannell & Gregory Zuckerman, Firm Contends It Was Blindsided by 
Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2010, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240 
52748703594404575192460560075600.html. 
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line up blue chip financials as your counterparties, but no one ever pays 
much attention until there’s red ink all over the table. Then they start 
asking questions. The SEC finally filed suit against Goldman in April 
2010.321 Goldman settled within three months for a record amount,322 
having incurred considerable reputational damage from a deal on which it 
may have lost money. 
D.  CONTRACT OR FIDUCIARY? 
We are accustomed to thinking of companies that issue securities as 
legal entities that act through agents—human beings who pull the strings 
and are ultimately responsible for what the firm does. Viewed 
contractually, a conventional producing corporation is a mix of explicit 
contractual instructions and open-ended principal-agent relationships. The 
gaps are filled in by governance institutions and fiduciary law. 
Synthetic CDOs work differently, occupying a higher stage of 
transactional evolutionary development. For all intents and purposes, the 
ABACUS SPE is a firm without human agents.323 All functions are 
performed by contract counterparties like indenture trustees and paying 
agents, and the tasks they perform are ministerial, set out ex ante in 
contractual instructions. Here, at last we encounter a gapless contractual 
firm—the documentation provides complete instructions. ABACUS is, in 
short, the apotheosis of the Jensen and Meckling “nexus of contracts” firm. 
Let us view the ABACUS transaction, thus described, through 
Goldman’s eyes. The advantage of the synthetic deal structure is its 
facilitation of direct manufacture of products—swaps and notes—that can 
be marketed by the Goldman sales force. And, despite the transactional 
complexity, the product brought forth is relatively simple when compared 
to debt securities issued by conventional operating companies. Even though 
a conventional operating company’s debt contract is simpler than the 
product’s, the analysis must still grapple with the factual complexity of the 
company and its business; there will be inevitable opaque patches in its 
profile. Accordingly, the bank that markets the conventional debt product 
 
 321. SEC Goldman Complaint, supra note 273, at 22. 
 322. SEC Goldman Settlement Release, supra note 272. 
 323. While the firm’s Delaware subsidiary presumably has a board of directors and its Cayman 
LLC parent presumably has a managing member (or members), these managing actors have nothing to 
manage and perform only formal functions. Cf. In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 684 F. Supp. 2d 453, 482–83 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that SPE promoter breached fiduciary disclosure duties to Cayman-based 
board of directors but that because the Cayman board was a rubber-stamp, actual disclosure would have 
made no difference to the outcome). 
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will have to invest in disclosure to ameliorate information asymmetries. 
Assuming the debt is unrated, potential purchasers will also have to invest 
in research and then go on to evaluate the debt against the yardstick of their 
existing portfolios; the new debt may or may not fit. 
A synthetic, in contrast, is more transparent—the assets are there on a 
list for all to see, each rated by a credit rating agency. The autopilot 
contractual instructions for the SPE eliminate most operational risk.324 The 
issuing entity, moreover, can be tailored to the preexisting demands of 
institutional debt portfolio managers. Goldman’s role is also different—it 
goes out into the market and finds out what bets actors want to place and 
then sets up the gambling table: step up and place your bet. If you don’t 
like this bet, we’ll construct another one for you. The deal, viewed as a 
whole, looks less like a long-term investment of capital than a collection of 
arm’s-length one-off bets entered into at the swap desk—a series of 
discrete contractual trades without fiduciary overtones. 
Commentators concur, situating the ABACUS fact pattern in an 
arm’s-length trading framework. The choice of strict contract as the frame 
magnifies the policy implications of the SEC’s enforcement action. This 
framework heralds a break in the traditional treatment of the relationship 
between broker-dealers and customers, pushing it out of the contractual 
sphere and into fiduciary territory.325 
This is a legitimate reading of the case.326 Alternatively, it has been 
noted that Goldman literally underwrote the ABACUS CLNs, buying them 
from the SPE and reselling them to the purchasers. From this perspective, 
Goldman is a gatekeeper with an information cost economizing role and a 
reputational interest in assuring the accuracy of the issuer’s disclosures.327 
Perhaps, but Goldman’s role here is more accurately characterized as the 
CLNs’ placement agent.328 Goldman assumed no underwriting risk; this 
 
 324. See Anna Gelpern & Adam J. Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: Workout 
Prohibitions in Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1078, 1087 (2009) 
(describing SPE immunity from bankruptcy and management discretion). 
 325. Steven M. Davidoff, Alan D. Morrison & William J. Willhelm, Jr., The SEC v. Goldman 
Sachs: Reputation, Trust, and Fiduciary Duties in Investment Banking, 37 J. CORP. L. 529, 551–52 
(2012); Onnig H. Dombalagian, Investment Recommendations and the Essence of Duty, 60 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1265, 1270–71 (2011). 
 326. For a hypothetical application of later-to-be-enacted provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act 
prohibiting specified bank conflicts of interest to the ABACUS fact pattern, see Andrew F. Tuch, 
Conflicted Gatekeepers: The Volcker Rule and Goldman Sachs 49–53 (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for 
Law, Econ., and Bus. Fellows' Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper No. 37, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1809271. 
 327. Id. at 56–57. 
 328. The SEC complaint describes, but never labels, Goldman’s role in the transaction. 
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was a private placement and Goldman would not have purchased the CLNs 
(and indeed ABACUS would not have come into existence) had it not 
already identified ready buyers.329 
We would like to experiment with a third, narrower reading that 
focuses on the facts of the case and the SPE structure. On the facts, 
ABACUS is a straightforward fraud case lacking in paradigmatic 
implications. It involves an affirmative representation—Fab Tourre’s 
statement that Paulson would be taking the first loss tranche.330 There is 
also a plausible defense: Goldman argues that between ACA’s own 
sophistication and disclaimers in the documentation there was no basis for 
reasonable reliance on the statement. There is in turn a plausible counter to 
the defense—that Goldman concealed Paulson’s role in the deal, the true 
nature of which was a fact exclusively in Goldman’s possession.331 The 
case, thus stated, poses a choice between caveat emptor and self-reliance on 
the one hand, and investor protection on the other. But the same choice is 
implied by the facts of any good fraud case. Whatever the choice made 
here, the law of fraud emerges in more or less the same shape, and the 
playbook for Goldman and its agents need not be rewritten. 
The case would be harder if Fab Tourre had kept his mouth shut. Then 
the issue would be whether Goldman had an affirmative duty to disclose, a 
duty that presupposes a fiduciary relationship, something that clearly does 
not exist at the swap dealer’s desk or otherwise between stockbrokers and 
their customers. Interpolating such a duty means taking a much bigger step 
than finding an actionable fraud on the facts of the case. But a fundamental 
realignment of broker-customer relationships would not need to be implied 
if the duty arose as an incident of the sponsor-SPE relationship. 
ABACUS, even as its actions were fully determined by a set of 
contracts, was also a firm that issued securities. It was an issuer of a 
particular sort, for it lacked human agents able to make representations 
about itself and its securities. Indeed, ABACUS didn’t even exist at the 
time the representations were made to ACA about Paulson’s involvement. 
Even as the fraud was perpetrated through ABACUS, ABACUS was an 
 
 329. It is also questionable whether Goldman added an underwriter’s bonding function to the 
transaction. Goldman’s brand and savior faire surely helped ABACUS obtain favorable credit ratings—
a type of indirect bonding—but the existence of ACA as portfolio selection agent suggests that there 
were clear limits to any bonding value Goldman brought to the table in a transaction structured like 
ABACUS. 
 330. SEC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147, 151, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 331. See ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 650027/11, 2012 N.Y. Misc. 
LEXIS 1940, at *42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 23, 2012) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss in ACA’s 
action against Goldman). 
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empty shell incapable of perpetrating a fraud. It was a vehicle, not an actor. 
Ergo, it is natural to look through ABACUS to Goldman as its progenitor. 
Goldman created and controlled it; Goldman’s agents made representations 
regarding it. Goldman accordingly was not just a dealer here; it had duties 
to disclose as if it were the issuing entity. 
The case for putting Goldman in the entity’s shoes strengthens when 
we look at Fab Tourre’s misrepresentation. Fab seems to have lulled ACA 
into complacency by portraying Paulson as a participant in a co-venture in 
the entity’s equity. Accordingly, ACA and Goldman were not in the 
position of one-off swap counterparties. Goldman sold the transaction to 
ACA as an investment in a firm—a firm in which Paulson was investing 
first loss, equity capital and so had an interest directly aligned with ACA’s. 
Irrespective of whether Goldman made an affirmative misrepresentation or 
simply failed to disabuse ACA of its misunderstanding, it was a material 
deception, no different than if Goldman underwrote the common stock of 
an operating company after knowingly choosing a CEO whose entire net 
worth was staked on a short position in the company’s stock. 
How strong is our theory doctrinally? It has indirect support in the 
Southern District of New York’s Parmalat decision of 2010, in which an 
SPE promoter was held to owe fiduciary duties to the SPE entity.332 
Whether such a duty somehow flows through to the holders of the SPE’s 
notes presents a question, but the inference arises. Another source of 
indirect support comes from section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933333 and 
section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,334 the control person 
liability provisions. In the SEC’s interpretation of these sections, control 
person liability attaches to actors with the power to direct the management 
or policies of a primary violator of the securities laws, whether through 
equity ownership, contract or otherwise.335 This bespeaks a substance-over-
form approach to fraud liability and Goldman certainly controlled 
ABACUS. Unfortunately for our theory, liability presupposes a primary 
violation by the ABACUS SPE, and any violation here originated with Fab 
Tourre, Goldman’s own agent on the deal. 
The closest analogies for our theory lie in doctrines that, much as does 
accounting when it mandates consolidated reports, consolidate legal entities 
for liability purposes. The corporate law of piercing the veil336 and 
 
 332. In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 684 F. Supp. 2d 453, 479–81 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 333. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (2006). 
 334. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2006). 
 335. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2011) (providing the SEC interpretive definition of “control”). 
 336. See, e.g., Walkovsky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 8–9 (N.Y. 1966) (discussing the conditions 
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bankruptcy consolidation337 are primary exemplars. Unfortunately for our 
reading, the Supreme Court recently rejected a theory that posed treatment 
of two closely related entities as one for federal securities law purposes. In 
Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders,338 a plaintiff sought 
to attach primary liability for a misstatement in a mutual fund prospectus to 
the fund’s investment advisor. But for a placeholder board of directors at 
the fund entity, the advisor entity ran the fund, including the drafting of 
document issued in the fund’s name. Even so, the court took a form-over-
substance approach, ruling that the entity with “ultimate authority” over a 
statement, here the fund, makes a statement for securities law purposes.339 
The cases of Goldman and ABACUS can easily be distinguished from 
the facts of Janus. But we take away a negative implication even so. The 
days when the federal securities laws could be relied upon to cut through 
layers of entities, ferret out a fraud’s economic motivations, and attach 
liability appear to be over. So while scandal and financial disaster have 
triggered an overhaul of the rules governing appearances, bringing SPEs 
into the zone of accounting consolidation, the regime of financial 
accountability remains impervious. It may even accord more respect to 
entities like SPEs than heretofore. 
VII.  CONCLUSION: THE NATURE OF THE FIRM AND 
REGULATION BY SCANDAL 
Scandal presupposes defalcation, but defalcation does not necessarily 
trigger scandal. The banks’ SIV accounting was clearly infirm, but the 
resulting mess did not grow into scandal because the very act that was 
scandalous, taking back the SIVs and thereby showing that they never had 
really been independent, limited the immediate financial pain. Nor was 
there any concealment; the regulators had signed off on SIV structures long 
before. That the SIVs were a financial disaster, then, was not by itself a 
 
under which courts may pierce the corporate veil). 
 337. See, e.g., In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 203–04 (3d Cir. 2005) (adopting a standard for 
determining when to apply the equitable doctrine of substantive consolidation, which permits a court to 
“treat separate legal entities as if they were merged into a single survivor left with all the cumulative 
assets and liabilities” (quoting In re Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., 402 F.3d 416, 423 (3d Cir. 2005))). 
 338. Janus Capital Group, Inc. v, First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2230–01 (2011).  
 339. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302. But see William A. Birdthistle, The Supreme Court’s Theory of the 
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Without Liars? Janus Capital and Conservative Securities Jurisprudence 25 (Georgetown Public Law 
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sufficient cause for scandal. 
Indeed, financial disaster is not even a necessary cause. The junk bond 
market still levitated when the federal government went after Michael 
Milken. Milken pleaded guilty in April 1989; the junk bond market would 
not collapse until October of that year. Milken was targeted because he was 
a financial success whose actions entailed negative externalities. Goldman 
became a post-financial crisis enforcement target for a similar reason. Each 
of the Drexel, Enron, and Goldman enforcement proceedings involved 
securities law violations. But the tie that binds them together in the minds 
of most people is the perpetrators’ free market arrogance. 
This Article has focused on a different tie, the SPE, as manifested in 
Bistro and its variants and asset light business planning more generally. 
Our account highlights strategic use of corporate alter egos facilitated by 
technocratic obfuscation. SPEs are suspicious because no one quite 
understands what they are. No one quite understands what they are because 
these entities take their form, but not their substance, from existing legal 
models. SPEs evolved in practice, and so lack a genesis in a generalized, 
planning intelligence, even as transaction engineers have shaped them to 
serve their sponsors’ immediate financial goals. An operative theory of the 
SPE is emerging, a theory based on economic fundamentals. Even though it 
is a theory of the firm, it does not come out of corporate law. It instead 
comes from GAAP. 
Corporate law is tolerant of alter-ego entities. Historically, these have 
been subsidiary corporations.340 So long as a subsidiary maintains its 
formal integrity, its liabilities are unlikely to flow through to the parent 
company, even though the subsidiary in substance does the parent’s 
bidding.341 It is accordingly unsurprising that corporate law has had little to 
say about SPEs. Indeed, its formalism makes them possible. It registers no 
policy objections: if asset light transactions enhance shareholder value, 
boards of directors should pursue them; the evaluation of concomitant risks 
is a matter of business judgment. When Enron and the bank SIV sponsors 
took the entities’ assets and liabilities back to their balance sheets, it was 
not as a result of some corporate law compulsion. 
But the convention of respect for formal separation has never applied 
 
 340. A related jurisprudence exists in bankruptcy relating substantive consolidation of separate 
entities. See In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d at 203–04 (listing the factors an appellate court considers to 
decide whether it has jurisdiction over a bankruptcy appeal). 
 341. See, e.g., Walkovsky v. Carlton, 223 N.E. 2d 6, 9 (N.Y. 1966) (finding that formal corporate 
separation will generally insulate companies from liability). 
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universally. Unsurprisingly, the qualifications tend to come from outside of 
corporate law. For example, accountants require consolidation of a 
majority-owned subsidiary for financial reporting purposes. Consolidation 
does two things: first, the alter ego’s assets and liabilities flow through to 
the parent’s statement, and second, contracts between the parent and the 
alter ego cannot create profits. 
The whole point of an SPE is to create an alter ego that, like a 
subsidiary, does the sponsor’s bidding but does so without being deemed 
controlled for accounting purposes (and, in the case of a regulated financial 
company, without being subject to regulatory capital requirements). The 
primary reason, as we have seen again and again, is to facilitate super-high 
leverage financing. SPEs proliferated on the theory that super-high 
leverage is appropriate for segregated, super-safe assets. An SPE that has 
no cognizable equity investment tends to be the entity that best serves this 
purpose. 
The Bistro structure is the ideal exemplar. Contracts create the SPE, 
assign its assets, and govern the terms under which the CDO pays or is 
paid. Once the structure is set up, there is nothing for the firm to do. The 
deal documents do not, of course, determine the performance of the 
reference securities. But that is the whole point. With a synthetic CDO the 
messy business of buying and managing risky assets is avoided altogether. 
The only risk investors assume is the performance of the reference assets; 
operational risk is eliminated.342 It is far better to “reference” the assets, 
sell the CLNs, and put the proceeds into Treasury securities, which, among 
all the real assets in the world are the ones that have the least risk and 
require the least effort to manage. To the extent there are profits, the 
contracts in the structure drain them off, while losses are also allocated 
contractually by tranching.343 Add it up and the traditional function of 
equity is eclipsed. Even when a synthetic CDO like ABACUS employs an 
SPE organized as a corporation rather than as a trust, the corporation’s 
board of directors is a placeholder dummy and the beneficial interest is 
vested in a charitable trust. Form prevails over substance. 
The Bistro SPE is a “firm,” but it is a firm in the purest sense of being 
nothing more than a nexus of contracts—a credit default swap here and a 
note there. It is a pure node of contractual risk allocation. But, unlike prices 
on a trading market, contracting nexuses do not coalesce in spontaneous 
 
 342. See Gelpern & Levitin, supra note 324, at 1078, 1087 (discussing investors’ protections from 
risk). 
 343. Id. at 1121–22 (discussing tranching in SPEs as a type of “contractual bankruptcy”). 
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order. They must be created; investors must be solicited. Formal separation 
between the sponsor and the entity becomes operative only once the deal 
closes. Thus did Goldman get into trouble regarding its formation stage 
representations and omissions regarding the content of ABACUS. Until the 
notes are sold, there is no ABACUS, only Goldman. 
Now compare the SIVs, where the sponsors got into trouble at the 
operating stage rather than the formation stage. Where the Bistro structure 
carries super-safe to its logical conclusion, filling the SPE with Treasuries, 
at the SIVs super-safe meant AAA- and AA-rated assets, but not without 
default risk. When an unexpected downside resulted, the sponsors’ regime 
of formal separation was wrecked. Because the outside world associated 
the SIVs with their bank sponsors, the banks proved unwilling to enforce 
their own formal regime. It followed that in substance the SIVs had never 
really been separate.344 
Now consider the role that contracts played at the SIVs. With Bistro 
everything goes on autopilot once the “on” switch is flicked. In contrast, 
the SIVs were managed, and management is an equity function under the 
traditional legal model of the firm. But once again a controlling equity 
interest is incompatible with the SPE business model. The solution was a 
management contract with the sponsor that included a performance-
sensitive fee. The sponsor also took on the junior creditor interest in the 
form of a subordinated note that had performance sensitive upside built into 
its interest rate. The traditional functions of equity—management control 
and residual risk bearing—have been contracted out, but to a sponsor that is 
not consolidating the entity for accounting and regulatory capital purposes, 
despite controlling it and holding the performance risk. 
It is, then, in the nature of a SPE to reallocate the functions of equity 
by contract, even as the SPE uses business forms that presuppose and 
create an equity interest. Given this profile, the original, non-GAAP “3% 
outside equity” rule was profoundly misguided. It presupposed that the 
traditional, equity-based theory of the firm determined the SPE’s economic 
substance, and then conveniently held that separation could follow from a 
minimal dollop of non-sponsor equity capital. The result was Enron’s LJM 
transaction. LJM in turn taught the lesson that outside equity cannot solve 
 
 344. A similar story emerges for credit card securitizations, which have always been founded on 
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Risk Retention Lessons from Credit Card Securitization, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), 
available at www.papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers/cfm?abstract_id=1898763 (discussing card issuer 
bailouts of their securitization trusts). Following SFAS 166 and 167, most credit card securitizations 
were required to be taken back on balance sheet. Id. 
  
2013] TRANSACTIONAL GENEALOGY OF SCANDAL 867 
the SPEs’ separation problem because SPEs are not about outside equity. 
To require it for real is to suppress the business model. 
The FASB, which as a political proposition is not situated to suppress 
trillion dollar business models, figured this out. Its two-step response to 
SPEs in FIN 46(R) and SFAS 167345 abandons traditional legal model of 
the firm and substitutes a new approach tailored for the SPE. Under the 
traditional approach, inter-firm connections follow from equity ownership; 
once the tie is established, inter-firm contracts literally drop out for 
reporting purposes. In contrast, FIN 46(R) and SFAS 167 look at equity 
only at the threshold: if the entity is well-capitalized with equity from 
outside, it is independent and there is no issue; if it is not, then contracts 
determine the outcome of the inquiry into sponsor separation. Thus, loss 
exposure on debt can lead to primary beneficiary status and consolidation. 
Control of business decisionmaking and profit sharing through an 
investment advisory contract can too. Moreover, determination of the 
business model through a controlling document imposed at formation by a 
sponsor weighs in the balance. 
This is a radical rethinking of inter-firm connectedness and firm 
boundaries. The old approach made everything follow from a line of 
separation between the equity interest and the interests of contract 
counterparties—equity was inside the firm, and contract was outside. 
Under the new approach, the line is drawn case by case, based on 
allocations of risk and directive power. Significantly, the new approach is 
very much compatible with a contractual theory of the firm—the firm as a 
“nexus of contracts”—even as it rejects the notion that contract constructs 
devised by SPE technicians should determine regulatory results. If the firm 
is a collection of different contracts, then an “equity” designation by itself 
should not determine substantive inquiries into financial presentation and 
risk capital adequacy. The SPEs teach us that residual risk and control can 
be allocated any number of different ways, only one of which is formal 
equity. The substance of each set of inter-firm relationships needs to be 
evaluated individually. Equity ownership may or may not be relevant. 
This does not go to say that FIN 46(R) and SFAS 167 solve all SPE-
related accounting problems. The SIVs showed that gaming can proceed 
even under a new substance over form regime. Decisions as to treatments 
continue to be opaque, for only the reporting company and its auditor know 
the governing analysis. The outside world gets a look only when things go 
wrong. 
 
 345. SFAS 167, supra note 266, at 2. 
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But the conceptual barrier has been surmounted. That it took the 
Enron scandal and collapse of the SIVs to get us over the barrier is 
unsurprising. The balance of power between reporting companies and the 
FASB guarantees that standard setting is a reactive proposition. In this 
singular, but critical corner of business regulation, scandal has proved a 
necessary driver of incentives. It is in this limited sense a cause for 
celebration. 
In contrast, our look at Goldman, ABACUS, and federal securities 
liability regime shows just how embedded superannuated notions of entity 
integrity can be. In our view, Goldman and ABACUS should have been 
consolidated for securities fraud purposes, with Goldman emerging as the 
securities issuer. But we doubt our theory has much traction in light of the 
Supreme Court’s recent Janus decision. Taking Janus together with the 
formalism of state corporate law, we fear that the legal environment 
remains as susceptible as ever to SPE shenanigans so far as concerns 
financial accountability. 
The SPE is a marvel of modern transaction engineering—a new form 
of corporate alter ego, controlled by contract rather than by equity 
ownership. The SPE has expanded the boundaries of the operating 
companies without law and regulation keeping pace. Only accounting 
principles have confronted the challenge of identifying and corralling the 
SPE’s abusive aspects. Accounting may be the occasion for fraud, but 
when incorporated into securities law, it can be a powerful mandate against 
fraud. While accounting treatment is traditionally derivative of legal status, 
the law now needs to take its cue from accounting and embrace a more 
functional model in which legal duties follow from substantive 
relationships rather than contractual forms. 
